RALPH GOODWIN v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is only binding on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

RALPH GOODWIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION; CHRISTOPHER D. CERF,

COMMISSIONER, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION; BARBARA GANTWERK,

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF STUDENT

AND FIELD SERVICES, NEW JERSEY

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION;

DR. KATHLEEN C. SERAFINO, EXECUTIVE

COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT (MORRIS),

Defendants-Respondents.

October 25, 2016

Submitted October 6, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Fuentes and Carroll.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-00338-14.

Gold, Albanese & Barletti, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael S. Williams, on the brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondents (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Agnes I. Rymer, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Ralph Goodwin appeals from the grant of defendants' summary judgment motion dismissing his complaint as time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to claims filed under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14. We affirm.

For the narrow purposes of this appeal, the facts and procedural history can be briefly summarized. Plaintiff was employed by defendant New Jersey Department of Education (Department) as the Interim School Business Administrator for Morris County from October 2010 until his termination in December 2012. On December 4, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Department, Commissioner Christopher D. Cerf, Assistant Commissioner Barbara Gantwerk, Executive County Superintendent Dr. Kathleen C. Serafino, and several unnamed individuals, alleging a violation of CEPA. Specifically, plaintiff asserted that "on or about December 4, 2012," he was terminated in retaliation for providing testimony related to an employment contract.

Defendants moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as barred by CEPA's one-year statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 34:19-5. On August 22, 2014, the court denied the motion without prejudice. The court found there were conflicting factual issues regarding when plaintiff's termination occurred, "and allow[ed] limited discovery on the issue of the date of termination."

On April 28, 2015, the parties entered into a written stipulation in which they agreed that plaintiff's employment with the Department was terminated on December 3, 2012, and that he was orally advised of his termination on that date. Defendants promptly renewed their summary judgment motion. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that his complaint was timely filed on December 4, 2013.

On June 1, 2015, the court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. In a thoughtful written opinion, Judge Thomas C. Miller, relying on Alderiso v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cty., 167 N.J. 191 (2001), concluded that because plaintiff was terminated on December 3, 2012, the time limitation began to run on December 4, 2012, and ended on December 3, 2013. "Thus, the filing of this matter on December 4, 2013[,] was untimely, as it was one day beyond the limitation period." The judge carefully distinguished Bernstein v. Bd. of Trustees, 151 N.J. Super. 71 (App. Div. 1977), and Negron v. Llarena, 156 N.J. 296 (1998), and further concluded that the doctrine of substantial compliance1 was unavailing to excuse plaintiff's untimely filing. This appeal followed.

We review summary judgment decisions de novo and apply the same standard utilized by the trial court, namely, whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, raises genuinely disputed issues of fact sufficient to warrant resolution by the trier of fact or whether the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998).

In this matter, there are no material facts in dispute and the issue is purely an interpretation of the applicable law. Consequently, we owe no deference to the trial court's interpretation. Hand v. Phila. Ins. Co., 408 N.J. Super. 124, 134 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 N.J.506 (2009). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

The present case involves a factual scenario substantially similar to that addressed by our Supreme Court in Alderiso. There, the Court considered CEPA's statute of limitations provision, N.J.S.A. 34:19-5, which provides that "[u]pon a violation of any of the provisions of this act, an aggrieved employee or former employee may, within one year, institute a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction." Alderiso, supra, 167 N.J. at 197. "In interpreting CEPA in accordance with its plain language," the Court first "concluded that plaintiff's date of discharge establishes the time when plaintiff's cause of action accrued under CEPA." Id. at 202.

The Court next considered the method to be used in calculating the statute's one-year limitations period. Id. at 202. After finding that the plaintiff was discharged on January 15, 1997, the Court stated

[W]e would exclude the date of discharge from the computation of the one-year statute of limitation and would thus include the first day after that date. Hence, . . . the period within one year of plaintiff's date of discharge encompasses January 16, 1997, through and including January 15, 1998. Under that measurement, a complaint filed on January 16, 1998, would be outside the applicable limitations window by one day.

[Id. at 202-03 (quotation marks omitted).]

Because the Court announced a new rule on a question of law or fact that was previously unsettled, it declined to retroactively apply the rule to dismiss plaintiff's CEPA action. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that "[f]or actions filed after the date of this opinion, the applicable accrual date shall be the employee's date of discharge." Id. at 204.

Before us, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that his complaint was not timely filed within CEPA's one-year statute of limitations period. Alternatively, he contends that his late filing should be excused under the doctrine of substantial compliance. We disagree. We have considered plaintiff's arguments and find them without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Miller's cogent written opinion. The judge correctly applied the Court's holding in Alderiso to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Judge Miller also aptly distinguished the cases cited by plaintiff in support of his argument that he substantially complied with CEPA's time limitation. Further, plaintiff knew or should reasonably have known that he was terminated on December 3, 2012, and his "belief" that his date of termination was December 4, 2012, does not excuse his late filing. Following Alderiso, there could be no doubt that the time constriction began to run on December 4, 2012, and ended on December 3, 2013. Consequently, the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff's complaint, filed on December 4, 2013, was time-barred.

Affirmed.

1 The doctrine of substantial compliance is an equitable doctrine designed "to avoid technical defeats of valid claims." Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 405 (2001). See also Berke v. Buckley Broad. Corp., 359 N.J. Super. 587, 598 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 571 (2003) (identifying five elements a plaintiff must demonstrate to invoke the substantial compliance doctrine in a statute of limitations context).