People v Landy

People v Landy 2009 NY Slip Op 09273 [68 AD3d 520] December 15, 2009 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected through Wednesday, February 10, 2010

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
Dan Landy, Appellant.

—[*1] Dan Landy, appellant pro se.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York (Paula-Rose Stark of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles H. Solomon, J.), rendered October 22, 2003, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the third degree (two counts), attempted robbery in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to an aggregate term of 20 years to life, and order, same court and Justice, entered on or about April 16, 2004, which denied defendant's CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant's suppression motion in all respects. The description of defendant was sufficiently detailed, given the temporal and spatial factors (see e.g. People v Rampersant, 272 AD2d 202 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 870 [2000]), so as to provide, at the very least, reasonable suspicion warranting an investigatory detention of defendant for prompt identification by the victims (see People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 238-239 [1986]). The manner in which the showup was conducted was not unduly suggestive, given the chain of fast-paced events (see People v Wilburn, 40 AD3d 508, 509 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 883 [2007]; People v Williams, 15 AD3d 244, 246 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 771 [2005]). Defendant's statements to the police were spontaneous and not the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent (see People v Campney, 94 NY2d 307, 314 [1999]).

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence. The dangerous instrument element of first-degree burglary under Penal Law § 140.30 (3), as well as the force element of robbery, was established by evidence that, during the commission of the crime, defendant possessed a sharp piece of metal capable of causing injury, and that he displayed it in a manner that conveyed a threat to stab the victims if they did not comply with his demand for money (see People v Carter, 53 NY2d 113, 116 [1981]; People v Pena, 50 NY2d 400, 407-408 [1980], cert denied 449 US 1087 [1981]).

Defendant's claims regarding the prosecutor's conduct in cross-examination and summation, and regarding the sufficiency of the court's jury instructions, are unpreserved and we [*2]decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject them on the merits. Defendant's pro se speedy trial claim is without merit. Defendant's remaining pro se claims are unpreserved or otherwise procedurally defective and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject them on the merits. Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Moskowitz, DeGrasse, Manzanet-Daniels and Roman, JJ.