STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. HECTOR RODRIGUEZ

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 
 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

HECTOR RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

December 20, 2016

 

Submitted September 20, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Koblitz and Sumners.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 09-01-0178.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Kevin G. Byrnes, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Mary R. Juliano, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On January 26, 2009, defendant Hector Rodriguez and fifteen other individuals were indicted for their involvement in a racketeering enterprise that was engaged in distributing cocaine and laundering the proceeds. The indictment was the result of an extensive year-long investigation by law enforcement which included the trial court's issuance of communication data warrants and search warrants.

On February 16, 2010, the judge entered an order and rendered an oral decision denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. Thereafter, on April 5, 2010, defendant pled guilty to second-degree racketeering conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; first-degree possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1); and first-degree financial facilitation of criminal activity (money laundering), N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25. The judge sentenced defendant on August 27, 2010, in accordance with the plea agreement, to an aggregate term of twelve years with a five-year period of parole ineligibility.

Defendant now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and his sentence, arguing

POINT I

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURES AS GUARANTEED BY ART. 1, PAR[A.] 7 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED BY THE POLICE SEARCH BASED ON AN INVALID WARRANT.

POINT II

THE SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY BALANCED THE AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS.

Initially, we point out that defendant's excessive sentence argument is moot. On January 19, 2016, the State filed a motion to correct defendant's illegal sentence. Defendant was paroled on March 16. On June 1, the judge entered a consent order correcting defendant's illegal sentence and resentenced him.1 No appeal has been filed concerning the new sentence.

With respect to the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant contends that the judge erred because the search warrant application was supported by affidavits that did not provide a factual basis establishing the reliability of informants who were relied upon. We are unpersuaded.

"[A] search executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed to be valid" and . . . a defendant challenging its validity has the burden to prove 'that there was no probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.'" State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004) (quoting State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983)). "Accordingly, courts 'accord substantial deference to the discretionary determination resulting in the issuance of the [search] warrant.'" State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541, 554 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, supra, 179 N.J. at 388). When "reviewing a grant or denial of a motion to suppress [we] must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014) (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We "should reverse only when the trial court's determination is 'so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" Id. at 425 (quoting Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 244). "A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. Therefore, a trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Ibid. (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)). Any "doubt as to the validity of the warrant 'should ordinarily be resolved by sustaining the search.'" Keyes, supra, 184 N.J. at 554 (quoting Jones, 179 N.J. at 389 (2004)).

Where an application for a search warrant was based upon a police informant, the trial court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the informant's reliability such that there is a "fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 213 (2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 (1983)). Evaluating an informant's reliability is not only based upon a past history of reliability but also on the detail provided by the informant that "may imply that the informant's knowledge of the alleged criminal activity is derived from a trustworthy source." Ibid. (quoting State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1033, 119 S. Ct. 576, 142 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1998)). A corroborative investigation by law enforcement can bolster "the informant's veracity, if inadequately documented in the [police] officer's affidavit[.]" Id. at 213-214 (quoting State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 113 (1987)).

With these principles in mind, we affirm the denial of defendant's suppression motion, substantially for the sound reasons set forth in the judge's comprehensive oral decision on February 16, 2010. The totality of the circumstances, as described in the affidavits supporting the warrant applications, amply supports the judge's finding that law enforcement had probable cause to search defendant's home to find evidence of a large-scale drug trafficking and money laundering enterprise based upon an extensive investigation.

Affirm.

1 Defendant's aggregate prison term remained the same, however, the count of the indictment charging money laundering, to which he had been sentenced to a concurrent term of twelve years with five years of parole ineligibility, was dismissed.