Tabak Assoc., LLC v Vargas

[*1] Tabak Assoc., LLC v Vargas 2015 NY Slip Op 51314(U) Decided on September 11, 2015 Appellate Term, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on September 11, 2015
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Hunter, Jr., J.P., Shulman, Ling-Cohan, JJ.
14-425

Tabak Associates, LLC, Petitioner-Landlord-Appellant,

against

Eunice Vargas, Respondent-Tenant-Respondent, -and- "John Doe" and "Jane Doe," Respondents.

Landlord appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Anne Katz, J.), entered May 21, 2014, which granted tenant's motion to vacate a stipulation of settlement and consent final judgment, and for leave to file an amended answer in a nonpayment summary proceeding.

Per Curiam.

Order (Anne Katz, J.), entered May 21, 2014, affirmed, with $10 costs.

While a stipulation is essentially a contract and should not be lightly set aside, the court possesses the discretionary authority to relieve parties from the consequences of a stipulation "if it appears that the stipulation was entered into inadvisedly or that it would be inequitable to hold the parties to it" (1420 Concourse Corp. v Cruz, 135 AD2d 371, 373 [1987], appeal dismissed 73 NY2d 868 [1989], citing Matter of Frutiger, 29 NY2d 143, 150 [1971]). In this case, tenant, now represented by counsel, has demonstrated that she has a potentially meritorious rent overcharge claim, which should not be deemed forfeited by her uncounseled decision to consent to judgment. Under the circumstances, we sustain the court's discretionary determination to vacate the stipulation (see Striver 140 LLC v Cruz, 1 Misc 3d 29 [App Term, 1st Dept 2003]). In doing so, we express no view as to the ultimate outcome on the merits of the rent overcharge claim. To the extent the motion court appears to have signaled an intention to examine the rental history outside the four-year look-back period (see Matter of Grimm v State of NY Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., 15 NY3d 358 [2010]; Matter of Boyd v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 23 NY3d 999 [2014]), any such determination is "premature and must await further discovery" (Meyers v Four Thirty Realty, 127 AD3d 501, 502 [*2][2015]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

I concur I concur I concur
Decision Date: September 11, 2015