ERIC I. FORD v. BOARD OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

ERIC I. FORD,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR and QUICK CHEK

CORPORATION,

Respondents.

______________________________

March 17, 2015

Before Judges Reisner and Haas.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 397,589.

Eric I. Ford, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brian M. Scott, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Respondent Quick Chek Corporation has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Appellant appeals from the April 24, 2013 decision of the Board of Review (Board) affirming a decision of the Appeal Tribunal that he was disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. We affirm.

Appellant was employed by Quick Chek Corporation as an assistant store leader from October 2009, until he quit his job on June 28, 2012. Appellant testified that he resigned from his position after receiving a text message from his supervisor the day before, June 27, which was his day off. The text stated, "Why were you here until 5:30 last night?" At the Appeal Tribunal hearing, appellant testified that he had worked from 5:00 a.m. until 5:30 p.m. on June 26, although his work day had been scheduled to end at 3:00 p.m. Appellant sent his supervisor a reply text, "asking her if . . . she thought I wanted to work that long or maybe it was because of a certain amount of work that had to be done and other people not completing their tasks." The supervisor replied, "Enjoy your day. We will chat tomorrow."

Appellant testified he thought about the supervisor's text message "the whole day" on June 27, and that "[i]t kept me awake all day." The "following morning," appellant "made the decision . . . to go in and finish with the employment with Quick Chek." He stated that, the previous fall, he had been transferred to a new store that was thirty-five miles away from his previous work location and that he was having problems with one of his new managers.

However, appellant admitted that he did not have any intention of resigning until he received the supervisor's text message on June 27. Appellant also admitted that, when he told his supervisor he was quitting, "she tried in her way to . . . to get me to change my mind about leaving." However, appellant "told her I made up my mind. That I was a little bit stubborn in that respect, pig headed if you'd like, and no, my mind was made up. I was leaving the company."

Appellant filed an application for unemployment benefits, which was denied by the Director because he had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. Appellant appealed and the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the denial of benefits, as did the Board.

This appeal followed. Before us, appellant contends the Board erred in finding he was disqualified for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We disagree.

Our review of an administrative agency decision is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "'[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obligated to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). Only if the Board's "action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable" should it be disturbed. Ibid.

An employee is disqualified for benefits

For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes re-employed and works eight weeks in employment . . . and has earned in employment at least ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate.

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).]

An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden of proving that he or she "did so with good cause attributable to [the] work." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218.

Here, the determination that appellant left work without good cause attributable to the work is amply supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole and is not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Appellant's supervisor merely asked him why he had stayed at work several hours longer than scheduled. The supervisor did not criticize appellant's work performance and, when appellant announced he was quitting his job, the supervisor attempted to persuade him to change his mind.

The record simply does not support appellant's current contention that he was forced to resign due to a "hostile work environment" caused by the two text messages, his transfer over six months before to a new store, or problems he allegedly had with one of his new managers. It is well-established that "'[m]ere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Medwick v. Bd. of Review, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)). "'The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances . . . attributable to the work.'" Shuster v. Bd. of Review, 396 N.J. Super. 240, 244-45 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Fernandez v. Bd. of Review, 304 N.J. Super. 603, 606 (App. Div. 1997)). "[I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288.

Appellant admitted he left work because he was unhappy with his supervisor's benign text messages, not because of his commute or his alleged problems with a new manager. Under these circumstances, we discern no basis for disturbing the Board's determination that appellant left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work.

Affirmed.