NEW JEREY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. E.W., JR

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

NEW JEREY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.W., JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF E.W., III, AND O.W.,

Minors.

___________________________________

February 26, 2014

Submitted on January 8, 2014 Decided

Before Judges Waugh, Nugent and Accurso.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County, Docket No. FG-19-15-12.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Carol A. Weil, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Victoria Galinski, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

This is a guardianship action. Defendant E.W., Jr., appeals from a Family Part judgment that terminated his parental rights to his two children. The action arose out of events that occurred during the time that defendant lived with a woman and her four children: two pre-teenage daughters, not his biological children; and a preschool-aged daughter, O.W., and a pre-adolescent son, E.W., III, his biological children who are the subject of this appeal. Since January 2011, defendant has been incarcerated on charges of aggravated sexual assault and child endangerment. The children's mother died in December 2011.

During the trial of this action, the Division presented, among other proofs, evidence that defendant was a violent man who routinely beat the children's mother within eyeshot or earshot of the children; sexually assaulted the two older girls over many years in many perverse ways; sexually assaulted his own preschool-aged daughter; exposed his pre-adolescent son to hard-core pornography; and on at least two occasions, sexually assaulted one of the older girls in front of the young boy. The Division's evidence included a DNA match between sperm cells that had dried on one of the older girl's eyeglasses and a buccal swab provided by defendant. The trial judge found the Division's evidence credible and entered an order terminating defendant's parental rights to his daughter and son.

In this appeal, defendant argues that the Division did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights is in his children's best interests. The Division and the Law Guardian disagree, as do we.

The "best interests" standard is codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and requires the State to establish the following four elements:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

Defendant contends that the Division did not prove the third statutory element. He raises the following points:

POINT I

The trial court erred by terminating the father's parental rights because alternatives to termination and adoption, including placement with relatives, were not properly considered.

POINT II

The judgment terminating the defendant's parental rights must be reversed because the division of child protection and permanency did not make reasonable efforts to provide contact and visitation between the children and their father.

We affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial judge, James A. Farber, in his oral decision of February 12, 2013. Judge Farber's decision, which evaluates each statutory element, "is based on findings of fact which are adequately supported by [the] evidence," R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A), and "falls squarely within the permissible bounds of discretion accorded to the family court," N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 454 (2012). Defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.