People v Porras (Jonathan)

[*1] People v Porras (Jonathan) 2015 NY Slip Op 50248(U) Decided on March 2, 2015 Appellate Term, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 2, 2015
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Hunter, Jr., J.P., Shulman, Ling-Cohan, JJ.
570283/12

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Jonathan Porras, Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (James M. Burke, J.), rendered December 22, 2011, convicting him, upon a plea of guilty, of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, and imposing sentence. Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (James M. Burke, J.), rendered December 22, 2011, affirmed.

The accusatory instrument charging defendant with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511[2][a][iv]) was not jurisdictionally defective. The information — comprising the misdemeanor complaint and the arresting police officer's supporting deposition — alleged, inter alia, that, at a specified time and location, defendant was observed operating a motor vehicle; that the computer check run by the officer of Department of Motor Vehicles records showed that defendant's driver's license had been suspended "on more than two times on more than two dates and has not been reinstated"; and that "defendant's license was suspended for failure to answer a New York summons." These factual allegations, given "a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), were sufficient, for pleading purposes, to establish the elements of the charged offense, including that defendant had "in effect three or more suspensions imposed on at least three separate dates for failure to answer, appear or pay a fine" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511[2][a][iv]).

We are unpersuaded that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh or severe, and find no extraordinary circumstances warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Fair, 33 AD3d 558, 558 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 945 [2007]). Further, defendant was sentenced in accordance with his plea bargain, and should not now "be heard to complain that he received what he bargained for" (People v Fair, 33 AD3d at 558, quoting People v Chambers, 123 AD2d 270, 270 [1986]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

I concurI concurI concur
Decision Date: March 02, 2015