DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. A.M.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-00231-15T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.M.,

Defendant-Appellant,

_______________________________

IN THE MATTER OF D.A.C.,

a minor.

_______________________________

December 15, 2016

/

Submitted November 15, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Koblitz, Rothstadt and Sumners.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FG-16-80-15.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Grace Eisenberg, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Mehnaz Rahim, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (R. Marcel Pirtea, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant A.M. appeals from an August 25, 2015 Family Part order terminating her parental rights to her son D.A.C., who was not yet two years old at the time of the guardianship trial. A.M. chose not to attend the trial. We affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Richard M. Freid in his written opinion issued with the order.

The evidence is outlined in detail in the judge's opinion. A summary will suffice here. The child was born in 2014 when A.M. was seventeen years old. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) had custody of A.M. for several years prior to the birth of her child. A.M. ran away often, refusing to remain in any single placement. She also engaged in aggressive behavior causing her removal from two placements. She was resistant to many of the other services offered to her by the Division, including the prenatal portion of "Mommy and Me" programs, GED courses and counseling.

Defendant consented to the Division obtaining custody of D.A.C. nine days after his birth. He has remained with the same resource parent since he was five months old. This caretaker is eager to adopt him. A.M. did not attend visits with any regularity, and stopped visiting completely when her son was thirteen months old. She has been missing for many periods of time, and her son has never been in her custody.

In his comprehensive opinion, Judge Freid found that the Division had proven all four prongs of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and that termination of defendant's parental rights was in the child's best interests. On this appeal, our review of the trial judge's decision is limited. We defer to his expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998), and we are bound by his factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)). After reviewing the record, we conclude that Judge Freid's factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, his legal conclusions are unassailable.

Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in finding that the Division demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence the four prongs of the best interests tests. She argues that her parental rights to D.A.C. should not have been terminated because she demonstrated that she could be a good caretaker and it was the Division's failure to assist her as its minor "child-client" that prevented her from doing so, citing to N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451 (App. Div. 2012). In L.J.D., we affirmed the termination of parental rights of a mother who was fourteen years old and in the custody of the Division of Youth and Family Services1 when she gave birth. Id. at 494. As occurred here, L.J.D. was offered many services but was unable to sufficiently improve her ability to parent her child. Defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

1 The former name of the Division.