RAY V. CAPRIO v. JOANN C. CAPRIO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

RAY V. CAPRIO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOANN C. CAPRIO,

Defendant-Respondent.

_____________________________________

September 14, 2016

Submitted June 22, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Fuentes and Koblitz.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FM-18-153-04.

Ray V. Caprio, appellant pro se.

Joanne C. Caprio, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

The parties married on December 3, 1989 and divorced on December 22, 2003. They have a daughter who is now twenty years old and attending college. Plaintiff Ray V. Caprio appeals from the order entered on March 13, 2015 by Judge Anthony F. Picheca, denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of an order entered on January 30, 2015. Both parties represent themselves in this appeal and consequently their respective presentations before this court suffer in a number of procedural and substantive ways. For example, in plaintiff's Civil Case Information Statement, which he filed pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(f)(2), plaintiff stated he would discuss in his appellate brief the enforcement of an agreement requiring the parties to submit to arbitration any disputes related to child support, college tuition, and medical expenses concerning their daughter. However, failing to adhere to Rule 2:6-2(a)(5), plaintiff wrote the following under a single point heading in his brief: "Appellate Court Should Declare Plaintiff/Appellant Medically Disabled And Reverse Court Below Reliving [sic] Plaintiff Of Ongoing Education & Medical Costs For Marital Child."

To ensure everyone has access to due process, the courthouse doors must always remain open to self-represented litigants. Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1982). However, status as a pro se litigant in no way relieves a party appearing before this court of his or her obligation to comply with the rules of appellate practice. Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J. Super. 106, 110 (App. Div. 1997). We will thus limit our review here to Judge Picheca's March 15, 2015 order, which denied plaintiff's motion, pursuant to Rule 4:49-2, to seek reconsideration of the January 30, 2015 order.

In the January 30, 2015 order, Judge Picheca: (1) denied the parties' request for oral argument; (2) denied plaintiff's motion to terminate his child support obligation effective December 1, 2014; (3) directed the parties "to address this issue through arbitration, as mutually agreed [upon] by the parties pursuant to the August 15, 2012 Consent Order[;]" (4) denied plaintiff's request to absolve his child support arrears; (5) denied defendant's cross-motion to increase child support; (6) granted defendant's cross-motion to compel plaintiff to reimburse her for her and their daughter's medical expenses and expenses associated with their daughter's college tuition; and (7) ordered defendant to provide "a complete accounting of the aforementioned expenses." Judge Picheca also denied a number of other miscellaneous requests made by the parties that are irrelevant to this appeal.

Pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(f), Judge Picheca attached to the January 30, 2015 order a detailed statement of reasons that articulated his findings and explained his legal reasons for granting and denying the relief requested by the parties. Rule 4:49-2 requires the party moving for reconsideration to "state with specificity" the basis upon which the motion is made and supply "a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred[.]" Here, plaintiff did not include as part of the appellate record the statement of reasons he submitted in support of his motion for reconsideration.

By contrast, the record includes the statement of reasons Judge Picheca attached to the March 15, 2015 order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. In this statement, Judge Picheca correctly applied the standard of review for reviewing such a motion, which was first articulated by our colleague Judge Jonathan Harris when he sat in the Chancery Division, Family Part and was subsequently adopted by this court

Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. . . .

Alternatively, if a litigant wishes to bring new or additional information to the Court's attention which it could not have provided on the first application, the Court should, in the interest of justice (and in the exercise of sound discretion), consider the evidence. Nevertheless, motion practice must come to an end at some point, and if repetitive bites at the apple are allowed, the core will swiftly sour. Thus, the Court must be sensitive and scrupulous in its analysis of the issues in a motion for reconsideration.

[Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).]

Applying this standard to the record before us, we discern no legal basis upon which to disagree with Judge Picheca's well-written statement of reasons and affirm substantially for the reasons stated therein.

Affirmed.