NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. K.C.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is only binding on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

K.C.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

S.P.,

Defendant.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF Z.L.S,

A Minor.

__________________________________

October 12, 2016

Submitted October 5, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Haas and Currier.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-193-15.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Marc D. Pereira, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jodie E. Van Wert, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Cory H. Cassar, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant K.C.1 appeals from the February 12, 2016 judgment of guardianship of the Family Part terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Z.L.S., born in 2013.2 Defendant contends that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence. The Law Guardian supports the termination on appeal as it did before the trial court.

Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied the evidence in favor of the guardianship petition overwhelmingly supports the decision to terminate defendant's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Linda L. Cavanaugh's thorough written decision rendered on February 12, 2016.

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's involvement with defendant. Instead, we incorporate by reference Judge Cavanaugh's factual findings and legal conclusions. We add only the following comments.

The baby's mother, S.P., was herself in the Division's custody from 2008 until she turned eighteen in July 2012. Thereafter, S.P. remained under the Division's care and supervision. Five days after S.P. gave birth to Z.L.S. in 2013, the Division assumed custody, care, and supervision of the infant because S.P. was unable to independently parent her. The Division enrolled S.P. and the baby in two successive programs, but the programs discharged S.P. after she violated curfew and failed to follow the staff's directions. The Division then placed Z.L.S., who was then six weeks old, with a resource parent. The child has remained in this placement since that time and the resource parent wishes to adopt her.

S.P. initially named another man as the baby's father, but a paternity test ruled him out. In June 2013, S.P. identified defendant as the father, but he denied paternity. At that time, defendant was in the county jail following his arrest for robbery and unlawful possession of a handgun. In January 2014, a paternity test established defendant as the baby's father and the Division arranged for him to have supervised visits with Z.L.S. at the jail beginning in March 2014.

In June 2015, defendant was sentenced to six years in prison. He is not eligible for release until April 2018. During the period between January 2014 and the February 12, 2016 judgment of guardianship, defendant visited with Z.L.S. on approximately ten occasions. The Division explored alternatives to placement for Z.L.S., but defendant's mother, the only possible relative resource he suggested, was ruled out because she had a "substantiated Division history."

Dr. Mark Singer, Ed.D., testified at trial as the Division's expert psychologist. After evaluating defendant, Dr. Singer opined that he was "not a viable parenting option" for Z.L.S. due to his incarceration and because, even after defendant's eventual release in 2018, he would "likely have difficulty establishing and maintaining appropriate stability in his own life, never mind in the life of his child."

Dr. Singer next conducted a bonding evaluation of defendant and Z.L.S. and concluded that the child did not consider defendant as a consistent, significant parental figure. Because Z.L.S. had no substantial bond with defendant, Dr. Singer testified that she would not experience any significant reaction if her relationship with defendant was severed. On the other hand, Dr. Singer's bonding evaluation of Z.L.S. and her resource parent revealed that the child regarded her caregiver as her parent and that the severance of this relationship would cause Z.L.S. significant and enduring harm. Defendant did not testify and did not present any witnesses at the trial.

In her comprehensive opinion, Judge Cavanaugh reviewed the evidence presented, and thereafter concluded that (1) the Division had proven all four prongs of the best interests test by clear and convincing evidence, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); and (2) termination of defendant's parental rights was in Z.L.S.'s best interests. On this appeal, our review of the trial judge's decision is limited. We defer to her expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998), and we are bound by her factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J.261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)). After reviewing the record, we conclude that Judge Cavanaugh's factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, her legal conclusions are unassailable. We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons that Judge Cavanaugh expressed in her comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion.

Affirmed.

1 We refer to the parties by initials to protect their identities.

2 The judgment also terminated the parental rights of the child's mother, S.P., who voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to the child on January 8, 2016. S.P. has not appealed the trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights.