PATRICIA MURPHY v. MICHAEL B. MURPHY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

PATRICIA MURPHY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL B. MURPHY,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

May 18, 2015

Submitted May 4, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Simonelli and Guadagno.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FM-14-1120-12.

Michael B. Murphy, appellant pro se.

Patricia Murphy, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

In this matrimonial matter, defendant Michael B. Murphy appeals from that part of the April 9, 2014 Family Part order, which denied his post-judgment motion to compel plaintiff Patricia Murphy to make mortgage payments on the parties' marital home, and granted plaintiff's cross-motion to compel him to reimburse her for unreimbursed medical expenses and medical insurance. For the following reasons, we affirm the denial of defendant's motion, but for reasons other than those expressed by the trial judge. Aquilio v. Cont'l Ins. Co. of N.J., 310 N.J. Super. 558, 561 (App. Div. 1998). We reverse the grant of plaintiff's cross-motion and vacate that part of the order requiring defendant to reimburse plaintiff for unreimbursed medical insurance and medical expenses.

The following facts inform our review. The parties were married on November 7, 1987. They have three children. At the time the final dual judgment of divorce (FDJD) was entered on June 28, 2013, two sons were emancipated and the parties shared joint custody of a daughter. The FDJD incorporated the parties' matrimonial settlement agreement (MSA).

Prior to entry of the FDJD, a December 21, 2012 court order required defendant to pay pendente lite support to plaintiff in the amount of $3000 per month. The order also required defendant to maintain medical insurance for plaintiff and pay her unreimbursed medical expenses, among other things.

The parties executed the MSA on June 28, 2013. Paragraph 3.1 required defendant to continue paying the pendente lite support of $3000 per month and also pay the carrying charges on the marital home. Paragraph 3.1 required defendant to make both payments "until the house [was] sold, or through January 1, 2014, whichever [was] sooner." After January 1, 2014, paragraph 3.2 of the MSA required defendant to pay alimony in the amount of $10,000 per month for a period of ten years plus a percentage of his annual bonuses.

Paragraph 3.8 of the MSA modified the December 21, 2012 order with respect to defendant's obligation to maintain medical insurance for plaintiff and pay her uncovered or unreimbursed health care expenses. Defendant was now only required to "maintain coverage for [plaintiff] on his health and dental plans through the [FDJD] and . . . ensure that [plaintiff] obtains COBRA benefits through his current employer, which she shall maintain at her own expense." (Emphasis added).

Because the parties were well-aware that the marital home had no equity, they acknowledged in the MSA that there may be a short sale and shortfall. They also anticipated that the marital home would sell quickly and well before January 1, 2014, and made no provision in the MSA for payment of the mortgage after January 1, 2014. Unfortunately, the marital home did not sell by January 1, 2014, allegedly because defendant would not agree to a price reduction or short sale.1 Defendant made no mortgage payments after December 2013. Instead, in a January 14, 2014 letter to plaintiff, he demanded as follows

The [FDJD] requires that you pay the mortgage as well as all bills and expenses for [the marital home] until the property is sold. The mortgage payment is due on the first of every month. As of this date the mortgage has not been paid.

Please make the January mortgage payment immediately and ensure that future payments are made in a timely [manner]. If not, I will have no alternative but to file a [m]otion with the [c]ourt to enforce the [FDJD].

On January 20, 2014, defendant filed a motion for an order compelling plaintiff to pay the mortgage or, alternatively, reducing the monthly alimony by the mortgage amount to pay the mortgage.2 Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for an order compelling defendant to pay the mortgage and for an award of $6,105.30 for her unreimbursed COBRA expenses from July through December 2013, and unreimbursed medical bills for medical treatment she received in September and October 2013.

In an April 9, 2014 order and written opinion, the trial judge denied defendant's motion. The judge found that the parties agreed there was no equity in the marital home and also agreed that continuing to pay the mortgage and taxes would produce no positive result. Accordingly, the judge held that neither party would be responsible for the mortgage. Relying, incorrectly, on paragraph 3.1 of the MSA, the judge granted plaintiff's cross-motion and ordered defendant to reimburse her for unreimbursed medical insurance and medical expenses. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues that the MSA did not obligate him to pay the mortgage after January 1, 2014, and since plaintiff continued to live in the marital home thereafter, she should have been ordered to pay the mortgage. Defendant also argues that the judge erred in ordering him to reimburse plaintiff for unreimbursed medical insurance and medical expenses. We disagree with defendant's first argument, but agree with the second.

"An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract which, like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other contracts." Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25 (App. Div.) (quoting Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J. Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 1974)), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983). "Settlement agreements in matrimonial matters, being 'essentially consensual and voluntary in character, . . . [are] entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability' in equity, provided they are fair and just." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 20 (App. Div. 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981)).

Separation agreements "'are generally favored by the courts as a peaceful means of terminating marital strife and discord so long as they are not against public policy.'" Dolce, supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 20 (quoting Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 194 (1999)). "And while incorporation of a [marital settlement agreement] into a divorce decree does not render it immutable, nor its terms solely governed by contract law, nevertheless, if found to be fair and just, it is specifically enforceable in equity." Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 224 (App. Div. 2004) (citations omitted).

Defendant does not argue that the MSA is unfair, unjust, or unenforceable. To the contrary, he seeks enforcement of the provisions terminating his mortgage obligation as of January 1, 2014, and terminating his obligation to reimburse plaintiff for her medical insurance and medical expenses as of June 28, 2013, the date of the FDJD. However, defendant seeks to compel plaintiff to pay the mortgage after January 1, 2014 when neither the MSA nor FDJD required her to do so, regardless of whether she continued living in the marital home thereafter. Although we understand defendant's equitable argument, if he had wanted plaintiff to pay the mortgage for as long as she lived in the marital home, regardless of the lack of a sale, he should have included a provision to that effect in the MSA. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of his motion.

We reach a different conclusion as to the grant of plaintiff's cross-motion. The judge incorrectly relied on paragraph 3.1 of the MSA to compel defendant to reimburse plaintiff for her unreimbursed medical insurance and medical expenses when paragraph 3.8 actually applied. Paragraph 3.8 modified the December 21, 2012 order and no longer required defendant to reimburse plaintiff as of June 28, 2013, the date of the FDJD. Because plaintiff incurred her medical insurance costs and medical expenses after that date, she was not entitled to any reimbursement from defendant. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the grant of plaintiff's cross-motion.

Affirmed in part and reversed and vacated in part.

1 The parties had priced the marital home for sale as lakefront property. However, a subsequent survey revealed that the property was actually less-valuable lake view property.

2 The mortgage payment was approximately $5000 per month.