Marderosian v General Inv. & Dev.

[*1] Marderosian v General Inv. & Dev. 2005 NY Slip Op 51652(U) [9 Misc 3d 133(A)] Decided on October 18, 2005 Appellate Term, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 18, 2005
APPELLATE TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Suarez, P.J., Davis, Schoenfeld, JJ.


Mark D. Marderosian,NY County Clerk's Plaintiff-Appellant, #570103/04 Cal. No. 04-300

against

General Investment and Development, d/b/a Windsor Communities, Windor at Hauppauge, Inc., Windsor at Hauppauge, Limited Partnership, Crawford & Company of New York, Inc. and Crawford & Company, Defendants-Respondents.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of Civil Court, New York County, entered May 7, 2002 (Carol R. Edmead, J.), which granted defendant Crawford's motion for summary judgment and defendant General Investment's cross motion to dismiss the complaint against it as time-barred, and denied plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend his complaint.

PER CURIAM:

Order, entered May 7, 2002 (Carol R. Edmead, J.) affirmed, with $10 costs.

Plaintiff's action, sounding in negligence for alleged personal injuries and property damage occurring in or about March 1997, was not commenced until July 2001, and thus was barred by the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 203[a], 214 [4] and [5]; see Spinale v Tenzer Greenblatt, 309 AD2d 632 [2003]). Even were plaintiff given an extension until discovery of his latent condition in April 1997 (CPLR 214-c), his cause of action would still be time-barred (Martin v 159 W. 80 St. Corp., 3 AD3d 439 [2004]). By plaintiff's own admission, his injury, described as allergy symptoms from mold in the apartment, abated when he moved from the apartment in April 1997, more than three years prior to commencement of this action. Plaintiff's application to amend his complaint, denied as moot, was untimely in any event, having been made after expiration of the three-year statute of limitations (see Riccardelli v Metropolitan Transp. Auth. of N.Y., 6 AD3d 689 [2004]).

We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them lacking in merit.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Decision Date: October 18, 2005