AMANDA PANCHOO-HOSEIN v. ROLAND ELLIS HOSEIN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

AMANDA PANCHOO-HOSEIN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROLAND ELLIS HOSEIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________

May 29, 2015

Submitted April 14, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Manahan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Family Division, Essex County, Docket No. FD-07-1295-14.

Roland Ellis Hosein, appellant, pro se.

Gourvitz & Gourvitz, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Ari H. Gourvitz and Melissa Gourvitz, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

This case arose under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C.A. 9001 to 9011.1 Defendant Roland Ellis Hosein appeals from a Family Part order requiring him to pay counsel fees to Amanda Panchoo-Hosein's attorneys as well as travel and other costs to plaintiff. We affirm.

The procedural history of this case is undisputed. In October 2013 plaintiff, who lives in Trinidad, filed a verified complaint and order to show cause in Essex County, Chancery Division, Family Part, pursuant to ICARA and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), N.J.S.A. 2A:34-53 to -95. She alleged defendant, her husband and the father of their four-year-old child, abducted the child to Newark, where defendant lived. Plaintiff sought physical custody as well as sole legal custody of the child.

On the same day plaintiff filed the verified complaint, the court signed an order to show cause declaring that New Jersey had emergent jurisdiction under the UCCJEA; compelling defendant to immediately turn over the child to plaintiff; requiring the Essex County Sheriff's Office to assist; permitting plaintiff to return to Trinidad with the child; enjoining defendant from commencing or continuing with any legal proceeding in any jurisdiction concerning the status of the child; and compelling defendant to surrender his travel documents, including his passport. The order directed defendant to appear in court eleven days later and show cause why the temporary restraints should not be made permanent and why other relief set forth in the order should not be granted to plaintiff.

Four days before defendant was to appear in court on the return date of the order to show cause, the parties entered into a consent order in which they agreed to the following: "Trinidad [and] Tabago is the proper venue and jurisdiction for the determination of custody of the minor child of the marriage"; the minor child would return to Trinidad [and] Tabago with plaintiff; and, "[p]laintiff may make her appearance in [c]ourt by [c]ontemporaneous means." The consent order also confirmed that defendant had turned over the child's passport to plaintiff and deposited his passport in court.

On the same day the parties and the court signed the consent order, the court issued a separate order that stated, among other things

Order approving the consent order attached hereto and made a part hereof, leaving the issues of attorney's fees, travel expenses and other costs associated with the matter, with the plaintiff's certification to be filed on or before [October 16, 2013], and defendant's reply on or before [October 3, 2013], with any additional certification by plaintiff on or before [November 11, 2013], with the matter to be heard on [November 11, 2013] at 8:30 [a.m.]

Plaintiff's attorney thereafter submitted a certification in support of an application for counsel fees.

In response, defendant filed a motion to vacate the order to show cause and temporary restraints as well as opposition to plaintiff's fee application. In his supporting certification, defendant disputed that he had abducted the parties' child, as plaintiff had alleged in her verified complaint. Defendant alleged that plaintiff had agreed that their daughter should attend school in New Jersey. Defendant submitted the certification of the child's Trinidad "nanny," who, among other things, said plaintiff had asked her to lie in the event of a custody battle. In addition, defendant submitted the certification of a woman who had grown up in Trinidad, a flight attendant who went with defendant to pick up his daughter and take her back to New Jersey. Concededly in a relationship with defendant, the woman nevertheless averred that plaintiff had agreed to have their daughter spend a school year in New Jersey.

Plaintiff submitted reply certifications. In an order dated November 22, 2013, the court stated

(1) For the reasons stated on the record, the [c]ourt finds the [d]efendant liable for [p]laintiff's attorney's fees pursuant to the Hague Convention and ICARA.

(2) Exceptions to the fee certification by defense counsel to be submitted by [December 12, 2013] with a response thereto by [December 12, 2013.]

Significantly, defendant has not appealed from the November 22, 2013 order, nor has he provided a transcript of the court's decision.

On December 18, 2013, after considering the moving and opposing papers, the court awarded plaintiff $17,362.38 in counsel fees, $1,502.40 for travel costs, and $363.76 for expenses. The order states that "[t]he [c]ourt finds as a matter of fact and based on the parties' certifications, assets, income and otherwise, that [d]efendant has the ability to make these payments, such payments to be made within [forty-five] days."

We discern from defendant's brief, which contains no point headings to be argued as required by Rule 2:6-2(a)(1), that he argues plaintiff and the trial court violated various provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. He contends the trial court erred by conducting an ex parte proceeding that resulted in the temporary restraints. He also claims plaintiff consented to defendant and their child coming to the United States and changed her mind only after he admonished her in an email to call the child more often. Lastly, he contends that none of the facts alleged by plaintiff were clearly and convincingly established at a hearing. He concludes as follows

[B]ecause I had been denied a trial before the state court and that the plaintiff's story, given in an ex parte hearing was believed I am appealing. The flaws, which I have pointed out in my legal argument that happened at the [s]tate [c]ourt level, and even the Central Authority level has to be rectified by this appeal.

Defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following brief comments.

ICARA, as it existed at the time, provided for the award of counsel fees

Any court ordering the return of a child pursuant to an action brought under section 11603 of this title shall order the respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner, including court costs, legal fees, foster home or other care during the course of proceedings in the action, and transportation costs related to the return of the child, unless the respondent establishes that such order would be inappropriate.

[42 U.S.C.A. 11607(b)(3)].

To the extent defendant argues that the trial court erred by determining plaintiff is entitled to fees or by denying his motion to vacate the consent order, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief. The trial court's determination that defendant was liable to plaintiff for counsel fees, costs and expenses was adjudicated at a hearing conducted on November 22, 2013, resulting in the court's entry of an order on that date. Defendant has not appealed from that order and has not included a transcript of either the proceedings or the court's decision. Consequently, we are unable to review that decision.

Although defendant appealed from the trial court's December 18, 2013 order in which the court quantified the fee, cost and expense award to plaintiff, defendant has made no argument as to how the court erred in computing the amount to be awarded. Absent an adequate legal argument concerning the quantum of fees, we are unable to address the issue. See 700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2011). Further, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in its computation of the award.

Affirmed.

1 ICARA was formerly found at 42 U.S.C.A. 11601 to 11611 but was transferred to 22 U.S.C.A. 9001 to 9011 in 2014. 42 U.S.C.A. 11611 was repealed that same year.