People v Figueroa (Jesse)

[*1] People v Figueroa (Jesse) 2009 NY Slip Op 50920(U) [23 Misc 3d 138(A)] Decided on May 11, 2009 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 11, 2009
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : RUDOLPH, P.J., TANENBAUM and SCHEINKMAN, JJ
2008-1050 OR CR.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Jesse J. Figueroa, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Village of Goshen, Orange County (Thomas J. Cione, J.), rendered April 16, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of failing to stop at a stop sign and sentenced him to a fine of $175.

Judgment of conviction reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and matter remitted for a new trial before a different judge.

Defendant was convicted of failing to stop at a stop sign (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1172 [a]) after a nonjury trial in the Justice Court at which stenographic minutes were not taken. The trial justice has submitted a very sparse return to defendant's affidavit of errors, thus inhibiting appellate review, notwithstanding that the statute requires that the return "set forth or summarize evidence, facts or occurrences in or adduced at the proceedings resulting in the judgment, sentence or order, which constitute the factual foundation for the contentions alleged in the affidavit of errors" (CPL 460.10 [3] [d]). Although the instant charge was only a traffic infraction, the allegations set forth in the affidavit of errors indicate that the trial was one which should have been readily recalled by the trial justice. We note that defendant should have been advised of his right to counsel (CPL 170.10 [3] [a], [b]; [4] [a]; cf. People v Ross, 67 NY2d 321 [1986]). We further observe that the fine imposed exceeded the maximum as a matter of law (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1800 [b] [1]).
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the interests of justice require that the judgment be reversed and the matter remitted for a new trial before a different judge (see generally CPL 470.15 [3] [c]).

Rudolph, P.J., Tanenbaum and Scheinkman, JJ., concur. [*2]
Decision Date: May 11, 2009