RENE D. EDWARDS v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

RENE D. EDWARDS,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

________________________________

June 15, 2015

Submitted January 12, 2015 Decided

Before Judges St. John and Rothstadt.

On appeal from New Jersey State Parole

Board.

Rene D. Edwards, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant, Rene D. Edwards, appeals from a final agency decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board denying him parole, and imposing a twenty-four month future eligibility term (FET). Appellant argues the Parole Board's decision was unwarranted because the conditions of his confinement require his release, he is innocent of the underlying charges for which he was incarcerated and he has successfully completed a period of parole in the past. In response, the Parole Board argues that it properly "exercised its authority and determined that, based on the facts and circumstances, [appellant] could not be released on parole." We affirm.

We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal.

At the time of his parole hearing, appellant was an inmate at New Jersey State Prison where he was serving an aggregate term of six years and six months, with a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment of three years and three months. His incarceration arose from his 2010 conviction after a jury trial for third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement Officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a), third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3), and the disorderly persons offense of simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a); from his 2006 guilty plea to one count of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b); as well his 2010 guilty plea to failure to comply with G.P.S. monitoring, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.94. Previously, appellant had been convicted of numerous offenses including first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1, and criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b). He received a period of five years' probation for the last charge and was classified as a high-risk sex offender. At the time of his latest convictions, he was on probation and ultimately pled guilty to violations of probation as well. While incarcerated, appellant was convicted of committing four institutional disciplinary infractions.

Appellant became eligible for parole in January 2013. In anticipation of that eligibility, the Parole Board scheduled him for a hearing before a hearing officer, who referred the matter to a Board Panel, which considered appellant's application in November 2012, denied parole, and imposed a twenty-four month FET. It specifically relied upon appellant's prior criminal record, which it found repetitive, his prior incarceration and failure to comply with conditions of probation, and his institutional infractions. In addition, the Board Panel found appellant had "insufficient problem resolution," which he demonstrated through "a lack of insight into [his] criminal behavior, the denial of [the] crime; [and his] minimiz[ing] conduct," noting that appellant "fails to take any responsibility for his conduct." The Board Panel also determined that appellant did not have an "adequate parole plan to assist in successful reintegration into the community." The panel considered mitigating factors, including appellant's risk assessment evaluation of "22." The Board Panel recommended appellant participate in behavior modification programs while he remained incarcerated.

In response to appellant's appeal from the Board Panel's determinations, the Parole Board affirmed the decision to deny parole and impose the twenty-four month FET. In its comprehensive written final decision, the Parole Board addressed each of appellant's contentions as to why he thought the Board Panel had erred in denying him parole. The Parole Board concluded

Based upon consideration of the facts cited above, the Board finds that the Board Panel has considered the aggregate of information pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11 and fully documented and supported its decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.18(f). Additionally, in assessing your case, the Board concurs with the determination of the Board Panel that a preponderance of the evidence indicates that there is a reasonable expectation that you would violate the conditions of parole if released on parole at this time. Accordingly, the Board affirms the Board Panel's November 9, 2012 decision to deny parole and establish a twenty-four (24) month future parole eligibility term.

This appeal followed.

Our review of the Parole Board's decision is limited. The Parole Board's "decisions are highly individualized discretionary appraisals." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (Trantino V) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although there is an "inherent difficulty in gauging whether a parole determination constitutes an abuse of discretion," the judicial review of Parole Board determinations "does not engender a more exacting standard of judicial review than that applicable to other administrative agency decisions." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19, 25 (1998) (Trantino IV), modified in part, aff'd in part, 166 N.J. 113 (2001). "Parole Board decisions should not be reversed . . . unless found to be arbitrary or an abuse of discretion." Ibid. (citations omitted); Monks v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 242 (1971); State v. Lavelle, 54 N.J. 315, 322 (1969); Pazden v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 374 N.J. Super. 356, 366 (App. Div. 2005). While we do owe deference to an administrative agency, we do not rubber stamp its decisions. See In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999).

Having considered appellant's arguments in light of the record and applicable law, we conclude that they are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). The standard applicable to the parole determination here is contained in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a), which provides that the inmate shall be released on parole unless, "by a preponderance of the evidence . . there is a reasonable expectation that the inmate will violate conditions of parole . . . if released on parole at that time."

In applying these principles to the record here, we defer to the Parole Board's factual findings and expertise and conclude its decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The Parole Board considered all relevant material facts as enumerated in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11. The record discloses no basis for concluding that the Parole Board's final decision was "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Trantino V, supra, 166 N.J. at 191-92. Rather, our review confirms that the its decision was based "on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record." Id. at 172 (quoting Trantino IV, supra, 154 N.J. at 24) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Affirmed.