JAMES WHITE v. CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

JAMES WHITE, on behalf of himself

and all other similarly-situated

employees,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN

FREEHOLDERS, CAMDEN COUNTY

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, and CAMDEN

COUNTY,

Defendants-Respondents.

July 28, 2016

Submitted July 12, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Carroll and Rothstadt.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-0824-15.

William B. Hildebrand, attorney for appellant.

Christopher A. Orlando, Camden County Counsel, attorney for respondents (Howard L. Goldberg, First Assistant County Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this wage dispute case, plaintiff James White appeals from a June 12, 2015 order dismissing his complaint on the basis that it fell within the grievance and arbitration provisions of his union's collective bargaining agreement (CBA). We affirm.

The record reveals the following. Plaintiff is employed by defendant Camden County Board of Freeholders (the County) and works as a corrections officer at the Camden County Correctional Facility (CCCF). Plaintiff is a member of PBA Local 351 (the Union), which serves as the exclusive bargaining agent for all corrections officers and sergeants employed at the CCCF. On June 23, 2010, the County and the Union entered into a CBA which

ha[d] as its purpose the promotion of harmonious relations between the County and the [Union]; the establishment of an equitable and peaceful procedure for the resolution of differences; and the establishment of rates of pay, hours of work, and other conditions of employment, and represents the complete and final understanding of all the bargainable issues between the County and the [Union].

Except as specifically modified, the terms of the CBA remained in effect pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into between the County and the Union dated November 19, 2013.

The CBA contained provisions for the resolution of all "grievances" involving the Union and the County. Article XIX Section 2 of the CBA defines a grievance as "a complaint or claim that there has been an improper application, interpretation, or violation of [the CBA], any County policy affecting the [Union], or any administrative decision affecting any member or members of the [Union]." Section 3 establishes a procedure that "constitutes the sole and exclusive method for resolving grievances." Ultimately, Section 6 calls for arbitration as the final step in the process. It provides that an arbitrator is to be selected pursuant to the rules, regulations and procedures of the Public Employment Relations Commission, and that the arbitrator's decision "shall be in writing with reasons therefore and shall be final and binding upon the parties."

On February 27, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Law Division "on behalf of himself and all other similarly-situated employees." The complaint alleged that the County engaged in a number of payroll practices that resulted in plaintiff and other similarly-situated corrections officers and sergeants "receiving less pay than they are actually entitled to." Specifically, plaintiff alleged that

"When calculating an employee's daily pay, the County rounds the result to only two decimal points. This creates a rounding error and results in less pay than the employee would receive without rounding."

When calculating daily pay for [c]orrections [o]fficers and [s]ergeants, the County does not use the time actually worked, as reflected by the time clock entries. Rather, it uses other methods to calculate those employees' hours for the day."

"The County uses a chart to calculate overtime for [c]orrections [o]fficers and sergeants which also results in rounding errors."

"The County pays [c]orrections officers and [s]ergeants for overtime once a month rather than every pay period."

"Although the County's [CBA] with the Union requires it to pay [c]orrections [o]fficers and [s]ergeants a [five-percent] shift differential for hours worked between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., the County does not pay this shift differential to employees working overtime or receiving comp time."

The first count of the complaint alleged that the County's payroll practices violate the Wage Payment Law (WPL), N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1 to -4.14. In the second count, plaintiff sought relief for the alleged payroll violations as the representative of a class of all corrections officers and sergeants employed at the CCCF.

In lieu of filing an answer, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment. Defendants argued that, as a corrections officer in the CCCF, plaintiff is subject to the terms of the CBA, including its grievance procedures, and that the issue of wages for corrections officers, including rates of pay, overtime, longevity and other benefits, is covered exclusively by the CBA and the related MOA. The trial court agreed, and on June 12, 2015, it entered an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

On appeal, relying on Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 436 (2014), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2804, 192 L. Ed. 2d 847 (2015), plaintiff argues that the absence of any language in the CBA's grievance procedures that its members are waiving a statutory right to seek relief in court renders its provisions unenforceable. Additionally, he contends that statutory remedies and remedies under a CBA have traditionally been viewed as complementary rather than exclusive, and he is thus free to seek relief either in this action or under the CBA's grievance procedures. We are not persuaded.

The Legislature and the Judiciary in our state both "have favored arbitration as a means of resolving disputes." See Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 84 (2002) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1 to -11); see also Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 131 (2001). Especially germane to the present appeal is the principle that "[a]rbitration is a favored means of resolving labor disputes." Mount Holly Tp. Bd. of Educ. v. Mount Holly Tp. Educ. Ass'n, 199 N.J. 319, 333 (2009) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Pascack Valley Reg'l High School Bd. of Educ. v. Pascack Valley Reg'l Support Staff Ass'n, 192 N.J. 489, 496 (2007)).

In many instances, as here, a threshold question presented is whether the parties have consented to an arbitral forum. "As a matter of both federal and state law, 'arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.'" Angrisani v. Fin. Tech. Ventures, L.P., 402 N.J. Super. 138, 148-49 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1418, 89 L. Ed. 2d 648, 655 (1986)).

Our Supreme Court has "recognized as settled law '[t]hat parties to an agreement may waive statutory remedies in favor of arbitration[.]'" Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 300 (alterations in original) (quoting Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 131), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 938, 124 S. Ct. 74, 157 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2003). Before enforcing such a claimed waiver, "the Court requires some concrete manifestation of [a party's] intent as reflected in the text of the agreement itself." Ibid. (quoting Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 135).

Here, the relevant agreement for determining the parties' intent is the CBA between the Union and the County. In construing that CBA, we must apply a statutory presumption in favor of arbitration. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 declares that "[i]n interpreting the meaning and extent of a provision of a collective negotiation agreement providing for grievance arbitration, a court or agency shall be bound by a presumption in favor of arbitration." (Emphasis added). The statute adds that "[d]oubts as to the scope of an arbitration clause shall be resolved in favor of requiring arbitration." Ibid. (emphasis added).

As noted, plaintiff relies on Atalese1 in support of his contention that he and his fellow Union members should not be required to engage in the CBA's grievance process since in that document they did not waive their right to litigate any statutory claims. We agree with plaintiff that employees bound by a CBA should not be charged with a greater understanding of their rights than, for example, the average consumer as considered in Atalese. However, in this case we do not discern that plaintiff's claim involves the pursuit of a statutory claim under the WPL or otherwise.

In his lawsuit, plaintiff seeks relief under the WPL, which generally "governs the time and mode of payment of wages due to employees," and, "[a]s a remedial statute, . . . should be liberally construed." Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 302-03 (2015). We acknowledge the salutory purposes the WPL is designed to achieve. Nonetheless, in this case, plaintiff fails to articulate any specific provisions of the WPL that expressly address the County's alleged improper practices in calculating wage payments that are due to Union employees pursuant to the terms of the CBA. As the County correctly asserts, the WPL does not dictate or delineate such matters as how many decimal points an employee's daily pay must be rounded to or whether a shift differential must be paid for overtime or comp time. Importantly, also, plaintiff does not identify any statutory remedies the WPL confers that he would be waiving or surrendering by pursuing his claims in accordance with the CBA's grievance procedures.

Simply put, the unfair payroll practices that plaintiff complains of fall squarely within the scope of issues encompassed by the CBA. Among other things, the CBA and MOA contain detailed provisions relating to the payment of wages, including how overtime is calculated and when it is to be paid; shift differentials; rates of pay; longevity; and payment for holidays, vacations, and sick leave. Plaintiff, on behalf of all Union members, seeks redress for the County's alleged improper practices in calculating the payments due all corrections officers under the CBA. Plaintiff thus alleges an improper application, interpretation, or violation of the CBA or a County policy, which plainly qualifies as a grievance to be resolved under the CBA's grievance procedures. Indeed, the entire premise of plaintiff's complaint is that he and the Union's members are "receiving less pay than they are entitled to" under the CBA. We therefore conclude that payroll disputes and claims of contractual violations of the type plaintiff asserts are subject to the CBA's grievance process and are not subsumed in public policy principles that are otherwise central to statutory claims of workplace discrimination.

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, we also view as clear and unambiguous the CBA's provision establishing a procedure that "constitutes the sole and exclusive method for resolving grievances." Bearing in mind New Jersey's strong public policy and decisional law favoring arbitration and counseling judges to read CBAs liberally toward that end, the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint in favor of the CBA's grievance procedures was sound.

Affirmed.

1 We observe that Atalese was decided in the context of a consumer service agreement, and that the Court emphasized that "an average member of the public may not know - without some explanatory comment - - that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one's claim adjudicated in a court of law." Atalese, supra, 219 N.J. at 442. That is not the situation here, where the County and the Union membership specifically bargained for the comprehensive grievance process that forms an integral part of the CBA, the express purpose of which was "the establishment of an equitable and peaceful procedure for the resolution of differences."