Matter of Smith v Amedee

Matter of Smith v Amedee 2012 NY Slip Op 08752 Decided on December 19, 2012 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 19, 2012
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKAPPELLATE DIVISION : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P.
DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO
SANDRA L. SGROI
ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
2011-10984
(Docket No. O-11632-10)

[*1]In the Matter of Mia Smith, respondent,

v

Franck Amedee, appellant. Placidus Aguwa, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellant. Elliot Green, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.




DECISION & ORDER

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Franck Amedee appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Queens County (Fitzmaurice, J.), dated November 2, 2011, which, after a hearing, and upon a finding that he had committed the family offenses of disorderly conduct, reckless endangerment in the second degree, and harassment in the second degree, directed him, inter alia, to stay away from the petitioner until and including November 2, 2013.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

"The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the hearing court" (Matter of Creighton v Whitmore, 71 AD3d 1141, 1141; see Family Ct Act §§ 812, 832; Matter of Kaur v Singh, 73 AD3d 1178), "and that court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to considerable deference on appeal" (Matter of Cruz v Rodriguez, 96 AD3d 838, 838; see Matter of Kaur v Singh, 73 AD3d at 1178; Matter of Creighton v Whitmore, 71 AD3d at 1141). Contrary to the appellant's contention, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence supported the Family Court's determination that he committed acts which constituted the family offenses of disorderly conduct (see Penal Law § 240.20[1]; Family Ct Act § 812[1]; Matter of Pearlman v Pearlman, 78 AD3d 711), reckless endangerment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 120.20; Family Ct Act § 812[1]; Matter of Knibbs v Zeman, 86 AD3d 568), and harassment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 240.26[1]; Family Ct Act § 812[1]; Matter of Kaur v Singh, 73 AD3d at 1178), warranting the issuance of an order of protection.

The appellant's remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before this Court.
MASTRO, J.P., ANGIOLILLO, SGROI and MILLER, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court