Matter of Miguel R.

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Matter of Miguel R. 2012 NY Slip Op 06560 Decided on October 2, 2012 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on October 2, 2012
Friedman, J.P., Acosta, Renwick, Richter, Abdus-Salaam, JJ. 8154-
8154A

[*1]In re Miguel R., A Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

Presentment Agency


Daniel R. Katz, New York, for appellant.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Jane L.
Gordon of counsel), for presentment agency.

Orders of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Susan R. Larabee, J.), entered on or about February 9, 2011, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon fact-finding determinations that he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, and scheme to defraud in the first degree, and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We reject appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the charge of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree. After a teacher confiscated appellant's school identification card in order to write him up for a disciplinary infraction, appellant violently attacked the teacher while trying to get back the card. As it was part of the teacher's official function to enforce the school's rules, the evidence supported the inference that appellant's conduct was intended to interfere with the teacher's performance of his duties (see Penal Law § 195.05; Matter of Joe R., 44 AD3d 376 [1st Dept 2007]).

The court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress his inculpatory statements to a police detective concerning the larceny-related charges. The totality of the circumstances establishes that appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights in [*2]the presence of his mother. Appellant's arguments concerning the voluntariness of his statement are without merit.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: OCTOBER 2, 2012

CLERK

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