SANG C. LEE v. TAE I. KIM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

SANG C. LEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TAE I. KIM,

Defendant.

__________________________________

April 20, 2016

Submitted April 5, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Currier.

On appeal from the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-8622-10.

Andrew Park, appellant pro se.

Jae Lee Law, P.C., for respondent Fishman McIntyre, P.C. (Martin S. Cedzidlo, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

After several plaintiffs transferred their personal injury cases to another firm, a dispute arose between the two law firms, each claiming that the other owed it legal fees and costs. After the firms came to a resolution of those claims, one of those firms, the Law Offices of Andrew Park, P.C., filed a motion under this caption, again claiming that Fishman McIntyre, P.C., the successor law firm, owed him fees and disbursements he had incurred while handling the matter. He appeals the judge's dismissal of his claim and the award of counsel fees to the successor firm. We find no merit in Park's arguments and affirm.

In a prior action, Sim & Park, LLP v. Fishman McIntyre, PC and Jae Lee, Park claimed that the Fishman law office had undertaken the representation of several of his former clients and he was owed fees for work performed on those files. Fishman counterclaimed, alleging there were also cases that had originally been filed by them in which work was thereafter done by Park; and therefore, it was Park who owed fees and disbursement costs. The firms settled all claims between them with Park making a settlement payment to Fishman. All claims each firm had against the other were dismissed with prejudice.

Within two weeks after payment was made, Park filed a motion under this caption, seeking fees and disbursement costs from Fishman. This personal injury case had settled prior to the inception of the fee litigation between the firms; Park had not asserted a lien for attorney's fees or costs. The judge denied the motion on the grounds that it was barred by the entire controversy doctrine. See R. 4:30A. She stated

The Court finds that Mr. Park's claim is precluded under the Entire Controversy Doctrine. Recently, the matter of Sim & Park, LLC v. Fishman McIntyre, P.C. had been settled outright and in its entirety. In that case, each law firm asserted claims against the other for fees purportedly owed due to firm substitutions. At the 11th [h]our, the parties settled a number of fee disputes and reached a resolution to the litigation in the form of a settlement agreement. . . .

The Court concludes that Mr. Park did not satisfy his continuing obligation during the pendency of that litigation to amend his claims so as to include the fee dispute now in question prior to the settlement agreement, which necessarily entailed dismissal with prejudice as to all claims between the firms. The court agrees . . . that Mr. Park knew, or should have known, that the claim for fees now before the Court arose from the same transaction or series of transactions pertaining to the Sim & Park, LLP v. Fishman McIntyre, P.C. case.

The judge subsequently granted Fishman's fee application, finding Park's motion to have been "frivolous; unnecessary, and unwarranted" in light of the reasons she expressed in her decision on the substantive motion.

On appeal, Park argues the judge erred in (1) denying his motion for fees and costs arising from his work in this matter; and (2) awarding counsel fees to Fishman. We find Park's arguments to be of insufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the judge in her written decision. We add only the following brief comments.

Park initially brought a lawsuit against Fishman for fees and costs pertaining to three matters. Fishman's answer and counterclaim added six additional cases to which Fishman asserted it was owed monies. The firms resolved all of these cases in a global settlement, agreeing to dismiss all claims between them. If there were additional matters the two firms had handled, in which Park believed he had an attorney's lien, the entire controversy rule required him to assert those claims in the Sims litigation. See Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 16 (1989) (stating that the entire controversy doctrine encompasses "virtually all causes, claims, and defenses relating to a controversy between parties engaged in litigation."). His failure to do so requires preclusion under Rule 4:30 A. 1

Finally, as to the counsel fee award, Park only argues error as to the amount of the award. We find the judge did not abuse her discretion in her determination of the appropriate award.

Affirmed.

1 We also note Park's failure to comply with Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) requiring the filing of a

certification as to whether the matter in controversy is the subject of any other action pending in any court . . . or whether any other action . . . is contemplated . . . .

Each party shall have a continuing obligation during the course of the litigation to file and serve on all other parties and with the court an amended certification if there is a change in the facts stated in the original certification.