People v Alexander (William)

[*1] People v Alexander (William) 2004 NY Slip Op 50730(U) Decided on July 1, 2004 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on July 1, 2004
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM : 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT:DECIDED July 1, 2004 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE TERM : 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS PRESENT : McCABE, P.J., RUDOLPH and ANGIOLILLO, JJ.
NO. 2003-403 OR CR

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant,

against

WILLIAM R. ALEXANDER, Respondent.

Appeal by the People from an order of the Justice Court, Village of Chester, Orange County (S. Hunter, J.), dated November 19, 2002, granting defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument charging defendant with driving while ability impaired by drugs (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [4]).

Order unanimously reversed on the law, defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument charging defendant with driving while ability impaired by drugs denied, accusatory instrument reinstated and matter remanded to the court below for all further proceedings thereon.

An accusatory instrument must contain nonhearsay allegations of an evidentiary nature providing reasonable cause to believe defendant committed the offense (CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1] [c]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 137 [1987]). The factual allegations must be "sufficiently evidentiary in character and tend to support the . . . charges" (People v Allen, 92 NY2d 378, 385 [1998]). The allegations need not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; indeed, "all questions as to the quality or weight of the proof should be deferred . . . [and] if the prosecutor has established a prima facie case, the evidence is legally sufficient even though its quality or weight may be so dubious as to preclude . . . conviction" (People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 115 [1986]). "[S]o long as such allegations . . . give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v [*2]Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]).

Here, the supporting deposition alleged the time, place and manner in which the offense was committed, the specific drug alleged to be the impairing agent, an admission that defendant had ingested the controlled substance in the recent past, and evidence of the impairment itself, including "glassy eyes" and impaired motor coordination, e.g., the erratic operation of the automobile and the inability to perform several roadside tests of coordination and balance. In this context, the laboratory report, which indicated the presence of a metabolite of Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), marihuana's active ingredient, in defendant's urine, merely established additional admissible and probative circumstantial evidence of the recent consumption of marihuana (see e.g. People v Crandall, 255 AD2d 617, 618 [1998]; Matter of Longo v Dolce, 192 AD2d 157, 159 [1993]; People v Hagmann, 160 AD2d 1125, 1126 [1990]). As defendant was not charged with driving while impaired by a marihuana metabolite, it is irrelevant that the metabolite is not one of the prohibited substances set forth
in Public Health Law § 3306. Finally, defendant's hearsay objection to the report, which the People attached to the accusatory instrument, is not preserved (People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 367) and, in any event, we find the instrument facially sufficient even if the report is disregarded.

Decision Date: July 01, 2004