Zherka v Gribler

Zherka v Gribler 2012 NY Slip Op 08516 Decided on December 12, 2012 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 12, 2012
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKAPPELLATE DIVISION : SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
RANDALL T. ENG, P.J.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL
L. PRISCILLA HALL
PLUMMER E. LOTT, JJ.
2011-10293
(Index No. 24267/10)

[*1]Selim Zherka, appellant,

v

Larry Gribler, et al., respondents.




Selim Zherka, New Rochelle, N.Y., appellant pro se.


DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), entered October 4, 2011, which granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the second amended complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that the defendants had made certain slanderous statements. "Slander as a rule is not actionable unless the plaintiff suffers special damage. Special damages contemplate the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value" (Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 434-435 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "The four established exceptions [to the requirement of special damages] (collectively slander per se') consist of statements (i) charging plaintiff with a serious crime; (ii) that tend to injure another in his or her trade, business or profession; (iii) that plaintiff has a loathsome disease; or (iv) imputing unchastity to a woman" (id. at 435). Here, the plaintiff failed to plead that he suffered special damages with the requisite particularity (see Matherson v Marchello, 100 AD2d 233, 236). Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the second amended complaint failed to allege that the defendants charged him with committing a serious crime (see Caffee v Arnold, 104 AD2d 352, 353; Privitera v Town of Phelps, 79 AD2d 1, 4; Klein v McGauley, 29 AD2d 418, 421). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the plaintiff's remaining contention.
ENG, P.J., LEVENTHAL, HALL and LOTT, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court