JOSEPH PRINCIPE v. PRC MANAGEMENT CO INC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

JOSEPH PRINCIPE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PRC MANAGEMENT CO., INC.,

PRC PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,

LLC, PLANNED RESIDENTIAL

COMMUNITIES, INC., ANTHONY

SICA and GREG LENTINE,

Defendants-Respondents.

_____________________________________________

January 15, 2014

 

 

Before Judges Ashrafi, St. John and Leone.

 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-3182-10.

 

Stuart J. Moskovitz, attorney for appellant.

 

Archer & Greiner, P.C., attorneys for respondents (John P. Quirke and Christopher J. Trofimov, on the brief).

 

PER CURIAM
 

Plaintiff Joseph Principe appeals from the summary judgment dismissal of his complaint alleging age discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, and other related claims. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.

I.

This matter comes to us from the motion court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, PRC Management Co., Inc., PRC Property Management, LLC, Planned Residential Communities, Inc., Anthony Sica and Greg Lentine.

Defendant PRC Management1 is a real estate company engaged in the business of marketing and selling residential housing and high-rise condominiums. Plaintiff served as an at-will employee at PRC from April 2009 to May 2010. Plaintiff was fifty-one years old when he was hired by defendant Greg Lentine, vice president of sales and plaintiff's immediate supervisor. Lentine is the same age as plaintiff.

Lentine assigned plaintiff to a position as the lead sales agent at Diamond Beach, a high-rise condominium complex where PRC was responsible for marketing units. Plaintiff's primary duty was showcasing residential units to prospective buyers. Lentine thereafter brought in Sharon Thomas, then age sixty-six, to serve as plaintiff's part-time assistant at Diamond Beach.

Lentine certified that in the spring of 2010, he discovered that the two employees "had stopped communicating verbally," though both plaintiff and Thomas dispute that assertion. Lentine thereafter sought to replace Thomas, later identifying Megan Kelliher, a part-time sales assistant, thirty years old at the time, as a potential replacement. Although Kelliher lacked enough experience for a lead sales position, Lentine believed she was a "good candidate for a position" at Diamond Beach.

In late April 2010, Lentine and plaintiff met with representatives from Fraser Wallace (FW), a marketing firm retained by PRC, to plan a "kickoff event" aimed at promoting sales at Diamond Beach. Lentine characterized plaintiff's attitude at that meeting as "extremely negative," which purportedly caused the FW representatives to walk out of the meeting after an hour. Lentine stated that one of the FW principals subsequently informed him that plaintiff's "negative demeanor might be hampering sales at Diamond Beach." Consequently, Lentine decided to entrust Kelliher with the event-planning.

On May 3, 2010, Lentine accompanied Kelliher to Diamond Beach to introduce her to plaintiff and acquaint her with the property. Though the parties dispute specific details, an incident occurred which led to disciplinary action against plaintiff. According to Lentine, plaintiff became confrontational and "went on a verbal tirade."

Plaintiff, at deposition, admitted that he had told Lentine, "You show her the models," meaning Lentine was to show Kelliher the models, but suggested that Lentine took it the wrong way. He denied raising his voice, and explained that he had walked away from Lentine because he had an imminent appointment with a customer. Plaintiff also refuted Lentine's contention that he exclaimed, "If you're here to fire me, just do it."

As a result of the incident, Lentine issued plaintiff a "disciplinary warning notice" on May 5, 2010. The notice, in pertinent part, stated as follows:

REASON FOR NOTICE:

2 On May 3rd, Megan Kelliher and I went to [D]iamond [B]each to introduce the building to Megan. [Plaintiff] met us at the stairs and over reacted to the point of total disrespect. He then [] walked away in a very angry way and said "let Greg show you around". I left Megan [i]n the model and went to see what was wrong and in the hallway [plaintiff] said "don't bother me, I have other things on my mind and walked away." In addition to the above event, [plaintiff] has been very negative and it has been recommended [b]y our agency that he be replaced or moved.

 

ACTION TAKEN ON THIS NOTICE:

This notice is to inform [plaintiff] that he is on a 30 day probation period. He will be evaluated during [t]he month and then a determination will be made to either change his community or [t]erminate employment.

 

The apparent purpose of the notice was to make plaintiff "aware of his inappropriate conduct and negative demeanor, and to seek improvement." According to Lentine, plaintiff "was made fully aware" that he would be terminated if he refused to accept a probationary period. Lentine instructed plaintiff to look over the notice and put any comments on it. Lentine gave plaintiff until May 18, 2010 to respond. He also informed plaintiff that he would be reassigning several members of the sales force, and that Kelliher would be relocated to Diamond Beach.

Plaintiff never discussed his misgivings about the notice with Lentine. According to plaintiff, he refused to acknowledge and sign the document because (1) it lacked Lentine's own signature and (2) he believed the accusations were false. However, at no time did he indicate to anyone at PRC that he believed the notice to be groundless or unwarranted. As plaintiff explained at his deposition:

Well, I figured I was terminated regardless, because the way [Kelliher] came in and she had, was taking all my material and going home with it, and, in fact, came in on her day off and picked up all her material, once again went home with it, that was being let go regardless of whether I signed this, which was false, whether or not I didn't sign it. And if I signed it, I was there to train her for 30 days. And, of course, there was no other community to transfer me.

 

On the same day the warning notice was issued, Lentine exchanged several emails with Kenneth Koehler, an executive at PRC and his superior. In the first email, Lentine discussed several "staffing adjustments" he intended to make. One such adjustment would be promoting Kelliher to a full-time employee to assist at Diamond Beach as well as cover appointments at another property. Lentine continued:

If [plaintiff] does not work out at [D]iamond [B]each ( he may be let go ) In this case [Kelliher] will be the lead sales person at [Diamond Beach] will then need to hire an assistant.

 

After Koehler inquired why two full-time employees were needed at Diamond Beach, Lentine replied:

[N]eed [Kelliher] to work 5 days a week to cover [another PRC location] and [Diamond Beach] which puts her full time.

 

Koehler then asked, "Are you no longer happy with [plaintiff]?" To which Lentine explained:

I am not happy with [plaintiff]. He is a very hard worker. He puts in 7 days a week with long hours. I don't like his attitude. I asked Fraser Wallace to evaluate all of our sales people and they will be reporting that [plaintiff] is DEPRESSING.

 

2 He will be on a 30 day probation. I need [Kelliher] there for her positive attitude and to get up to speed in case I need to get [plaintiff] out.

 

Koehler then replied:

I am not sure we can afford to wait 30 days. We need sales during this peak season[.]

 

After receiving the warning notice from Lentine, plaintiff retained counsel. On May 12, 2010, PRC received a letter from plaintiff's attorney, Stuart J. Moskovitz, who wrote that he had been retained by plaintiff "in connection with the threats . . . made to terminate his employment." The letter invited Lentine to clarify the contents of the disciplinary warning notice so that plaintiff could thereafter respond. Moskovitz, after noting that federal and state law prohibit discrimination on the basis of age, opined, "I can only conclude that [plaintiff] is being pushed aside for younger personnel, such as Megan Kelliher, or you have a personality problem that the company needs to deal with rather than lose the profits generated by [plaintiff]."

Defendant Anthony R. Sica, then assistant general counsel at PRC,2 answered that letter on May 14 by denying any discriminatory motive on the part of PRC. Sica explained that plaintiff's conduct at Diamond Beach on May 3 was "unacceptable" and informed Moskovitz that PRC would terminate plaintiff if he "is unable or unwilling to agree to address these issues during a period of probation."

The attorneys exchanged two more letters that day. Moskovitz continued to seek clarification regarding the grounds for plaintiff's disciplinary action. Sica then replied that the requested information "will not be provided to you . . ." because plaintiff "is an at-will employee . . . . His employment may be terminated at any time and for any reason, other than for reasons prohibited by law." Sica then reiterated PRC's position that plaintiff would be terminated on May 18 unless he accepted the probationary period. Moskovitz responded in turn, alleging that PRC's continued demand that plaintiff accept probation "is clearly a retaliation for my client's [LAD] claim."

Meanwhile, in response to plaintiff's accusation, representatives from PRC's human resources department commenced an investigation into plaintiff's allegations. On May 17, 2010, in connection with that inquiry, plaintiff was interviewed with his attorney present. Lentine was also interviewed. The investigators found "no evidence to support [plaintiff's] assertions of age discrimination. In particular, [plaintiff] did not point to one age-related comment or any actions taken by any employee of PRC that appeared to be based on his age."

On May 18, 2010, Sica informed Moskovitz by letter that the internal investigation had uncovered nothing to substantiate plaintiff's accusations. Sica advised that PRC was giving plaintiff an additional day to acquiesce to a probationary period of thirty days.

PRC terminated plaintiff on May 19 for "inappropriate conduct" and failure to accept the warning notice and accompanying probationary period. On May 21, Sica confirmed to Moskovitz in writing that plaintiff had been terminated effective May 19. Plaintiff was fifty-two years old at the time.

On June 28, 2010, plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that he had been terminated solely on account of his age. Plaintiff also claimed that defendants terminated him in retaliation for accusing the company of age-based discrimination. Discovery followed thereafter, including depositions of the principal actors. In March 2012, defendants moved for summary judgment. The parties filed lengthy certifications and other exhibits in connection with that motion.

The parties' submissions disputed who actually replaced plaintiff as lead sales agent at Diamond Beach. On May 11, 2010, eight days before plaintiff was terminated, Lentine had sent out a scheduling email assigning plaintiff and Kelliher to Diamond Beach. Michael Hernandez, another lead salesperson then age fifty-three, was assigned to his usual location at another PRC property.

The documents filed in support of defendants' motion for summary judgment indicate that Kelliher did not replace plaintiff; rather, she had been transferred to Diamond Beach effective May 12 to replace Thomas, plaintiff's outgoing assistant. The certifications showed that Hernandez, after plaintiff's termination on May 19, took over his duties as lead salesperson effective May 24, while Kelliher became sales manager at another property approximately five months later. Koehler, PRC's president, was deposed in October 2011 and testified that he would not have granted approval for the inexperienced Kelliher to take over as lead salesperson at Diamond Beach. Defendants certified that if plaintiff had accepted the warning notice and subsequent probationary period, he would not have been terminated.

Also among the filings were PRC's uncontroverted certifications showing that Lentine had hired fourteen sales personnel in his capacity as vice president; twelve of those hires were over the age of forty, seven being fifty years-old or more. As of May 2010, the average age of PRC's sales force was fifty-three.

On August 10, 2012, the motion judge heard oral argument before rendering an oral decision, finding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Though the judge determined that plaintiff had satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case, she nevertheless found no proof in the motion record that plaintiff was "replaced by a person sufficiently younger to raise the inference of age discrimination." An order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment was entered on August 10.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment for defendants because he produced substantial evidence raising genuine issues of material fact with respect to his age-discrimination and retaliation claims. Accordingly, plaintiff argues that the case should have proceeded to a jury trial for resolution of the factual disputes and, therefore, dismissal of his claims was improper.

 

 

 

II.

Although we affirm the grant of summary judgment, we do so, in part, for reasons in addition to those expressed by the motion judge.3

In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply the same standard as employed by the motion judge. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998). Accordingly, we must decide whether

[T]he competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. . . . If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to constitute a "genuine" issue of material fact for purposes of Rule 4:46-2.

 

[Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)(citation omitted).]

 

"Bare conclusions in the pleadings, without factual support in tendered affidavits, will not defeat a meritorious application for summary judgment." U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399 400 (App. Div. 1961). In other words, "[a] plaintiff's self-serving assertion alone will not create a question of material fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2.2 on R. 4:46-2 (2013). Furthermore, an opposing party who offers no substantial or material facts in opposition to the motion cannot complain if the court takes as true the uncontradicted facts in the movant's papers. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954).

Therefore, "the essence of the inquiry . . . is . . . 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 536 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 214 (1986)).

In our review, "'[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382 (2010) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

We begin our analysis by restating the following, well-settled principles. The LAD prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or job applicants on the basis of, among other things, age, when making hiring or termination decisions. N.J.S.A. 10:5-3; 10:5-12(a). The LAD does not bar "the termination or change of the employment of any person who in the opinion of the employer, reasonably arrived at, is unable to perform adequately the duties of employment, nor to preclude discrimination among individuals on the basis of competence, performance, conduct or any other reasonable standards." N.J.S.A. 10:5-2.1.

Because of the difficulty of proving that an employer was motivated by a discriminatory intent in making a personnel decision, New Jersey has adopted the procedural burden-shifting methodology that the United States Supreme Court articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). See Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005). The plaintiff may make his or her case through circumstantial evidence. Ibid.

In the context of a discharge case, a plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of age discrimination by proving that "(1) he was in the protected group; (2) he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations; (3) he nevertheless was fired; and (4) the employer sought someone to perform the same work after he left." Id. at 450. In this case, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff was a member of a protected class; other than the subject of the "disciplinary warning notice" and his decision to not accept the probationary period, was performing his job duties adequately; and was terminated. The dispute focuses on the fourth element of the prima facie test.

The employer is entitled to summary judgment if, after proffering a non-discriminatory reason for its decision, plaintiff cannot "point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a fact-finder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Id. at 455-56.

In Young v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 459-60 (App. Div. 2005), we found that plaintiff failed to establish that she was terminated due to her age rather than as a cost reduction measure, noting that nobody was hired to replace her. However, we stated:

[P]laintiff cannot show either that she was replaced by someone sufficiently younger, or that "age in any significant way made a difference" in the treatment she was accorded by her employer. Even had plaintiff established that her age was a primary factor in [defendants'] decision to terminate her, she has not refuted defendants' legitimate business reasons for discharging her.

 

[Id. at 460.]

 

In Petrusky v. Maxfli Dunlop Sports Corp., 342 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 388 (2001), we held that the trial court misconceived the fourth element to require a showing that the plaintiff had been replaced by a younger person, and stated that "'[t]he fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas test could be satisfied by proof of either replacement by someone outside the protected class or by someone younger or by other proof that the discharge was because of age.'" Id. at 82 (emphasis omitted)(quoting Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S. Ct. 796, 88 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1986)); see also Reynolds v. Palnut Co., 330 N.J. Super. 162, 168 (App. Div. 2000)(holding that in a "traditional age discrimination claim," a plaintiff "need not show that he [or she] was replaced by someone sufficiently younger" in order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination (emphasis omitted)).

In Williams v. Pemberton Township Public Schools, 323 N.J. Super. 490 (App. Div. 1999), we deemed it "unwise," in light of the assorted circumstances under which employment discrimination claims emanate, "to require a plaintiff to establish unfailingly as part of the prima facie case that plaintiff was replaced by an individual outside the plaintiff's protected class." Id. at 502. Rather, we held that

The appropriate fourth element of a plaintiff's prima facie case requires a showing that the challenged employment decision (i.e., failure to hire, failure to promote, wrongful discharge) took place under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. . . .

 

Under this approach, a showing that a plaintiff was replaced by an individual outside the protected class could support an inference of unlawful discrimination. Similarly, a plaintiff who was replaced by an individual within the protected class but could show other circumstances indicating unlawful discrimination would not be unfairly precluded from presenting a case.

 

[Id. at 502-03 (citations omitted).]

 

In O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 309, 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1309, 134 L. Ed. 2d 433, 437 (1996), the Supreme Court addressed this issue in considering a prima facie case of age discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 621 to 634. The Court held that a prima facie case of age discrimination does not require proof of replacement by a person outside the protected class, but it also considered how "to avoid creating a prima facie case on the basis of very thin evidence," such as the replacement of an older employee with another older employee. Id. at 311-13, 116 S. Ct. 1310, 134 L. Ed. 2d 438-39. The Court explained that "the proper solution to the problem lies . . . in recognizing that the prima facie case requires 'evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion.'" Id. at 312-13, 116 S. Ct. 1310, 134 L. Ed. 2d 438-39 (alterations in original)(emphasis omitted)(quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1977). Where one employee is replaced by another worker "insignificantly younger," the Court reasoned, an inference of age discrimination "cannot be drawn." Id. at 313, 116 S. Ct. 1310, 134 L. Ed. 2d 439.

If a plaintiff establishes his or her prima facie case, creating an inference of discrimination, the burden of production then shifts to defendants to "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's action." Zive, supra, 182 N.J. at 449 (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 596 (1988)). "The burden of production shifts back to the employee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason articulated by the employer was merely a pretext for discrimination and not the true reason for the employment decision." Ibid. To prove pretext, "a plaintiff may not simply show that the employer's reason was false but must also demonstrate that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent." Ibid. (citing Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 14 (2002)). At all times, however, the burden of proof that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination remains with the employee. Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 596.

Plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to who actually filled his position. He contends that Lentine's emails demonstrated his desire and intention to replace plaintiff with Kelliher, a younger woman. However, Lentine's suggested substitution was explicitly conditioned upon plaintiff's failure to adhere to a probationary period. Lentine wrote that "If [plaintiff] does not work out . . . (he may be let go)," then Kelliher would have to "get up to speed in case I need to get [plaintiff] out." (Emphasis added). Moreover, Koehler testified that Lentine never attempted to put Kelliher in as the lead sales agent, and if he had, Koehler never would have approved it. Plaintiff has not pointed to any facts casting doubt on that testimony. Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, mere speculation by Lentine about potential staffing contingencies cannot, by itself, sustain plaintiff's otherwise-unsubstantiated charge that Lentine actually supplanted plaintiff with Kelliher. Plaintiff has referenced no other specific facts in the record that contradict defendants' evidential materials indicating that Hernandez replaced him. As a defendant's uncontradicted assertions must be taken as true in a motion for summary judgment, Judson, supra, 17 N.J. at 75, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to show, or create a genuine issue of fact, that he was replaced by a person "'sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age discrimination.'" Young, supra, 385 N.J. Super. at 458 (quoting Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 213 (1999)). Further, plaintiff's "theory" that PRC transferred Hernandez to Diamond Beach as a stratagem for concealing its discriminatory motives is wholly unsupported by facts in the record. Plaintiff's naked, unsubstantiated allegation is insufficient to create an issue of material fact.

The record before us also does not support that plaintiff's termination took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that such circumstances include "actions or remarks made by decisionmakers that could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus, preferential treatment given to employees outside the protected class, . . . [and] the timing and sequence of events leading to the plaintiff's termination"). At his deposition, plaintiff acknowledged that his suit was based on his belief that a thirty-year-old employee took his position. That belief alone, however, is insufficient to infer discrimination. It is undisputed that plaintiff never complained about discriminatory treatment to supervisors or human resources prior to May 12, 2010. Nor, as plaintiff testified, did Lentine ever do anything that plaintiff considered discriminatory on the basis of age. There is also no dispute that: (1) plaintiff was already within the protected class when he was hired in 2009; (2) Lentine himself was within the protected class both when he hired and terminated plaintiff; (3) plaintiff never received or overheard derogatory comments concerning his or any other employee's age; and (4) PRC has never been subject to an age discrimination lawsuit. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish a reasonable inference that his age "'made a difference' in the treatment he was accorded by his employer." Petrusky, supra, 342 N.J. Super. at 82. While plaintiff asserts that certain older employees were let go during the time period relevant to this suit, he provides nothing to support an inference of age discrimination with respect to those terminations beyond two affiants' bare, conclusory allegations that they were fired solely because of their age. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of the fourth element that he was terminated under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.

As to plaintiff's contention that defendants terminated him in retaliation for accusing them of age discrimination, we find this contention to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the following brief comments.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the LAD, a plaintiff must demonstrate: "(1) that [plaintiff] engaged in protected activity; (2) the activity was known to the employer; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) there existed a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Young, supra, 385 N.J. Super. at 465; see also Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001). Plaintiff argues that the retaliatory nature of Sica's letters is self-evident. Those letters, coupled with the temporal proximity of plaintiff's complaint and ensuing termination, purportedly raise a genuine issue of fact with respect to causation. Accordingly, plaintiff asserts, the motion court committed reversible error by granting summary judgment. We disagree.

There is no evidence in the record to support an inference that plaintiff's eventual termination was causally connected to the May 12 letter of counsel. Instead, the record overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that plaintiff was terminated as a result of his failure to comply with the warning notice he received on May 3.

Affirmed.

1 The company consists of separate legal entities. "PRC Management Co., Inc." encompasses the business's executive and finance staff, while "PRC Property Management, LLC" is a separate entity that manages the apartment complexes. "Planned Residential Communities, Inc." is the parent company. As the composition of the business has no relevance to this appeal, the three entities hereinafter will be collectively referred to as "PRC" to avoid confusion.

2 Sica is no longer employed by PRC. He was terminated for reasons not having anything to do with the litigation at hand.

3 Because we review judgments, not decisions, we may affirm on any ground. Serrano v. Serrano, 367 N.J. Super. 450, 461 (App. Div. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 183 N.J. 508 (2005).