RICHARD A. POLINE v. BOARD OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

RICHARD A. POLINE,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR,

Respondent.

______________________________________________________

December 9, 2015

 

Submitted September 24, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Koblitz and Kennedy.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 421,182.

Richard A. Poline, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Robert M. Strang, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant challenges the decision of the Board of Review (the Board) rejecting his request for a waiver of payment of the refund balance due as a consequence of his receipt of unemployment benefits for a period for which he was later found disqualified. In a separate appeal, we affirmed the decision of the Board disqualifying him for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).

In denying his request for a waiver the Board found

[I]n light of the fact that the claimant is able to work and based on job market statistics for his occupation as a plumber, the claimant has very good chances of becoming re-employed. The claimant, in addition to owning a home with his spouse, has a monthly income from part-time employment that can be supplemented with his earnings from self-employment. The Director has already assigned a repayment agreement that can be negotiated to fit the claimant's current circumstances. Hence, there is no evidence to support that recovery of the overpayment would be patently contrary to the principles of equity. The claimant is not entitled to a waiver of the refund.

Appellant argues that the Board erred because he faces economic hardship due to "a great deal of competition from other plumbers." He adds that he had "spent money [he] never would have spent" had he known that he would not be entitled to unemployment benefits. We disagree and affirm the decision of the Board.

We will not recite the facts we have already set forth at length in our decision affirming the Board's determination on appellant's disqualification. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d), if an individual receives benefits for any reason while he or she was disqualified from receiving said benefits, the individual "shall be liable to repay those benefits in full." The waiver of recovery of benefit overpayment can only be granted by the Director of the Division in accordance with N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2. Specifically, the Director may grant a waiver under N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(a)(3), if the recovery of the overpayment would be "patently contrary to the principles of equity." In making that determination, the Director must "consider whether the terms of a reasonable repayment schedule would result in economic hardship to the claimant." N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(d).

Full repayment of benefits is required from anyone "who, for any reason, regardless of good faith, was not actually entitled to those benefits." Bannan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App. Div. 1997) (citation omitted). Indeed, the recovery of monies improvidently paid to those found ineligible to receive benefits furthers the purpose of the unemployment compensation laws and "preserve[s] the Unemployment Trust Fund for the payment of benefits to those individuals entitled to receive them." Ibid. Moreover, "federal law requires that a state recover improperly paid unemployment compensation benefits[,]" id. at 675; see 42 U.S.C.A. 503(a)(9), as do State regulations. See N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.1.

The only question is whether appellant is entitled to a waiver pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2. The Director of the Division may waive repayment of an overpayment of unemployment benefits under the limited circumstances in N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2. As we have noted, the Director may grant a waiver where the recovery of the overpayment "would be patently contrary to the principles of equity." N.J.A.C. 12:14.2(a)(3). In order to determine whether recovery or overpayment would be "patently contrary to the principles of equity," the "Director . . . shall consider whether the terms of a reasonable repayment schedule would result in economic hardship to the claimant." N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(d). Where a waiver is denied, the overpayment "must be repaid in full." N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2. Appellant in the matter before us has failed to demonstrate that repayment would result in economic hardship to him or is otherwise contrary to the principles of equity.

The Board's decision was rendered following a hearing which comported with due process. See Malady v. Bd. of Review, 166 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div. 1979). Its determination is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and we discern no basis for the decision to be disturbed. See Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 71 (1985).

Affirmed.