STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. QURAN GOODMAN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

QURAN GOODMAN, a/k/a QUAN GOODMAN,

QUAN M. GOODMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________

January 14, 2014

Submitted October 23, 2013 Decided

Before Judges Grall and Waugh.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 04-11-3543.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lucille M. Rosano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Quran Goodman appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We reverse and remand for oral argument and further consideration of the merits of Goodman's entire petition.

In September 2006, Goodman was convicted of the knowing or purposeful murder of Rashon Bryant and related offenses. He was sentenced in February 2007, to an aggregate term of incarceration for thirty years, with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. Goodman appealed, and we affirmed. State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 2010). The Supreme Court denied certification. 205 N.J. 78 (2011).

Goodman filed his PCR petition on April 7, 2011. He argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate level. The trial judge dismissed Goodman's petition without oral argument on January 17, 2012. He concluded that Goodman was procedurally barred from arguing two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because all information pertaining to those claims was part of the trial record and could have been raised on his direct appeal.1 The judge also found that Goodman's other contentions that his trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally deficient were without merit. Because Goodman failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR judge determined that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

Goodman raises the following issues on appeal:

POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION AT THE TRIAL LEVEL.

A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS AND PETITIONS FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF SINCE THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL AS A RESULT OF COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS WITH RESPECT TO GANGS AND GANG-RELATED ACTIVITY.

POINT II: RULE 3:22-4 DID NOT OPERATE AS A PROCEDURAL BAR TO PRECLUDE THE DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION REGARDING TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS FROM BEING ADJUDICATED ON A SUBSTANTIVE BASIS, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THAT ASPECT OF THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO THAT RULE.

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING POST CONVICTION RELIEF COUNSEL THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ORAL ARGUMENT.

In State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280-82 (2012), the Supreme Court outlined the considerations governing a PCR judge's consideration of whether to allow oral argument.

Rule 3:22 contains no explicit statement with respect to whether a defendant is entitled to present oral argument in support of his petition for post-conviction relief. There are two reported decisions of the Appellate Division that have commented on this omission. Each panel had a different emphasis and reached differing results.

 
In State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 588 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 78 (1989), the defendant was convicted at trial of aggravated manslaughter and possession of a sawed-off shotgun and sentenced to an aggregate term of nineteen years. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and this Court denied certification, the defendant filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he elected to represent himself. Id. at 589. His petition focused primarily on challenges to the sentence he had received, and the trial judge denied the petition after reviewing the papers. Ibid. The appellate panel rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court had erred in disposing of the matter on the papers, noting that while it had no "doubt that it was within the power of the court to require oral argument, we discern no statutory or procedural provision compelling it to adopt this course." Id. at 590. It affirmed the order of the trial judge that denied post-conviction relief. Id. at 597.

 
In State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382, 384 (App. Div.2001), the defendant was convicted at trial of murder and kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison for murder, with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility and a consecutive thirty years in prison with a fifteen-year period of parole ineligibility on the kidnapping conviction. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and certification was denied. Ibid. The defendant thereafter filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, asserting several grounds for his claim that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel during his trial. Ibid. The trial judge denied the defendant's petition based solely on a review of the papers, without having heard oral argument. Id. at 385. The appellate panel noted the absence of a specific directive within Rule 3:22 with respect to oral argument and concluded that the decision whether to grant oral argument on a petition for post-conviction relief rested "within the sound discretion of the post-conviction relief court." Id. at 386-87.

 
Although this view is in accord with Flores, supra, the appellate panel in Mayron continued, however, that "there should be a significant presumption in favor of oral argument [i]n light of what is at stake for a defendant[.]" Id. at 387. It observed that "[t]he issues at stake on an initial petition for post-conviction relief are no less significant than those typically presented when the court rules ensure oral argument." Id. at 386. It noted several factors that a trial judge should weigh when deciding whether to hear oral argument or to dispense with it. It included within those factors "the apparent merits and complexity of the issues . . ., whether argument of counsel [would] add to the written positions . . ., and in general, whether the goals and purposes of the post-conviction procedure are furthered by oral argument." Id. at 387. It thus declined to address the substantive merits of the defendant's arguments with respect to whether he was entitled to post-conviction relief and remanded the matter to the trial court for the purpose of that oral argument. Id. at 388.

 
Although we agree that those are appropriate factors and recognize the residuum of discretion that rests within our trial judges in weighing those factors, we stress that in considering each, they should be approached with the view that oral argument should be granted. Just as when determining whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in connection with his petition for post-conviction relief the facts should be "view[ed] in the light most favorable to a defendant," State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992), so too, in determining whether to entertain oral argument, the facts should be viewed through the same generous lens.

At the time the PCR judge ruled on Goodman's petition, he weighed the factors from Mayron and concluded that oral argument was not necessary. After an independent analysis of the Mayron factors, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Parker, we conclude that oral argument should have been granted. Viewing Goodman's arguments "in the light most favorable" to him, we conclude that the "significant presumption in favor of oral argument" has not been overcome.

We also conclude that the judge incorrectly determined that Goodman's claim concerning his trial counsel's failure to object to the qualifications of the State's gang expert should have been raised on direct appeal and was consequently barred. Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are ordinarily not raised on direct appeal because they usually require consideration of facts that are not part of the record. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992). While we will very occasionally consider such an issue on direct appeal, failure to raise the issue on direct appeal should not act as a bar given our "general" disposition not to consider it.

In addition, our review of the record suggests that the remand judge must, after hearing oral argument, carefully consider whether there needs to be an evidentiary hearing, at least concerning trial counsel's decision to withdraw his previously-sustained objection to testimony outside of the expert's report. We express, however, no view on the merits of Goodman's contentions, but hold only that they deserve careful consideration after oral argument.

For these reasons, we reverse and remand to the Law Division. We do not retain jurisdiction.

1 Only one of those claims is raised on appeal.