IN THE MATTER OF ERIK MATA

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

IN THE MATTER OF

ERIK MATA, A NGRI ACQUITTEE.

___________________________________

December 7, 2015

Argued October 5, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Higbee.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 12-08-1437.

Joshua D. Sanders, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant Erik Mata (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Sanders, of counsel and on the briefs).

Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Elson, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On March 9, 2012, Erik Mata entered a liquor store holding a knife and demanded the employees empty the cash register. The employees observed he looked psychotic; he was shaking, twitching, spoke irregularly, and seemed more afraid than the employees. Mata requested that the employees either call the police or give him all the money. The employees called the police and Mata waited for their arrival. He was arrested and indicted on one count of first degree armed robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; one count of third degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and one count of fourth degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). Mata later stated his motivation for the crime was to silence the voices in his head telling him to get off the streets. He feared if he stayed on the streets he would die.

The State and defendant stipulated to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1. In an order dated May 29, 2014, Judge Adam E. Jacobs found Mata not to be a danger to himself or the community provided he remained under supervision or under conditions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2). He set Mata's supervisory time limit at nineteen-years and three-weeks. Judge Jacobs authored a written opinion accompanying the order explaining he set the supervisory period equivalent to the aggregate maximum term for first degree armed robbery.

In making his decision, the judge weighed factors to determine the supervisory term. He found the extended supervisory time period was needed to assure Mata's therapeutic progress and liberty interests were maintained while still balancing any risk he posed to public safety. The judge explained Mata's liberty interests were minimally restricted in that he was only to report every six-to-twelve-months to court to ensure he received the appropriate treatment. The judge also pointed out a reduction in his supervisory period would only curtail the treatment options available to Mata in the event his mental health degenerated, increasing the likelihood he would commit another criminal act in a desperate effort to find help. Finally, he noted Mata would be entitled to periodic review hearings where his continued supervision could be terminated or modified when appropriate.

On appeal, Mata raised the following points

POINT I

THE LEGISLATURE SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED, UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3), THAT A DEFENDANT WHO CANNOT BE RELEASED WITHOUT POSING A DANGER, MUST BE COMMITTED TO THE COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN SERVICES TO BE TREATED AS A PERSON CIVILLY COMMITTED, AND MUST RECEIVE THE "MAXIMUM PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT," WHICH IS CLEARLY NOT APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE OMITTED THE "MAXIMUM PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT" LANGUAGE FROM N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2).

A. On Its Face, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2) Is Clear In Omitting A Period Of Supervision Equaling The Maximum Period Of Imprisonment That Could Have Been Imposed. Therefore The Imposition Of Such A Term Is Clear Error Under The Statute.

B. As The Plain Meaning Of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2) Cannot Be Determined On Its Face As To The Length Of A Period Of Supervision And Is Therefore Ambiguous, This Court Must Adhere To Basic Principles Of Statutory Construction Which Preclude The Implantation Of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3)'s "Maximum Term" Language Into N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2).

C. The Legislative History Of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2) Precludes The Annexation Of The Maximum Term Language From N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3).

POINT II

A MAXIMUM KROL TERM FOR MR. MATA, A MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANT IN REMISSION, IS INAPPROPRIATE AND AMOUNTS TO PUNISHING HIM FOR HIS MENTAL ILLNESS.

A. Because The Lower Court Found That Mr. Mata Is Not Dangerous, A 20-Year Period Of Supervision Is Not Warranted And Is An Abuse Of Discretion By The Lower Court.

B. Mr. Mata Completed An Intensive Outpatient Program As A Condition Of Bail Prior To Being Placed In Krol Status, Therefore He Is Much Closer To An N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(1) Acquittee Than An N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3) Acquittee; Therefore, A 20-Year Period Of Supervision Is Unwarranted.

C. Courts Should Apply The Same Standards As Would Be Employed In Other Supervised Release Criminal Matters, Given The Absence Of Statutory Guidance As To The Length Of Supervision And The Rehabilitative And Therapeutic Purposes Underlying Releasing NGRI Acquittees Into The Community Under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2).

D. A Hearing Must Be Held By The Trial Court To Determine The Appropriate Length Of Time In Krol Status Under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2), Taking Into Consideration The Unique Treatment Needs Of Mr. Mata, With Expert Testimony As Necessary.

The statute in question states after an individual is acquitted by reason of insanity

(b) The court shall dispose of the defendant in the following manner

(1) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or himself without supervision, the court shall so release the defendant; or

(2) If the court finds that the defendant may be released without danger to the community or to himself under supervision or under conditions, the court shall so order; or

(3) If the court finds that the defendant cannot be released with or without supervision or conditions without posing a danger to the community or to himself, it shall commit the defendant to a mental health facility approved for this purpose by the Commissioner of Human Services to be treated as a person civilly committed. . . . The defendant s continued commitment, under the law governing civil commitment, shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence, during the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed, as an ordinary term of imprisonment, for any charge on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(1)-(3).]

The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2) in State v. Ortiz, 193 N.J. 278 (2008). In Ortiz, a defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 285. He was released pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2). Id. at 286. The Court held trial courts possessed the inherent authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2) to impose procedural conditions including mandatory periodic review. Id. at 281-82. The Court reasoned an individual "released pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2) stands far closer to a committed defendant who has been acquitted by reason of insanity under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3) than to an unconditionally released defendant who has been acquitted by reason of insanity as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(1)." Id. at 291. The Supreme Court further held conditionally released individuals were still considered a threat to themselves and others unlike unconditionally released persons. Ibid. This danger was mitigated by the supervision and/or conditions governing the release. Ibid. It remained the court's obligation "to manage and minimize the degree of danger [a person] may present to himself and to others while, at the same time, balancing the curtailment of defendant's liberty interests." Id. at 292. This required a delicate balancing between society's interests in protection from harm against the individual's personal liberty and autonomy. Id. at 292-93.

While Ortiz did not specifically address the proper length for a supervisory term, we take guidance from the Court's decision. In determining the length of supervision a court must balance the acquitted individual's liberty interests against the public's interest in protection from harm. Judge Jacobs properly considered this balance in his analysis. He determined Mata still remained a threat to himself and the public, as demonstrated by the need for his conditional, rather than unconditional, release. He also found Mata's liberties were restricted only to the extent that he was assured appropriate treatment while reporting to court once every six-to-twelve months.

We agree with Mata that the supervisory term need not be for the crime's maximum sentence as required for individuals committed under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(3), but the crime's degree and the crime's sentence limits can be considered by the judge as they reflect the potential risks to society. The supervisory term length under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2) is left to the court's discretion by the Legislature's silence on the matter. The court in its discretion may choose to use the maximum or minimum sentence term for the crime or whatever other time frame it finds appropriate after balancing the individual's liberty interests against both the individual and the public's safety interests.

We are satisfied Judge Jacobs balanced the risk of harm to society against Mata's liberty and safety interests in determining the supervisory period length. He considered Mata's needs and society's needs in light of the record and applicable legal principles. Mata is entitled to periodic hearings to review his status and to allow termination of his supervision when it is appropriate. We find no abuse of Judge Jacobs' discretion.

Affirmed.