DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. D.S.Q.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.S.Q.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF A.A.Q.,

Minor.

_________________________________

December 14, 2015

Submitted November 4, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Hoffman, Leone and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-135-13.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Carol A. Weil, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jillian Sauchelli, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Annemarie Sedore, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from the December 23, 2014 judgment of guardianship terminating his parental rights to his daughter. Defendant asserts that the trial judge erred in not considering alternatives to termination and adoption, such as placement with other family members, and erred by refusing to allow a bonding evaluation between himself and the child. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated in the thoughtful, seventy-five page written opinion of Judge Wayne J. Forrest.

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency's (the Division's) involvement with defendant and his child. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in the judge's written opinion. We add the following comments.

We are satisfied that, commencing with the Division's involvement with defendant in 2007, continuing up to and including the commencement of trial in November 2014, the child has been endangered by the parental relationship with defendant as a result of physical abuse. Defendant has also endangered the child through his inability to address his child's complex and fragile emotional condition. The child was removed from his care for these reasons, as well as suspicion of sexual abuse. Although the court made no finding on sexual abuse, it found that "the relationship that [the child] had with [defendant] had caused instability in her life." Defendant's failure to explain to the child that she was adopted, his lack of candor with the child, and his demonstrated lack of empathy for her and engagement with recommended therapies contributed to the child's emotional instability. The credible expert evidence demonstrates that defendant lacks the capacity to care for the child and is incapable of providing her a safe, stable and permanent home. The evidence demonstrated that even a bonding evaluation would have further traumatized the child and under these circumstances was unnecessary. Alternatives to termination were considered, including potential placements with three other family members who were assessed numerous times, and ruled out.

Judge Forrest carefully reviewed the evidence presented, and thereafter concluded that the Division had met all of the legal requirements for a judgment of guardianship by clear and convincing evidence. Although a potential adoptive family had not been identified due to the child's therapeutic needs, the court concluded that Division would work to successfully identify an adoptive home for her. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 611 (1986) (explaining that under New Jersey law termination of parental rights may precede the establishment of a definite permanency plan when justice so requires) (citing In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, 930, 623 P.2d 198, 210 (1981) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting)). The court also ruled that, even if the Division is unsuccessful, there would still be no circumstances under which the child should be reunited with defendant. Ibid.

The judge's opinion comports with the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). See In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-48 (1999) and N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons the judge expressed in his comprehensive well-reasoned opinion.

Affirmed.