ESSEX COUNTY CORRECTIONS OFFICERS PBA LOCAL NO. 382 v. COUNTY OF ESSEX

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

ESSEX COUNTY CORRECTIONS

OFFICERS PBA LOCAL NO. 382,

NEW JERSEY STATE POLICEMEN'S

BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION;

JOSEPH AMATO; and ANTHONY WIENERS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF ESSEX, a body politic

and corporate of the State of New

Jersey; BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS

OF THE COUNTY OF ESSEX, a body politic

and corporate of the State of New

Jersey; EDUCATION AND HEALTH

CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC.; and

COMMUNITY EDUCATION CENTERS, INC.,

Defendants-Respondents.

December 20, 2016

Argued November 16, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Carroll.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-646-13.

Robert A. Fagella argued the cause for appellants (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman, attorneys; Mr. Fagella, Colin M. Lynch and Flavio L. Komuves, on the briefs).

Ronald L. Israel argued the cause for respondents County of Essex and Essex County Board of Chosen Freeholders (Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, PC, attorneys; Mr. Israel, Robert L. Hornby and Mauro G. Tucci, Jr., on the joint brief).

Angelo J. Genova argued the cause for respondent Community Education Centers, Inc. (Genova Burns LLC, attorneys; Mr. Genova and Charles J. Messina, on the joint brief).

William Harla argued the cause for respondent Education and Health Centers of America, Inc. (DeCotiis, FitzPatrick & Cole, LLP, attorneys; Mr. Harla and Thomas A. Abbate, on the joint brief).

PER CURIAM

This matter is before us a second time. In our prior opinion, we set forth the factual background and procedural history that led to the first appeal, and we incorporate that prior discussion by reference here. Essex Cty. Corr. Officers PBA Local No. 382 v. Cty. of Essex, 439 N.J. Super. 107 (App. Div. 2014), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 567 (2015). We briefly reiterate the most pertinent background and our earlier rulings to lend context to the posture of the present appeal.

As noted in our prior opinion,

Plaintiffs are the union and the local that represent Essex County corrections officers, as well as the presidents of those labor organizations. Defendants are Essex County and its Board of Chosen Freeholders ("the County"), and also Education and Health Centers of America, Inc. ("EHCA") and Community Education Centers, Inc. ("CEC"), the private companies that provide the disputed housing and other inmate services at Delaney and Logan Halls.

In August 2012, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that the current contract the County awarded to EHCA is an ultra vires delegation of the County's statutory duty to confine and maintain inmates in other words, that the County acted without the legal authority that only the State Legislature can grant to it. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from continuing the housing of County inmates at Delaney and Logan Halls.

Together, those two facilities hold more than 1000 inmate beds. They are operated by CEC, a for-profit company closely associated with EHCA, which is the non-profit company that entered into a publicly-bid contract with the County. The two companies have separate boards of directors but share some of the same executives and are owned by some of the same persons.

[Id. at 112-13.]

We summarized the parties' respective positions as follows

Plaintiffs allege that Essex County's contract for the housing of inmates at those facilities is an unlawful "privatization" of county jail operations. Defendants contend that the County contracted for rehabilitative and similar inmate treatment services at the two facilities, as it is authorized to do.

[Id. at 112.]

We first addressed plaintiffs' contention that the statutes that pertain to the management and operation of county detention and penal facilities, N.J.S.A. 30:8-1 to -69, do not grant the County authority to enter into a contract for the private operation of inmate confinement services. Id. at 118. Defendants in turn cited N.J.S.A. 30:8-16.1, -16.2, and -16.4 as "contradict[ing] a legislative intent to preempt the field of inmate services." Id. at 121-22. Defendants also "cite[d] N.J.A.C. 10A:31-26.1(b) and (c) as regulatory authority for counties to contract with outside vendors to provide '[d]rug and alcohol addiction counseling,' '[f]amily counseling,' '[c]risis intervention,' and '[v]ocational counseling.'" Id. at 122-23. Finding defendants' interpretation more persuasive, we held

We agree with defendants that these statutes and regulations indicate that the Legislature did not intend its own [legislative] actions pertinent to county correctional institutions to be exclusive of local decisions regarding how to provide certain inmate services. An intent to occupy the field must appear clearly. Here, the Legislature granted authority to county governments to devise means and methods to provide inmate rehabilitative and similar services. It did not preempt the action of counties in devising innovative ways to provide those services.

We conclude the doctrine of preemption does not prohibit the County from contracting with private entities for inmate rehabilitation and similar treatment services. Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, we further conclude that the County is not restricted by statute to providing such services within the County's own facilities. Since the housing of inmates who receive rehabilitative and similar services may be necessary in conjunction with providing those services, we conclude that the statutes upon which plaintiffs rely neither prohibit nor preempt the County from confining inmates who are in need of and receiving rehabilitative and similar services in private facilities such as Delaney and Logan Halls.

[Id. at 123 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).]

Plaintiffs next argued that the disputed contract violated N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.2, which limits to non-profit entities any private contract for the provision of inmate treatment services that includes confinement. Id. at 123-24. We rejected this contention, noting that the statute by its express terms applies only to State correctional facilities and not to county governments or jails. Id. at 124.

Finally, addressing the non-delegation doctrine, we held "that the confining of inmates, and the concomitant responsibility for their welfare and the security of the public, is a core governmental function" that the County could not delegate absent express legislative authorization. Id. at 127. We noted that "[p]laintiffs [had] requested that the [case] proceed as a summary action under Rule 4:67, without discovery of evidence and without a trial." Id. at 129-30. Consequently, we concluded the record was insufficient to determine whether "the County has in fact delegated the core governmental function of confining County inmates to EHCA and CEC." Id. at 127. We found that

The issue that the summary record does not satisfactorily resolve in favor of either party is whether Delaney and Logan Halls are being utilized for the permitted purposes of providing substance abuse, rehabilitative, and similar services to inmates, or whether they are merely alternative jail facilities for the incarceration of County inmates.

[Ibid.]

Accordingly, we remanded to the trial court "to consider our discussion of the issues and our holdings, and to explore with the parties whether they wish to conduct discovery and to proceed in a plenary action, including a trial if necessary." Id. at 130.

On remand, the trial court conducted a case management conference and entered a case management order (CMO) on August 25, 2015. In relevant part, the CMO: permitted the parties to "engage in discovery limited to the sole question of whether EHCA's Delaney Hall and Logan Hall facilities actually provide 'authorized inmate rehabilitative and similar services;'" established an informal method of resolving discovery disputes before resorting to motion practice; and set a discovery end date for January 8, 2016, which was "not [to] be extended absent exceptional circumstances."

Plaintiffs served defendants with interrogatories and a demand for the production of documents. Plaintiffs' first interrogatory asked EHCA and CEC to describe all counseling services they regularly provide to inmates of Logan and Delaney Halls. EHCA and CEC jointly responded

The mission of [EHCA] is to provide a healthy, drug-free, safe and secure environment for the provision of treatment and education services that focus on changing addictive and criminal behaviors. EHCA provides its participants with the knowledge and skills necessary to lead productive lifestyles prior to reintegration into their communities.

CEC is the nation's leading provider of rehabilitative services for offenders in reentry and in-prison treatment facilities. CEC provides evidence-based programming for residential and non-residential clients and maintains a documented record of reducing recidivism . . . .

. . . .

Logan Hall is a 644-bed risk and psychological assessment-driven structured adult treatment facility located in Newark, New Jersey. The facility is owned and operated by CEC in West Caldwell, New Jersey. Logan Hall offers services to male and female offenders referred by Union and Essex Counties (adjudicated and pre-adjudicated respectively); the New Jersey State Parole Board, Juvenile Justice Commission, Intensive Supervision Program and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Logan Hall also accepts residents who are transferred from other CEC facilities. Currently, Essex County residents are housed on Unit 1, which has 200 beds.

Delaney Hall is a 560-bed risk and psychological assessment-driven structured adult treatment facility located in Newark, New Jersey. The facility is owned and operated by CEC as well, in West Caldwell, New Jersey. Similarly, Delaney Hall offers services to male offenders referred by Essex County (adjudicated and pre-adjudicated respectively); the New Jersey State Parole Board, Juvenile Justice Commission, Intensive Supervision Program and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Delaney Hall also accepts residents who are transferred from other CEC facilities. Essex County residents are presently housed in the Freedom Unit and Liberation Unit. The Freedom Unit houses 382 residents, while the Liberation Unit houses 158 residents in total. The "Steps Unit" is utilized for new arrivals on a daily basis and for some orientation services. This unit is also currently utilized for the Clinical Intervention Committee to address maladaptive behaviors.

Logan and Delaney Halls are assessment-driven programs that address criminal thinking as well as substance use and abuse. Services provided are through groups, along with individual counseling.

Logan and Delaney Halls use Albert Ellis' Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy (REBT) and Motivational Interviewing as components of the treatment model. All staff are trained in REBT and Motivational Interviewing prior to starting and at least once a year. Furthermore, all residents are taught how to apply the principles of REBT in their daily lives while residing in the program.

Services include (in the order requested in plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 1) the following

Psychological Counseling Services Individual counseling sessions are utilized to learn about the client and his/her specific needs. The Program Counselor utilizes the information to work with the client directly, as well as to develop the specific treatment plan.

Rehabilitative Counseling or Services Drug and alcohol addiction counseling is provided along with individual counseling sessions. There are a number of didactic groups and lectures to also address addiction and relapse prevention.

Anti-recidivism Counseling or Services Logan Hall and Delaney Hall offer a variety of groups and lectures on varied topics. More specifically, there are regularly scheduled groups that address recidivism, rehabilitation, substance use and relapse prevention, life skills, jobs skills and anger management. Logan Hall and Delaney Hall utilize the Thinking for a Change Curricula and Cage Your Rage. Staff also utilizes varied curricula to supplement the groups.

Addiction Services for Drug, Alcohol and/or Gambling Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholic Anonymous groups are also provided daily at both facilities. NA and AA are run by residents, staff, and when possible, outside committees. As of 2014, services have also been provided for Gamblers Anonymous. At intake, each resident is assessed for gambling addiction using the "South Oaks Gambling Screener." The "Screener" is a self-administered, [sixteen] item questionnaire used to determine problems. Logan Hall provides a small group to address gambling and when possible has outside committees come to the facility.

Family Counseling or Services Family is an integral part of reentry and addressing recidivism. Logan and Delaney Halls address family dynamics at intake in creating a genogram with each resident. Moreover, both facilities offer additional services through the Family Services Program. The Family Services Program emphasizes generational relationships and communication patterns. Residents may choose to be involved in the Family Services Program by completing the Family Services Consent Form. The Family Services coordinator ensures the provision of group counseling, psycho-educational lectures regarding family issues and referrals to outside community resources for family therapy when needed. Family services meetings occur once a week, and where possible, the internship program is utilized to provide couple and family counseling. On average, 120 residents participate in the Family Services Program per month. Residents are also receiving counseling services to deal with being an absentee father and understanding how their absence affects their children in our Inside Out Dads group which meets weekly, culminating in a graduation with their families in attendance.

Education Counseling or Services An important element in the Logan Hall continuum of care model is the emphasis that is placed on education and vocational training. Studies show that recidivism rates decline when non-reading residents become literate or in cases where residents earn a GED while incarcerated. Logan Hall employs full-time certified teachers. Although new educational technology may be used with residents, it is understood that teacher-to-offender and offender-to-offender relationships in a group setting are still important to the success of the overall educational process. The classrooms, although businesslike, provide an atmosphere of encouragement and positive reinforcement. In December [] 2008, Logan Hall became an official General Educational Development ("GED") testing site, as did Delaney Hall in October 2015. The test measures high school level skills, which would allow those that did not graduate a second chance at obtaining their high school equivalency diploma and more lucrative employment opportunities. Residents who are not taking GED due to limited education are being tutored by volunteer peers who have received their HS diploma or have furthered their education with college courses and or degrees.

Life Skills or Vocational Counseling or Services Logan and Delaney Halls utilize "Thinking for a Change" curricula and Job Readiness curricula to address both life skills and job skills. These groups include, among other things, information on interviewing, job seeking, maintaining a job, work ethic and resume building. The life skills groups include but are not limited to: lectures and assignments addressing conversation, relationships, social skills, budget, anger management, and transitions. Delaney Hall is currently working in conjunction with Newark re-entry services, in order to refer residents for employment and continuing educational services.

Plaintiffs' second interrogatory asked EHCA and CEC to describe the frequency with which the above services were provided. They responded

Logan and Delaney Halls adhere to the standard dictated by [the] American Correctional Association ("ACA"). Residents meet for individual counseling at minimum on a biweekly basis. If needed, each resident has access to the counselor via request slip. This allows the counselor to address residents need[s] outside of their regularly scheduled counseling session. Groups and lectures are conducted daily, typically three (3) groups per day addressing the varied topics listed above. Educational services are offered daily.

Family services are offered daily and there is a weekly meeting offered by the Family Service Department where the family members are present for a lecture and then meet to address family concerns about reentry.

Defendants declined to answer most of plaintiffs' remaining interrogatories on various grounds, contending, among other things, that they exceeded the scope of the remand, sought proprietary and confidential data, and implicated the residents' private and confidential medical information.

In response to plaintiffs' document demands, EHCA and CEC produced a number of sample clinical schedules showing the various programs, courses, and services at Logan and Delaney Halls and the days and times they are offered. They also produced their policy and procedure manuals for the Halls. Notably, among other things, CEC's policy manual provides that residents arriving at Delaney Hall are immediately assigned a program counselor who is "responsible for the resident's treatment plan, reviews, counseling, groups and clinical activities. . . ."

CEC's policy and procedure manual for Logan Hall contains similar provisions. It additionally provides that: updated treatment plans be developed every thirty days for residents whose stay at the facility exceeds that duration; "[t]he Program Counselor and Unit manager or like staff shall schedule sufficient counseling sessions with the resident to review individual needs, long and short term goals, family issues, financial needs and special problem areas such as substance abuse;" and "[a]t least every [fourteen] days, the Program Counselor and resident shall review progress and goal achievement during regularly scheduled Individual Counseling."

Both the Delaney and Logan Hall policy and procedure manuals contain "guidelines regarding the use of consequences to facilitate and maintain pro-social behavioral change." They provide that "[t]he aim of the disciplinary process is to affect resident behavior with the least amount of corrective action necessary to achieve the greatest compliance." They also establish a Clinical Intervention Committee (CIC) that meets daily to address all incidents, merits, and demerits. Sanctions are designed to be "educational in nature" so as "[t]o accomplish the desired therapeutic goal of the CIC," and can range from a verbal warning to a behavioral contract.

After the discovery period ended and an April 4, 2016 trial date had been set, on February 17, 2016, plaintiffs moved to compel defendants to furnish the discovery they had declined to provide. Plaintiffs also sought to extend the discovery period in order to take depositions of defendants' representatives. Notably, plaintiffs further asked to adjourn the April 4, 2016 trial date and "substitut[e] for it an appropriate schedule allowing the parties to submit this matter to the [c]ourt on dispositive cross-motions."

On March 4, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery and extend the discovery end date. The court reasoned that the specific discovery plaintiffs sought to compel exceeded the scope of the remand, and that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of the discovery period. The court agreed to adjourn the trial date, and "encouraged [the parties] to file dispositive motions."

The parties then filed competing summary judgment motions. In his oral opinion, the motion judge noted that the records he reviewed showed that "when an inmate arrives at Delaney or Logan Hall, each inmate meets with a counselor, [who] develops an individual treatment plan which is tailored to the specific treatment needs of the inmate." Unlike a "normal jail," inmates in the Halls are given individualized goals, "based on their specific circumstances relating to employment, finances, education and substance abuse." The judge found nothing in the record that "would even tilt the scales of justice in favor of [] plaintiffs, against [] defendants" so as to prove the Halls are merely alternative jail facilities for the incarceration of County inmates. To the contrary, the judge found "there can be no doubt, whatsoever, that in fact, Delaney Hall and Logan Hall[]" are being utilized for the permitted purposes of providing substance abuse, rehabilitative, and similar services to inmates.

The judge also noted that our remand did not include a directive to determine the quality of the services that were being provided. In any event, the judge found from his review of the record that it was "clear" the services being provided at both Halls were adequate and that the County was "very satisfied" with them. Accordingly, on April 22, 2016, the judge entered companion orders granting defendants' joint motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs again appeal, asserting challenges to the August 25, 2015 CMO, the March 4, 2016 discovery order, and the April 22, 2016 summary judgment orders. Plaintiffs argue, as they did in their initial appeal, that they established that Logan and Delaney Halls are predominantly privatized jails. As support for their position, plaintiffs contend that: the contractual agreement between the County and EHCA/CEC is primarily one of confinement, with treatment services merely being ancillary to incarceration; to the extent EHCA/CEC provides "treatment services," such services are no different than those offered at any county-run facility; and the scope and quality of the rehabilitative services offered at the Halls fall far short of that mandated by State regulations. Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in failing to compel defendants to comply with plaintiffs' written discovery questions, in not extending discovery to allow plaintiff to take depositions, and in denying plaintiffs' discovery motion as untimely.

Defendants jointly argue that the trial court correctly held that the undisputed evidence unequivocally established that inmates receive specialized treatment at the Halls, and thus the 2012 EHCA contract did not constitute an unlawful delegation of the County's responsibility to maintain custody of inmates. Defendants also maintain that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its various discovery rulings.

We first address the discovery issues. We begin by noting that "[a]n appellate court applies 'an abuse of discretion standard to decisions made by [the] trial courts relating to matters of discovery.'" C.A. ex rel. Applegrad v. Bentolila, 219 N.J. 449, 459 (2014) (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)). "A trial court's resolution of a discovery issue is entitled to substantial deference and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 593 (2016). "We need not defer, however, to a discovery order that is . . . 'based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law.'" Ibid. (citations omitted); cf. Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Med., 210 N.J. 597, 604 (2012) (applying a de novo standard of review because the issue turned on the interpretation of contractual and statutory provisions).

Contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, we find that the trial court did not unduly restrict their ability to conduct meaningful discovery. Rather, the August 25, 2015 CMO permitted the parties "to engage in discovery limited to the sole question of whether EHCA's Delaney Hall and Logan Hall facilities actually provide 'authorized inmate rehabilitative and similar services.'" This, we find, is consistent with the scope of our remand, which was necessary to resolve "whether Delaney and Logan Halls are being utilized for the permitted purposes of providing substance abuse, rehabilitative, and similar services," as opposed to merely serving as "alternative jail facilities." Essex Cty. Corr. Officers PBA Local No. 382, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 127. For the same reason, we find no error in the court's March 4, 2016 order declining to compel written discovery responses that exceeded the scope of our remand.

Plaintiffs also challenge the trial court's decision not to extend the discovery period. In reviewing such a decision under Rule 4:24-1(c), we are "limited to a determination of whether the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion[.]" Leitner v. Toms River Reg'l Schs., 392 N.J. Super. 80, 87 (App. Div. 2007) (citation omitted). We are bound to defer to the trial judge's authority to manage the litigation within the procedural framework established by the Supreme Court, and are not in a position to micro-manage or substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial court. See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52-53 (2015). When a party attempts to reopen discovery after a date has been fixed for trial or arbitration, the party making the motion must show "exceptional circumstances." R. 4:24-1(c). In order to extend discovery based upon "exceptional circumstances," the moving party must satisfy four inquiries

(1) why discovery has not been completed within time and counsel's diligence in pursuing discovery during that time; (2) the additional discovery or disclosure sought is essential; (3) an explanation for counsel's failure to request an extension of the time for discovery within the original time period; and (4) the circumstances presented were clearly beyond the control of the attorney and litigant seeking the extension of time.

[Rivers v. LSC P'ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 79 (App. Div.) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 296 (2005).]

Here, plaintiffs have failed to meet this heavy burden for second-guessing the trial court's case management decisions. From the outset, in the August 25, 2015 CMO, the court made it clear that the January 8, 2016 discovery end date "shall not be extended absent exceptional circumstances," which ultimately the court did not find. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, while the CMO established an informal procedure to attempt to resolve discovery disputes, it did not preclude the filing of a discovery motion. We discern no circumstances beyond plaintiffs' control that prevented them from completing discovery or filing a timely motion to compel or extend discovery. Accordingly, we find that the trial court acted within its discretionary authority in denying plaintiffs' motion.

Before turning to the merits, we further note that, at oral argument before us, plaintiffs posited that no further discovery was necessary and that the record was sufficiently developed so as to clearly establish its claim that Delaney and Logan Halls functioned primarily as prison facilities. Additionally, we think it important to recognize that we instructed the trial court on remand to "explore with the parties whether they wish to . . . proceed in a plenary action, including a trial if necessary." Essex Cty. Corr. Officers PBA Local No. 382, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 130. Neither party requested a trial or plenary hearing. Moreover, as noted, in seeking to adjourn the trial date, plaintiffs specifically asked to substitute in its place a schedule for the filing of dispositive summary judgment motions.

We are thus left to scrutinize the additional record that was developed on remand to determine whether it was sufficient to establish, for summary judgment purposes, whether "Delaney and Logan Halls constitute privately run jails and not distinct correctional facilities that combine authorized inmate rehabilitative and similar services with the need to maintain those inmates in confinement." Id. at 129. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, observing the same standard as the trial court. Townsend, supra, 221 N.J. at 59. Summary judgment should be granted only if the record demonstrates there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). We consider "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). If no genuine issue of material fact exists, the inquiry then turns to "whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law." DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 419 (2008)).

To be sure, plaintiffs established that Delaney and Logan Halls bear several key trappings traditionally associated with a conventional prison facility. Plaintiffs correctly posit that EHCA's 2012 contract with the County requires that the Halls be operated in accordance with state regulations applicable to county jails and that the contract further requires that the Halls maintain a secured, fenced, and monitored perimeter. Plaintiffs also point out that the Halls do in fact comply with all aspects of Department of Corrections mandates for county jails, including safety precautions and surveillance, and that the Halls utilize high-technology security measures such as "First Defense" and "Laser-1-Beam" systems. Additionally, EHCA and CEC are contractually responsible for all provisions an inmate would normally need, including food, clothing, and medical and dental care.

This, however, does not end our inquiry. Having brought this action, plaintiffs ultimately bear the burden to establish the invalidity of the 2012 contract. In this case, we have previously recognized the distinction between privately run jails, which would violate the non-delegation doctrine, and "distinct correctional facilities that combine authorized inmate rehabilitative and similar services with the need to maintain those inmates in confinement," which would not. Essex Cty. Corr. Officers PBA Local No. 382, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 129.

We conclude that plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof, since the record unequivocally demonstrates that "Delaney and Logan Halls are being utilized for the permitted purposes of providing substance abuse, rehabilitative, and similar services to inmates." Id. at 127. We agree with defendants that the undisputed evidence amply demonstrates that: inmates who meet the County's eligibility criteria for outpatient treatment are promptly evaluated for behavioral, psychological, and substance abuse issues to develop individualized treatment plans to fit their unique needs; each inmate participates in a customized treatment plan with individual and group therapy to help them develop life skills, reestablish a family support network, and, if needed, combat substance abuse; the treatment programs are delivered by a trained, certified, clinically-supervised staff in a highly-structured manner pursuant to detailed schedules; and inmates who fail to comply with their treatment programs are ultimately transferred back to the Essex County Jail.

The written discovery produced by EHCA and CEC unquestionably demonstrates that residents at the Halls are offered a broad panoply of services that include psychological, rehabilitative, anti-recidivism, and family counseling; addiction services for drugs, alcohol, and gambling; education services; and vocational counseling and services. The schedules produced in discovery document the frequency and regularity with which inmates receive the benefit of these services. Additionally, in contrast to the traditional penal environment, sanctions for disciplinary infractions in the Halls are designed to be "educational in nature" so as "[t]o accomplish [] desired therapeutic goals."

Summary judgment was therefore appropriately granted in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs. For the reasons expressed herein, as well as those stated in our previous published opinion, plaintiffs' action to invalidate the County's 2012 contract with EHCA was properly dismissed.

Affirmed.