IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT RECORD OF C.L.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5284-14T2

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT

OF THE INVOLUNTARY CIVIL

COMMITMENT RECORD OF C.L.
_________________________________

November 14, 2016

Before Judges Fasciale and Gilson.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-2955-15.

Jason T. Komninos argued the cause for appellant C.L.

John E. Ten Hoeve, Jr. argued the cause for respondent Bergen County Adjuster.

PER CURIAM

C.L. appeals from a June 22, 2015 amended order denying his petition to expunge mental health records pertaining to his involuntary civil commitment in the Bergen Regional Medical Center, a county psychiatric hospital (the psychiatric hospital). We affirm.

In 2005, C.L. was involuntarily committed in the psychiatric hospital for approximately one week. At that time, he was forty-four years old. The court had committed C.L. to the psychiatric hospital after his mother had called the police stating that C.L. had become "increasingly more bizarre in the community." C.L. believed his neighbors were watching him with binoculars, and that the police were surveilling him and stealing his money. As a result, he installed three cameras at his home and hired a private investigator. C.L. told hospital staff he started using illicit drugs to make him feel "less depressed."

In 2006, C.L. moved to South Carolina, where he opened a jewelry store and married. Since 2006, C.L. has been involved in seven incidents involving civil disputes, property damage, and petit larceny. The incidents generated police reports, which demonstrated that C.L. was aggressive, confrontational, and struggled with anger issues.

In 2013, C.L. could not purchase a firearm due his mental health records. The denial of his firearm purchase prompted him to file this expungement petition. In support of his petition, C.L. asserted he was "drug free" and had "a good reputation in the community[.]" C.L. provided the court with letters from a social worker, his wife, a friend, and a business associate. The judge denied the petition stating

[C.L.] has been involved in a number of incidents with the police in South Carolina. These incidents make clear that [C.L.] is still involved in incidents of conflict and tension. The number of incidents that [C.L.] is involved in is higher than that of the average person, and indicate issues with anger management.

On appeal, C.L. argues that his substantial improvement since his involuntary commitment warrants an expungement of his mental health records. C.L. contends for the first time on appeal that the judge erroneously focused on maintaining access to his mental health records. And he asserts that the judge unfairly held his criminal history against him.

We review the trial court's interpretation of the statute governing expungement of mental health records de novo. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J.161, 176 (2010). However, we give deference to the judge's fact findings because he has the "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J.152, 174 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Assuming no error of law, we defer to a trial court's exercise of discretion so long as it was not 'clearly unreasonable in the light of the accompanying and surrounding circumstances[.]'" In re LoBasso, 423 N.J. Super. 475, 496 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 17 N.J. Super. 128, 132-33 (App. Div. 1951), certif. denied, 9 N.J.178 (1952)). We conclude the judge correctly applied the law, and that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying C.L.'s expungement petition.

The expungement of mental health records is governed by N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.8 to -80.11. N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.8 states

Any person who has been, or shall be, committed to any institution or facility providing mental health services, . . . and . . . whose illness upon discharge, . . . is substantially improved . . . may apply to the court [for an expungement].

N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9 requires the court to hold a hearing on the matter and consider "the circumstances of why the commitment or determination was imposed upon the petitioner, the petitioner's mental health record and criminal history, and the petitioner's reputation in the community." The court should grant the expungement "[i]f the court finds that the petitioner will not likely act in a manner dangerous to the public safety and finds that the grant of relief is not contrary to the public interest . . . ."

As to C.L.'s contention that he substantially improved, the judge focused on whether C.L. was likely to act in a manner dangerous to the public safety and whether granting the petition would be contrary to the public interest. In reaching this determination, the judge conducted a hearing and considered C.L.'s mental health record, his reputation, and his criminal history.

In evaluating C.L.'s reputation in the community, the judge considered all the evidence produced at the hearing. He placed great weight, however, on the information contained in the police reports, which were admitted into evidence without any objection. Based on that information, the judge concluded C.L. had remained involved in incidents of "conflict and tension[,]" indicating that C.L. continued struggling with anger-management issues.

We reject C.L.'s argument that the judge denied the petition erroneously focusing on the importance of maintaining future access to the mental health records. The judge stated the records "may be necessary for future mental health evaluations." It is clear to us that this statement was not the judge's basis for denying the petition. Instead, as the credible evidence in the record demonstrates, the judge found that C.L. failed to "sufficiently prove[] that he will not act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety."

Finally, we conclude C.L.'s argument, that the judge erroneously considered his criminal history, is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We note briefly that the judge is required to consider criminal history pursuant to N.J.S.A.30:4-80.9. Prior to the involuntary civil commitment, C.L. was arrested six times for various offenses, committed numerous traffic violations, including speeding and driving under the influence (DUI) of drugs or alcohol, and was found guilty of resisting arrest, N.J.S.A.2C:29-2(a). After the involuntary civil commitment, but before the filing of the petition, C.L. was also arrested for simple assault, N.J.S.A.2C:12-1(a)(1). Although C.L.'s DUI offenses are not criminal convictions, the judge did not unreasonably concentrate on these indiscretions when making his decision. Rather, he considered the entire criminal history.

Affirmed.