People v Khramtsov (Sergei)

[*1] People v Khramtsov (Sergei) 2009 NY Slip Op 51760(U) [24 Misc 3d 143(A)] Decided on August 14, 2009 Appellate Term, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected in part through December 23, 2009; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on August 14, 2009
APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: McKeon, P.J., Schoenfeld, Heitler, JJ
570822/07.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Sergei Khramtsov, Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Alexander Jeong, J.), rendered September 29, 2006, convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of resisting arrest and disorderly conduct, and imposing sentence.

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (Alexander Jeong, J.), rendered September 29, 2006, affirmed.

Treating the accusatory instrument as an information in evaluating defendant's jurisdictional challenge (see People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228 [2009]), we find that the accusatory instrument sufficiently set forth the factual bases of the underlying offenses by alleging, inter alia, that, during the early morning hours at a specified Manhattan eatery, defendant, with the requisite intent, broke "a large porcelain pot" without permission of the establishment's manager, and that police observed defendant "shouting and screaming" obscenities, the latter conduct causing "a crowd to gather and people to express alarm." These allegations, "given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), were sufficient for pleading purposes to establish reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that defendant committed criminal mischief in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 145.00[1]; People v Vinolas, 174 Misc 2d 740 [1997]) and disorderly conduct (see Penal Law § 240.20[3]; see generally People v Tichenor, 89 NY2d 769 [1997]). Inasmuch as the People alleged sufficient facts to support the underlying charges, those facts were also sufficient to allege that defendant's arrest was "authorized" for purposes of the resisting arrest charge (see Penal Law § 205.30; cf. People v Jones, 9 NY3d 259, 263 [2007]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
Decision Date: August 14, 2009