Clarke v Montgo Realty

[*1] Clarke v Montgo Realty 2004 NY Slip Op 50216(U) Decided on March 26, 2004 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 26, 2004
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT:DECIDED March 26, 2004 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS PRESENT : ARONIN, J.P., PATTERSON and RIOS, JJ.
NO. 2003-1004 K C

CARLENE P. CLARKE, Respondent,

against

MONTGO REALTY INC., Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a small claims judgment of the Civil Court, Kings County (B. Balter, J.), entered on February 25, 2003, awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $2,100.

Judgment unanimously affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover, inter alia, the amounts she paid to the former superintendent of defendant's apartment building as a security deposit and future rent. The superintendent apparently absconded with plaintiff's money, and his whereabouts are presently unknown.

When a principal places its agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence is led to believe that the agent has authority to perform a particular act, the principal will be estopped from denying the agent's authority to do that act upon which a third party has relied to his or her detriment (see Matter of Enright v Ansplundh Tree Expert Co., 271 App Div 847 [1946], affd 297 NY 452 [1947]). The liability of a principal for an agent's acts within the agent's apparent authority is the result of the equitable doctrine stating that when one of two innocent persons must suffer from the act of a third person, the person who has enabled the third person to do the injury must sustain the loss. The principal's liability in this respect is based essentially on estoppel (see 2A NY Jur 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors § 96).

While defendant's manager testified that the superintendent did not have the authority to accept any money on defendant's behalf, he acknowledged that the superintendent was authorized [*2]to show the apartments to prospective tenants and to accept applications from them. Under the circumstances presented, there is no basis to disturb the lower court's implicit finding that defendant's investiture of such authority in the superintendent might reasonably mislead third parties into believing that he was also authorized to accept money for the application fees which had to accompany the application forms or to accept payments of security deposits or rent for the apartments themselves.

In finding defendant liable under principles of apparent authority, the court rendered substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (CCA 1807).
Decision Date: March 26, 2004