STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SARA CHAMOUN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SARA CHAMOUN,

Defendant-Appellant.

August 7, 2015

Before Judges Kennedy and Hoffman.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Municipal Appeal No. 001-62-13.

Demetrios K. Stratis argued the cause for appellant (Ruta, Soulios & Stratis, LLP, attorneys; Mr. Stratis, on the briefs).

Elizabeth R. Rebein, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (John Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Rebein, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Sara Chamoun appeals from her de novo conviction for harassment as a petty disorderly offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). We affirm.

I.

We discern the following facts from the record. Defendant was once engaged to Moira Sotelo s current husband. Defendant and Sotelo have had a tense relationship with accusations of defendant frequently driving by Sotelo s home, following Sotelo and her husband to church, and calling Sotelo on the phone. Notably, defendant and Sotelo s husband both speak Arabic. Sotelo s son, M.M., understands some Arabic, while Sotelo only speaks Spanish.

On April 21, 2012, Sotelo drove to the Meadowlands Flea Market with M.M. While there, Sotelo spotted defendant and her sister. As defendant and her sister walked by, Sotelo heard defendant say, "sharmoota." Following this, M.M. left his mother s side and followed defendant. M.M. returned approximately five minutes later, stating he had followed defendant and her sister. He saw the two walk past Sotelo s vehicle, with defendant running her hand along the vehicle. M.M. also explained to Sotelo that "sharmoota" is an Arabic word for whore. Sotelo testified that she did not know the meaning of the word prior to her son's explanation. Upon leaving the market, Sotelo and M.M. noticed new scratches on Sotelo s car. At this point, they contacted the police regarding both the spoken word and the scratches to the vehicle.

On June 22, 2012, Sotelo filed a citizen s complaint against defendant. On July 11, 2012, the municipal court judge found probable cause and issued defendant a summons for harassment in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). A trial was held in the municipal court on December 5, 2012, and March 6, 2013. At the conclusion of all testimony, defendant moved for dismissal, which the court denied. After considering written summations, on May 15, 2013, the court found defendant guilty and imposed a fine of $506, plus mandatory assessments and court costs.

Defendant appealed to the Law Division. On November 22, 2013, the Law Division judge conducted a trial de novo, where defendant's counsel argued that defendant's conduct could not be considered harassment because the victim of the alleged harassment did not understand Arabic. The judge rejected defendant's argument, found defendant guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), and imposed the same sentence as the municipal court judge.

This appeal followed. On appeal, defendant raises the following points

2 POINT 1.

THE SUPERIOR COURT WAS TO APPLY DE NOVO CONSIDERATION.

2 POINT 2.

THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING OF GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

2 POINT 3.

NO INTENT WAS ESTABLISHED AND IT IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT FOR A FINDING OF GUILT.

2 POINT 4.

CONSTITUTIONAL FREE SPEECH PROTECTION ARE AVAILABLE TO THE DEFENDANT.

2 POINT 5.

NO HARASSMENT CAN BE INFERRED IF THE COMPLAINANT COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE DEFENDANT'S WORDS.

2 POINT 6.

THE SUPERIOR COURT FINDING OF GUILTY WAS SOLELY BASED ON THE COMMUNICATION SUBSECTION OF N.J.S.A. 2[C]:33-4.

II.

When a defendant appeals a decision made by a municipal court to the Law Division, the court must conduct a de novo review of the record, giving "due regard to the municipal judge's opportunity to view the witnesses and assess credibility." State v. Golin, 363 N.J. Super. 474, 481 (App. Div. 2003) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964)). On appeal from the Law Division's decision, we must determine whether the Law Division judge's findings "'could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.'" State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 162). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

Harassment as a petty disorderly persons offense occurs when an individual, "with purpose to harass another, . . . [m]akes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). Our Supreme Court has stated that a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) requires the following elements

(1) defendant made or caused to be made a communication; (2) defendant's purpose in making or causing the communication to be made was to harass another person; and (3) the communication was in one of the specified manners or any other manner similarly likely to cause annoyance or alarm to its intended recipient.

[State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 576 (1997).]

Here, there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the Law Division judge's finding that defendant committed the act of harassment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). It is undisputed that defendant was previously engaged to Sotelo's husband. The record also indicates a previous history of unwelcome encounters, including defendant frequently driving by Sotelo s home, following Sotelo and her husband to church, and calling Sotelo on the phone.

Defendant argues that the State failed to prove a purpose to harass beyond a reasonable doubt. "A finding that defendant acted with a purpose or intent to harass another is integral to a determination of harassment." State v. Duncan, 376 N.J. Super. 253, 261 (App. Div. 2005)."

Like the Law Division judge, we reject defendant's argument that defendant could not be found guilty of the offense because Sotelo does not speak Arabic. While the victim was not fluent in Arabic, her son, who was with her at the time, understood the insult. "There is rarely direct proof of intent, and purpose may and often must be inferred from what is said and done and the surrounding circumstances. Prior conduct and statements may be relevant to and support and inference of purpose." State v. Castagna, 387 N.J. Super. 598, 606 (App. Div.) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 577 (2006).

The time, place, and circumstances of this incident, including the fact that the victim's son who understands Arabic was present, strongly support the inference that defendant uttered the offensive term with the intent to harass the wife of her ex-fiancé. As the Law Division judge found, "This was said . . . in a public place where it was heard by the victim . . . . These people had a history. The victim not only heard comments being made . . . but she understood the intent and the demeanor of this defendant."

We conclude the Law Division did not err in finding defendant guilty in the trial de novo as the judge's decision is amply supported by credible evidence in the record. See Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 162. We find defendant's remaining contentions to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.