DAVID TRUITT v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD COMMUNITY EDUCATION CENTERS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 
 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0T1

DAVID TRUITT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD;

COMMUNITY EDUCATION CENTERS,

Defendants-Respondents.

___________________________________

December 12, 2016

 

Submitted November 1, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Leone and Vernoia.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Sussex County, Indictment Nos. 15-03-0116 and 15-02-0083.

Murphy & Woyce, attorneys for appellant (Michael C. Woyce and Joseph S. Murphy, on the brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey State Parole Board (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Respondent Community Education Centers has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff David Truitt appeals the trial court's June 2, 2015 dismissal of his motion for a writ of habeas corpus for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

I.

On November 2, 2001, Truitt pled guilty to six counts of endangering the welfare of a child due to inappropriate sexual contact. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). On December 20, 2001, Truitt was sentenced to time served, four years on probation, compliance with the requirements of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, and Community Supervision for Life (CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 (1994). After serving his probation, he remained on CSL.

In 2015, two complaints were filed against Truitt for violating his CSL by driving a minor home. He was arrested for a parole violation, but was released on bail on May 6, 2015. When he reported to the Parole District Office on May 7, 2015, the parole officers ordered Truitt to complete a ninety-day residential treatment program at Logan Hall, a private facility operated by defendant Community Education Centers, Inc. (CEC) in Newark.1 Truitt was later transferred to the Bo Robinson Assessment and Treatment Center, another CEC facility in Trenton, to complete the remainder of that ninety-day residential treatment program.

On May 8, 2015, Truitt filed in the Law Division a motion for a writ of habeas corpus alleging he was being incarcerated without due process. On June 2, 2015, the trial court dismissed the motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning "[s]uch an application is appropriately made to the Appellate Division" pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(2).

Truitt appealed only the trial court's order. He filed an emergent motion seeking immediate release. In denying the emergent motion, we specifically noted "Truitt is being held on a parole violation, and is not being held pursuant to indictments in Superior Court. There is no administrative order presented to the court for review."

In his appellate brief, Truitt argues

THE COURT BELOW VIOLATED ART. I, Para 14 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION (1947) BY REFUSING TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION TO HEAR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WHERE THE INDIVIDUAL WAS INCARCERATED IN A PRIVATE PRISON FACILITY IN EFFECT SUSPENDING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

We review the trial court's jurisdictional ruling de novo. Baanyan Software Servs., Inc. v. Kuncha, 433 N.J. Super. 466, 476 (App. Div. 2013). We must hew to this standard of review.

II.

The trial court properly determined it lacked jurisdiction because the exclusive method for Truitt to bring his claim against the Parole Board was via direct appeal to the Appellate Division. Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) provides that "appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division . . . to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or officer." Ibid. "That rule vests the Appellate Division with exclusive jurisdiction over all such decisions or actions." Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 422 (2006). Accordingly, "the exclusive method for review of an action or inaction of the State Parole Board is by direct appeal to the Appellate Division under R. 2:2-3(a)(2)." Shaw v. Hatrak, 164 N.J. Super. 414, 416 17 (App. Div. 1978).

As Truitt is subject to CSL pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 (1994), he is supervised by the Division of Parole of the State Parole Board. Based on Truitt's two criminal charges, Truitt's parole supervisor took administrative action, ordering Truitt to complete a ninety-day residential treatment program. The exclusive method of review of this administrative action was by direct appeal to the Appellate Division.2

Instead, Truitt sought to challenge the parole action by filing a motion for writ of habeas corpus in the Law Division. That was improper. "The writ of habeas corpus is not designed as a substitute for routine and completely adequate rules of practice, nor is it designed to serve the office of an appeal." Shaw, supra, 164 N.J. Super. at 417.

The writ of habeas corpus . . . is a "common law . . . prerogative writ." But when habeas corpus is sought because of illegal detention by the DOC or the Parole Board, the applicant must appeal from the agency's action or conduct in holding the prisoner. . . . R. 4:69-1, dealing with actions "In Lieu of Prerogative Writs," expressly provides that the Law Division has habeas corpus jurisdiction only where relief is "not available under R. 2:2-3."

[Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 296 N.J. Super. 437, 460 (App. Div. 1997) (citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 154 N.J. 19 (1998).]

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Truitt's motion for a writ of habeas corpus for lack of jurisdiction. Shaw, supra, 164 N.J. Super. at 417.

Truitt argues that habeas corpus is necessary to challenge actions of short duration such as the treatment program here. However, had he filed an appeal of the parole action directly in the Appellate Division, that administrative action might have been properly before us, and he could have sought emergent relief. R. 2:9-8.

In addition, Truitt's motion became moot on appeal. An action is rendered moot where a judgment cannot grant effective relief. The State represents that Truitt successfully completed the ninety-day treatment program and was released on August 5, 2015. Truitt has not contradicted this representation. As Truitt is no longer enrolled in the residential treatment program, Truitt's motion is moot. See State v. F.W., 443 N.J. Super. 476, 479 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, __ N.J. __ (2016). "'It is firmly established that controversies which have become moot or academic prior to judicial resolution ordinarily will be dismissed.' Generally, 'courts will not decide cases in which . . . a judgment cannot grant effective relief.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. W.F., 434 N.J. Super. 288, 297 (App. Div.) (quoting Cinque v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 261 N.J. Super. 242, 243 (App. Div. 1993)), certif. denied, 218 N.J. 275 (2014). Thus, even if we had jurisdiction, we would now be unable to grant effective relief.3

Affirmed.

1 See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.11(b)(12). Truitt signed papers agreeing to participate in a parolee treatment program, but indicated he was doing so "under threat of incarceration."

2 Such a direct appeal may also have required the exhaustion of administrative remedies pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.6 and N.J.A.C. 10A:71-4.1(c).

3 Moreover, Truitt has not shown that "the issues raised 'involve significant matters of public policy, are extremely important, and undoubtedly will recur in cases that are likely to be mooted before adjudication.'" Ibid. (quoting In re N.N., 146 N.J. 112, 124 (1996)).