IAN SKINNER v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

IAN SKINNER,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

______________________________

June 1, 2016

Submitted May 18, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Ostrer and Haas.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Ian Skinner, appellant pro se.

Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gregory Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Ian Skinner challenges a final disciplinary decision of the Department of Corrections (DOC). Skinner was sentenced on May 3, 2013 to an aggregate term of six years, with a mandatory minimum term of thirty-four months, for various drug offenses. He appeals from a December 22, 2014 decision of the associate administrator of the Southern State Correctional Facility, upholding a hearing officer's finding that Skinner committed prohibited act *.202, "possession or introduction of a weapon, such as, but not limited to, a sharpened instrument, knife or unauthorized tool"; and prohibited act *.803/*.203, attempting to possess or introduce "any prohibited substances such as [unprescribed] drugs, intoxicants or related paraphernalia . . . ."1 See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1.

The hearing was Skinner's second. Skinner was found guilty of *.202 and *.203 after a hearing in November of 2013. The finding was upheld on administrative appeal in December of 2013. While his appeal to this court was pending, the DOC sought a remand, which we granted without retaining jurisdiction. At the rehearing, the prohibited substance charge, *.203, was modified to an attempted prohibited substance charge, *.803/*.203. Skinner ultimately received a sanction of 15 days detention, 200 days administrative segregation, and 200 days loss of commutation time.

The finding arises out of the interception, on November 23, 2013, of two pieces of mail addressed to Skinner. The hearing officer found that Suboxone, a controlled dangerous substance, was hidden beneath the postage stamps on the two envelopes. During Skinner's detention after the mail interception, Skinner disclosed that a "shank" was hidden in a shower curtain rod. The discovery of that weapon formed the basis of the *.202 finding. On appeal, Skinner argues that the finding was not supported by substantial credible evidence.

Our standard of review is well-settled. We will disturb a disciplinary decision of the DOC only upon a finding that the decision is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable," or unsupported "by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App. Div. 2010); see alsoIn re Carter, 191 N.J.474, 482 (2007) (describing arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable finding). Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A reviewing court "may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's, even though the court might have reached a different result." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J.182, 194 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Yet, our review is not "perfunctory," nor is "our function . . . merely [to] rubberstamp an agency's decision. . . ." Figueroa, supra, 414 N.J. Super.at 191.

Having reviewed the record in light of this standard of review, we discern no basis to disturb the hearing officer's findings, which the associate administrator adopted. We consider first the finding that Skinner attempted to introduce a prohibited substance, Suboxone, into the facility. Skinner contends the evidence was insufficient because the DOC failed to test the substance found beneath the postage stamps; and his identification number on the face of the envelope was misstated by one digit. We disagree. The record reflects that the substance found possessed markings associated with the drug. Furthermore, Skinner admitted in a statement to prison officials that he knew an attempt would be made to send Suboxone to him by mail. His assertion that the substance was intended for another person's use is no defense.

With respect to the possession of a weapon charge, Skinner asserted that he voluntarily disclosed the existence of the shank, as well as other prisoners' plan to harm a corrections officer. Even if Skinner renounced participation in the plan, he admitted in a statement that he was handed the shank by a fellow prisoner, and thus possessed it, before handing it back. Skinner stated that his fingerprints would be found on the shank. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that Skinner had possessed the weapon.

To the extent not addressed, Skinner's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

1 Prohibited act *.803 states that "attempting to commit any of the above acts preceded by an asterisk, aiding another person to commit any such act or making plans to commit such acts, shall be considered the same as a commission of the act itself." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1.