People v Corona (Eric)

[*1] People v Corona (Eric) 2009 NY Slip Op 52107(U) [25 Misc 3d 129(A)] Decided on October 13, 2009 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 13, 2009
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : GOLIA, J.P., PESCE and RIOS, JJ
2007-1319 Q CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Eric Corona, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Deborah Stevens Modica, J.), rendered July 26, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of harassment in the second degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26). Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of said charge. Further, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]). It is well settled that the credibility of witnesses is a question of fact, and the resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, is for the trier of fact, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]). The determination of the trier of fact should be afforded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]). In finding defendant guilty, the jury implicitly accepted the testimony of the complainant concerning the physical abuse she had suffered at the hands of defendant. Although defendant argues that his only intent was to bring the complainant back to the apartment so that they could resolve their differences, even if it is assumed that the foregoing was defendant's ultimate motive, there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to establish that defendant had the intent to harass the complainant in order to achieve said objective. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Golia, J.P., Pesce and Rios, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: October 13, 2009