JUSTICE RASIDEEN ALLAH v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

JUSTICE RASIDEEN ALLAH,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

October 18, 2016

Submitted May 23, 2016 Decided

Before Judges O'Connor and Suter.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Justice Rasideen Allah, appellant pro se.

Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUTER, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).

Appellant Justice Rasideen Allah is an inmate at the New Jersey State Prison currently serving a life sentence following a conviction for murder. He appeals from two January 28, 2014 final administrative determinations of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) finding him guilty of two counts of prohibited act .754, "giving money or anything of value to, or accepting money or anything of value from, a member of another inmate's family or another inmate's friend with an intent to circumvent any correctional facility or Departmental rule, regulation or policy or with an intent to further an illegal or improper purpose." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). After reviewing the briefs, the record, and applicable legal principles, we affirm.

On December 7, 2013, appellant was charged with *.704, perpetration of a fraud; *.009, "misuse, possession, distribution . . . [of] an electronic communication device;" and *.803/*.306, "conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the correctional facility." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). Appellant was removed from the general prison population and placed in prehearing detention. He pled not guilty to the administrative charges and was granted the assistance of counsel substitute.

At the disciplinary hearing on December 23, 2013,1 the two *.704 charges were modified by the hearing officer to two charges of prohibited act .754. Appellant and his counsel substitute questioned the evidentiary support for the charges, but did not provide statements from witnesses or request to cross-examine adverse witnesses.

The hearing officer relied upon a summary of the confidential material prepared by the investigator and various exhibits identified in the summary to support the findings of guilt. The summary reported that a $350 money order purchased in, and mailed from, North Carolina was mailed to the prison in an envelope with a purported return address in New Jersey. The money order was mailed from a North Carolina address belonging to appellant's brother, an address that was implicated in a previous investigation involving appellant. The same debit card used to purchase that money order was used to purchase five other money orders from October 2010 to November 2013. These money orders were addressed to three different inmates and appeared to be sent, based on the return addresses, by persons in New Jersey and North Carolina.

The investigation revealed that appellant placed "numerous" phone calls to his family members and others telling them to not send money because of his outstanding bills, but did instruct them to where they were to send and the amounts of the money orders. On one occasion, appellant discussed ordering a food package for another inmate. A money order using the same debit card was later sent to that inmate. In this way, appellant "took steps to avoid having funds deposited into his trust account by having it filtered thru (sic) other inmates."

The hearing officer found that appellant had his family send money to another inmate to purchase food. Appellant also had his family send money orders to other inmates. Because inmates are prohibited from sending money or anything of value to other inmates, appellant was found guilty of both .754 charges. The charges under *.803/*.306 were dismissed as not substantiated. Appellant was sanctioned to nineteen days of detention with credit for time served in prehearing detention, ninety-days administrative segregation, and temporary loss of canteen privileges. His administrative appeal of the hearing officer's decisions was rejected on January 28, 2014.

Appellant raises the following points on appeal

THE FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2014 WHICH UPHELD THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING OFFICERS DECEMBER 23, 2013 GUILTY ADJUDICATIONS FOR VIOLATING PROHIBITED ACT .754, SHOULD BE REVERSED AS THIS ADJUDICATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AS A WHOLE, AND IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE. HENRY VS. RAHWAY STATE PRISON, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) AND ALSO IN RE TAYLOR, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999).

i. Forfeiture of Funds

We will not interfere with an agency's final decision unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). When reviewing a final determination of the DOC in a prisoner disciplinary matter, we consider whether there is substantial evidence the inmate has committed the prohibited act and whether, in making its decision, the DOC followed the regulations adopted to afford inmates procedural due process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-98 (1995). Substantial evidence means "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Figueroa v. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961) (internal citation omitted)).

Based upon our review of the record, the charges against appellant were supported by substantial credible evidence, and the DOC's determination was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a); Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212, 222 (1995). Financial transactions of inmates are monitored for security purposes. The hearing officer found that appellant had his family send another inmate money to purchase a food package and had his family send money orders to other inmates. The confidential summary included in the record stated that the money orders were all purchased by the same debit card in North Carolina and payments were directed to a small group of inmates. Appellant's phone calls requested the purchase of money orders, in which he directed where to send and specified the amounts of the orders. In one instance, appellant discussed a food order and a money order was later sent. Although there might not be evidence of a phone call, the money order in close temporal proximity to the food order provided substantial evidence that money orders, all from the same source, were being directed to other inmates at appellant's urging, and that food was ordered either for that inmate or himself to avoid having money deposited in his account because he owed money for legal costs and fees.

We further conclude that appellant received all due process protections afforded him. Appellant was given notice of the charges and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where he declined the opportunity to call or cross-examine witnesses. Both he and counsel substitute provided statements and had the ability to review the adjudication reports for accuracy. The record does reflect there are two final decisions, not one as appellant contends. Appellant implies religious bias on the part of the investigator based on an unrelated case involving another inmate, but presents no evidence of bias here or even if the allegation was raised before the hearing officer. Finally, appellant contends the hearing officer erred by ordering the forfeiture of monies received by other inmates that were derived from the money orders. Appellant has no standing, however, to raise claims for other inmates. See In re Adoption of Baby T, 160 N.J. 332, 340 (App. Div. 1999) ("Entitlement to sue requires a sufficient stake and real adverseness with respect to the subject matter of the litigation.").

We conclude that appellant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

1 For inmates confined in prehearing detention, the hearings are to be held within three calendar days unless there are "exceptional circumstances, unavoidable delays or reasonable postponements." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.8(c). Here, the hearing was adjourned twice so the hearing officer could review the evidence.