Reynolds v Thompson

Reynolds v Thompson 2012 NY Slip Op 08505 Decided on December 12, 2012 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 12, 2012
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKAPPELLATE DIVISION : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS
SANDRA L. SGROI
SYLVIA HINDS-RADIX, JJ.
2012-04250
(Index No. 15098/08)

[*1]Sherlock Reynolds, appellant,

v

Margreta Thompson, respondent.




Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, N.Y. (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for
appellant.


DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Agate, J.), entered February 24, 2012, which granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Fudol v Sullivan, 38 AD3d 593, 594), and that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Richards v Tyson, 64 AD3d 760, 761).

The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Thus, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

In view of the foregoing, we do not address the plaintiff's remaining contention.
SKELOS, J.P., CHAMBERS, SGROI and HINDS-RADIX, JJ., concur.

ENTER: [*2]

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court