STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LENNOX RISDEN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LENNOX RISDEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

December 11, 2015

Submitted March 3, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Messano and Ostrer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 05-04-0577.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Steven E. Braun, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Joie Piderit, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OSTRER, J.A.D.

Defendant Lennox Risden appeals from the trial court's October 17, 2013 order denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Following a December 2006 jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), -3(a)(2); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4. After merger, he received an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment on the murder conviction and a consecutive twenty-year sentence on the robbery conviction, both pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Having reviewed defendant's arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, we affirm.

I.

We summarized the underlying facts of the case in our opinion affirming defendant's conviction on direct appeal. State v. Risden, No. A-4876-06 (App. Div. Jan. 31, 2011), certif. denied, 207 N.J. 64 (2011).1 We review the key facts here.

The State presented overwhelming evidence that defendant robbed and murdered Jerome O'Brien, the owner of Brandywine Trucking, a used truck and parts business in Woodbridge Township. Defendant was a Jamaican national who had been in the country a few months. He was supposed to purchase a truck for shipment back to Jamaica for use by his family's business. He had visited Brandywine on several occasions prior to the murder.

Defendant provided a custodial statement in which he admitted taking part in the robbery and homicide, but claimed to do so at the suggestion of a man known only as Bill. Defendant admitted he fired the fatal shotgun blast at short range into O'Brien's chest. He claimed that Bill had told him the shotgun was not loaded, and that he intended only to frighten O'Brien, but the shotgun accidentally fired.

The trial court allowed the State to introduce defendant's custodial statement after an extensive Miranda2 hearing. Defendant's principal ground for suppressing his statement was that he was mentally retarded and lacked the cognitive ability to understand and waive his rights. Defendant presented two experts and extensive testing data to support his contention. Defendant also argued the statement should be suppressed because he was not informed of his right to contact Jamaican consular officials before making his statement, in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).

The State presented an expert who opined that defendant had feigned his lack of intelligence, and was not incapable of understanding and waiving his rights. Based on that expert's testimony and other evidence, including testimony of other persons who had interacted with defendant, the court found that defendant had feigned that he was mentally retarded; Miranda warnings were timely given; and defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to remain silent.

Aside from his custodial statement, other compelling evidence tied defendant to the murder. Defendant left his car keys on O'Brien's desk after the shooting. Pursuant to a consent search of defendant's automobile, police seized the shotgun used, a substantial amount of cash, a bandana with defendant's DNA, and a receipt and title for a truck dated the previous day that was signed by O'Brien and stained with O'Brien's blood.

On the day of the shooting, defendant parked his car a couple of blocks away from Brandywine. A witness saw defendant leave the office wearing a coat long enough to conceal a shotgun and then return soon thereafter. Defendant had returned to retrieve his keys. By that time, another customer saw O'Brien slumped over his desk. Defendant remained on the scene, pretending to be unaware of O'Brien's death, intent upon retrieving his keys. On the way to the station for questioning, defendant left a shotgun shell in the police vehicle that matched the murder weapon.

II.

Defendant filed his pro se PCR petition in May 2012, along with supplemental pro se filings and submissions of counsel. Defendant presented the following grounds for relief, as he summarized them

trial and appellate counsel failed to federalize his claims so that they could be preserved for habeas corpus review; trial counsel failed to timely consult a mental health expert to prepare a defense of incompetence; trial counsel failed to file a timely motion for an interlocutory appeal of the order denying the competency motion; trial counsel was ineffective in closing argument when she changed the defense from innocence to admitting Petitioner's guilt by arguing that he accidentally shot and killed the victim; trial counsel was ineffective in recommending that Petitioner not accept the plea offer and proceed to trial inasmuch as counsel admitted his guilt in summation and provided him with incorrect legal advice; trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call witnesses requested by Petitioner, including John Meyer, Debbie Risden, Kimberly Risden, and Lisa Bryant Smart; trial counsel was ineffective in failing to show that had Petitioner been advised of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, he would have exercised his right to consult the Jamaican Consulate and remained silent; and trial counsel was ineffective in waiving Petitioner's presence at his own trial, without his consent, when the jury sent notes requesting his taped statement and a copy of the indictment.

Appointed counsel then presented the following points for the PCR court's consideration in a supplemental brief

Point I Petitioner's Waiver Of His Miranda Rights Was Unknowing And His Statements To Police Were Inadmissible Because He Was Not Advised Of His Right To Consular Notification As A Foreign national Under The "Vienna Convention On Consular Relations" (VCCR); Trial Counsel's Failure To Pursue This Issue Was Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel And Materially Contributed To The Conviction.

Point II Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance When She Waived Petitioner's Presence At Trial, Without His Consent, During The Colloquy Over Juror's Notes; This Violated His Right Under Rule 3:16-(b) To Be Present At Trial And The Guilty Verdict Must Be Vacated.

PointIII Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance When She Argued Accidental Shooting In Summation; This Was A High-Risk Defense Tactic Employed Without Petitioner's Consent That Materially Contributed To The Conviction.

Point IV- Exhaustion Of VCCR Claims Under Federal Law For Habeas Corpus Review.

PointV- Petitioner Has Established His Right To Post-Conviction Relief By A Preponderance Of The Evidence; At A Minimum, He Has Shown A Prima Facie Case To Warrant An Evidentiary Hearing.

Point VI- Compliance with Webster.

The petition was heard on October 17, 2013, in a non-evidentiary hearing, before the same judge who presided over defendant's trial. In an extensive oral opinion, the PCR court denied defendant's petition. The court applied the well-settled two-pronged test for assessing claims of ineffective assistance announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under that test, a defendant must establish (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient and he made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and (2) that defendant was prejudiced such that there existed a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Id.at 687, 694, 104 S. Ct.at 2064, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 693, 698; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.42, 58 (1987) (adopting Stricklandstandard).

The trial court reviewed the rights of a foreign national pursuant to Article 36 of the VCCR.3 In brief, it entitles a foreign nation's consular officers to communicate with a national of that country who has been arrested or detained pending trial, and to arrange for his legal representation. The VCCR also entitles the national to communicate with consular officials. If the national requests, police are required to notify the consular officials of his arrest or detention "without delay." Art. 36(1)(b). Police shall also notify the national "without delay" of his right to have the consular officials notified. Ibid.

The court rejected defendant's arguments that his Mirandawaiver was unknowing because police did not inform him of his rights under the VCCR and that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to pursue the VCCR issue. The court noted that defense counsel raised the VCCR issue. Citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2006), and State v. Cabrera, 387 N.J. Super.81 (App. Div. 2006), the PCR court held that the failure of police to inform defendant of his rights under the VCCR did not require suppression of his custodial statement.

The court also rejected defendant's argument that counsel was ineffective by waiving his presence during a colloquy in which the court discussed notes from the jury during deliberations. The jury had requested defendant's taped statement, a transcript of the statement, and a copy of the indictment. Without objection, the trial court provided the first two, but not the third, and provided instructions that the transcript was not evidence. The judge noted that his decision to do so occurred before the Court decided State v. Burr, 195 N.J.119 (2008). The BurrCourt held that "in the future, if a request is made by a jury to replay a videotaped pretrial interview that has been introduced into evidence," the court must follow certain prescribed precautionary procedures. Id.at 134-35. Citing State v. Childs, 204 N.J. Super.639, 656-47 (App. Div. 1985), the court held that defendant's presence was not mandated and that, in any event, he suffered no prejudice.

The PCR court also rejected defendant's argument that defense counsel was ineffective in her closing by asserting that defendant accidentally shot O'Brien. The court held

Specifically Defendant claims that while the trial Counsel initially argued that Defendant was presumed innocent, the following statement that trial Counsel made during the summation created the implication that the jury could find that the shooting was accidental while also arguing that Defendant's statement . . . was presumably untrue while he was in police custody.

In this statement -- and this is from the trial transcript of '06, Volume 1.

And you'll hear this statement and you'll see it, Lennox says various things. He says he's there, that he runs into Bill and that Bill is a person that he has met before at Brandywine. That he -- that Bill[] says, we're going to play a joke on Jerry and that Bill gives him the gun and he holds that gun, and the gun goes off. I submit to you that when they -- the police -- first start speaking to Lennox, that's not what he said.4

Defendant argues that trial Counsel changed defense strategy to innocence to accident at the end of the case by admitting that Defendant accidentally shot the victim, thus guarantees conviction.

However, upon further reading of the complete trial record and examination of the evidence presented, there's no indication that trial Counsel changed her strategy whatsoever. After the statement quoted above was made, trial Counsel went on to explain then the apparent inconsistencies and Defendant's statement to the police were the product of his being tired after a long day of interrogation, questioning, and "shock" by essentially what had happened previously.

Furthermore, in light of the overwhelming evidence, placing the Defendant at the scene and implicating him, that is the proceeds of the robbery, the murder weapon that was found in his vehicle, Defendant's keys on the victim's desk as well as his admission on the tape that he fired the gun; it is difficult, if not impossible, to find that trial Counsel's argument constituted a high risk defense.

III.

On appeal, defendant presents the following points for our consideration

POINT I - MR. RISDEN'S CONFESSION WAS INVOLUNTARILY RENDERED BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF STATE AUTHORITIES TO ADVISE HIM OF HIS RIGHT TO CONSULAR SERVICES PURSUANT TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS, AND TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO FULLY PURSUE THE ISSUE AT TRIAL.

POINT II - TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PROVIDE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY WAIVING MR. RISDEN'S PRESENCE AT TRIAL, WITHOUT HIS CONSENT, DURING THE COLLOQUY REGARDING THE JURY'S NOTES, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF R. 3:16(B).

POINT III - TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN SHE ARGUED THE HIGH-RISK DEFENSE OF ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING IN SUMMATION WITHOUT MR. RISDEN'S CONSENT--A DEFENSE WHICH CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THE CONVICTION.

POINT IV MR. RISDEN'S DECISION WHETHER HE WANTED TO TESTIFY ON HIS OWN BEHALF OR REMAIN SILENT, AND HIS CHOICE AS TO WHETHER HE DESIRED TO HAVE THE JURY READ AN INSTRUCTION IF HE HAD CHOSEN TO REMAIN SILENT, WERE NOT PLACED ON THE RECORD, AND THUS A REMAND IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER MR. RISDEN WAS PREJUDICED BY THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OR TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL TO HAVE MR. RISDEN'S ELECTIONS PLACED ON THE RECORD (NOT RAISED BELOW).

POINT V EXHAUSTION OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION CLAIMS TO ENABLE SUBSEQUENT HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW.

POINT VI MR. RISDEN HAS ESTABLISHED HIS RIGHT TO POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE; AT A MINIMUM, HE HAS SHOWN A PRIMA FACIE CASE TO WARRANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

POINT VII THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER ALL OTHER POINTS OF CONTENTION WHICH WERE RAISED BY MR. RISDEN IN HIS PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF OR BY COUNSEL IN HIS BRIEF AND AT THE PCR HEARING.

We review a PCR judge's legal conclusions de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2005). When the PCR court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the court drew from the documentary record. Id.at 421. We conclude defendant's arguments lack merit and affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the PCR court's oral opinion. Only his arguments with respect to the VCCR and defense counsel's summation warrant additional comment.

A.

We consider first the VCCR. It is now well-settled that a violation of the VCCR does not require suppression of a foreign national's otherwise admissible statement. Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 U.S. at 349-50, 126 S. Ct. at 2681-82, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 578-79; Cabrera, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 86. However, "[a] defendant can raise an Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his statements to police." Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 U.S. at 350, 126 S. Ct. at 2682, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 579.

"In determining the voluntariness of a defendant's confession, we traditionally look to the totality of the circumstances to assess whether the waiver of rights was the product of a free will or police coercion." State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 402 (2007). Knowledge of one's rights is just one factor. "In the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, we consider such factors as the defendant's 'age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)). A confession is not rendered involuntary merely because, but for one factor, defendant would not have confessed. One can imagine a variety of scenarios in which, if only a suspect had been more mature or more educated, or detained for less time, he would not have confessed; that would not necessarily render the confession involuntary. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045-46, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 861 (1973) (discussing the notion of voluntariness).

In other words, a confession is not automatically deemed involuntary if a defendant can show he would not have confessed had he been informed of his consular rights. We note that advice of one's right to contact consular officials does not as directly affect the decision to confess as does advice of one's constitutional right to remain silent, which is achieved through the Miranda warnings. The ultimate question is whether the defendant's will was "overborne by police conduct." Presha, supra, 163 N.J. at 313.

Defendant's VCCR argument is unavailing for several reasons. To the extent he argues his confession was involuntary without tying it to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the argument is barred, as it was not raised on direct appeal. R. 3:22-4 (stating that, subject to exceptions, "[a]ny ground for relief not raised in the proceedings resulting in the conviction . . . is barred from assertion in a proceeding under this rule").

His ineffective assistance of counsel claim also lacks merit. As the PCR court noted, defense counsel raised the VCCR issue, seeking suppression on that basis. Counsel did so in her brief in support of the Miranda motion and questioned police witnesses about when they contacted Jamaican consular officials. Defendant's argument that counsel did not press the issue sufficiently is unpersuasive. Moreover, as a matter of trial strategy, it would have been inconsistent for defense counsel to argue that defendant would have remained silent if only he had been informed of his consular rights. The defense had argued that defendant lacked the cognitive capacity to understand the Miranda warnings. If so, defendant presumably also lacked the cognitive capacity to understand the significance of his rights under the VCCR.

In any event, defendant does not actually contend he would have remained silent if he had been so informed. He alleged in his petition that had he been advised of his right to contact the consulate, he would have exercised that right; and, upon doing so, "he would have been advised by the Consulate to exercise[] his rights to remain silent." Aside from the fact there is no record evidence that the consulate would have given defendant such advice, defendant does not assert he would have exercised the right to remain silent if informed by a consular official as opposed to a Woodbridge police officer.

Moreover, it is not at all clear that the VCCR required the police to inform defendant of his consular rights before his interrogation. The requirement that arresting officials contact a consulate "without delay" may be satisfied within twenty-four or as much as seventy-two hours after an arrestee's request for notification. Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 U.S. at 361, 126 S. Ct. at 2689, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 586 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that "[i]n contrast to Miranda warnings, which must be given on the spot before the police interrogate, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does not require the arresting authority to contact the consular post instantly" and that State Department guidance directs authorities to do so "within 24 hours, and certainly within 72 hours") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is also authority for the proposition that interrogation of arrestees may precede notification to them of their rights under the VCCR. Id. at 362 n.2, 126 S. Ct. at 2689 n.2, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 586 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Consequently, timely compliance with the VCCR may have had no impact on defendant's confession because it could have been accomplished after he confessed. In sum, defendant has failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the VCCR.

B.

We consider next defendant's argument that counsel was ineffective by arguing "the high-risk defense of accidental shooting." We apply a strong presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S.at 689, 104 S. Ct.at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fritz, supra, 105 N.J.at 54 ("complaints merely of matters of trial strategy will not serve to ground a constitutional claim of inadequacy") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Having carefully reviewed defense counsel's summation, we are convinced defendant has mischaracterized the substance of counsel's closing argument. Defense counsel was faced with overwhelming proof of defendant's guilt. Counsel did not concede that defendant was the shooter. Yet, counsel could not ignore defendant's confession.

Counsel highlighted other facts that she argued raised doubts that defendant was the shooter, including the absence of any blood on defendant's clothes or fingerprints on the weapon. She contended that defendant's actions were inconsistent with a consciousness of guilt, such as his return to the scene and his consent to a search. She maintained that the real killer must have fled by the rear door.

As a strategic matter, counsel acknowledged defendant's custodial statement but attempted to raise questions about its accuracy. Counsel noted that defendant had given varying versions of events prior to the recorded statement; defendant was in custody for many hours and was exhausted; he was "duped" into making the confession; and even the police disbelieved his confession in part. We quote at length from counsel's summation

They don't tell him what the result of the search is, and they keep going to talk to him. They dupe him so[me] more. Now, at 11:30, he gives his statement. Ivan Scott says, and candidly, he didn't believe there was a Bill. He never thought there was a Bill. He says the defendant -- well, you know, Lennox kept changing his story, told different things. He said different things. Unfortunately, we don't have any taping of any other supposed change in his story. We don't have a record of all that occurred there. We only have this final snapshot of what at the end of the day Lennox does tell the police. But Mr. Scott says that he does insist there's a Bill involved, and he does say things like that, and essentially places himself there.

In the statement -- and you'll hear the statement, and you'll see it -- Lennox says various things. He says that he's there, that he runs into Bill, that Bill is a person that he has met before at Brandywine. That he, that Bill says, we're going to play a joke on Jerry, and that Bill gives him a gun, and he holds the gun, but the gun goes off. I submit to you that when they first started speaking to Lennox, that's not what he said. He said, certainly, that Bill was there, but from 7 p.m. till 11:30 p.m., clearly there is a process and a discussion and a disagreement with what Lennox is telling them. The gist of it, certainly, is that Bill was involved, and that Bill was the person who planned the robbery. Bill takes the money, and Bill takes the gun. And I submit to you, and Bill takes everything and puts it in the car, because everything has gone badly, whatever it is that was going to be taken. Now, unfortunately, Mr. O'Brien has been killed, and Bill leaves. But in the statement, again -- and you'll hear it, you'll hear Lennox -- Lennox is kind of talking flat toned. I'd submit to you he's tired. It's been a long day of all this. He keeps indicating that he was so freaked out by what happened. He indicates that he was scared, that he was shocked essentially by what happened. Same as Kerisha Sayles, who says she was 22 at the time and very upset or affected by what occurred, and that makes sense.

But Lennox indicates that Bill does this. Bill took the money, and Bill left. And that makes more sense, that Bill went up to the car, put the stuff in the car and took off. But Lennox, who somehow feels he's not participating in this as much because it wasn't his idea, it's not his thing, it's not his weapon, sticks around. And he finds Kerisha Sayles and says, where's your husband, and he goes over and gets Leopold Sayles. And when they call 911, Lennox is there. He doesn't try to leave. Leopold Sayles says that Lennox said, can you give me a ride out of here. And that, again, is something that the state will emphasize to you, that he's trying to get out of there then. But that seems a little late. It just -- it doesn't make sense. Lennox does not have the consciousness of guilt that one would believe should occur if you're the person planning a robbery and doing a robbery. It just doesn't make sense.

In sum, defense counsel's use of defendant's confession was a reasonable trial strategy. We discern no error in the PCR court's determination that defendant was not denied ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.2:11-3(e)(2). We also decline to address defendant's fourth point on appeal that a remand is necessary because counsel did not place on the record defendant's waiver of his right to testify as that point was not raised before the PCR court. SeeNieder v. Royal Indemn. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).

Affirmed.

1 We remanded for resentencing, and subsequently affirmed on the ESOA calendar. State v. Risden, No. A-264-11 (App. Div. Apr. 25, 2012).

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

3 The full text of Article 36 states

1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State

 
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;

 
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;

 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.

[Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 100-101.]

4
 
 
 
 
For clarity, we have block-quoted the excerpt of defense counsel's closing statement that the PCR judge quoted.