People v Adoms

People v Adoms 2012 NY Slip Op 00826 Decided on February 7, 2012 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on February 7, 2012
Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, DeGrasse, Richter, Abdus-Salaam, JJ.
6724 2764/03

[*1]The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v

Jorge Adoms, Defendant-Appellant.




Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New
York (Rebekah J. Pazmiño of counsel), for appellate.
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Noah J. Chamoy
of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert A. Sackett, J.), rendered May 20, 2004, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of rape in the first and second degrees, rape in the third degree (three counts), sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 15 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting expert testimony relating to child sexual abuse syndrome (CSAS). The expert's testimony provided a possible explanation, beyond the knowledge of the average juror, for the victim's delay in reporting repeated instances of sexual abuse occurring over a long period of time (see People v Caroll, 95 NY2d 375, 387 [2000]; People v Gilley, 4 AD3d 127, 128 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 799 [2004]). Regardless of whether defendant expressly raised the issue of delayed disclosure, the jury may have been concerned that the delay impacted the victim's credibility. Furthermore, the expert did not improperly bolster the victim's testimony (see People v Spicola, 16 NY3d 441, 465-66 [2011], cert denied __US __, 132 S Ct 400 [2011]).

Defendant did not preserve his arguments that the victim's explanation of the reasons for her delayed disclosure obviated any need for expert testimony, or that CSAS is not a scientifically valid theory. As alternative holding, we reject those arguments.

Defendant expressly waived his present claim that the court should have instructed the jury on the use of expert testimony (see People v Gonzalez, 99 NY2d 76, 83 [2002]). As an alternative holding, we find that the absence of that instruction did not cause defendant any prejudice.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: FEBRUARY 7, 2012 [*2]

CLERK