DAVID OLSON v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4499-11T1

DAVID OLSON,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

___________________________________

April 30, 2013

Submitted April 17, 2013 Decided

Before Judges Axelrad and Happas.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

David Olson, appellant pro se.

Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent(Lewis A.Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Shirley P. Dickstein, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

David Olson appeals from a final agency decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board denying him parole and imposing an eighteen-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.

Olson was sentenced on June 17, 2010 to a flat five-year term for a conviction of sexual assault. His extensive criminal history included convictions for trespass, aggravated assault, and two convictions for CDS, one of which was for distribution in a school zone. Additionally, he had violated restraining orders on several occasions and had three juvenile adjudications.

Olson became eligible for parole on January 22, 2012. A hearing officer conducted an initial hearing and then referred the matter to a Parole Board panel. Parole was denied and an eighteen month FET established based upon the panel's determination that there was a reasonable expectation that Olson would violate conditions of parole if released on parole. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a). The panel acknowledged that Olson had no infractions while incarcerated, he participated in institutional programs including programs specific to behavior and he made attempts to enroll in programs but was not admitted. However, in reaching its decision, the panel considered, among other things, Olson's extensive and repetitive prior criminal record, his prior violations of probation, and his prior incarcerations. In addition, the panel observed that Olson exhibited insufficient problem resolution, specifically that he had not sufficiently addressed his substance abuse problem which he identified as a major contributor to his criminal behavior.

Olson appealed the panel's decision to the full Parole Board. On March 28, 2012 the Parole Board affirmed the panel's decision and this appeal followed. On appeal, Olson contends he "was denied parole based on his past history; arbitrarily and contrary to the standard of the New Jersey Parole Board's Administrative Treatment Act."

The Parole Board's decisions are highly "individualized discretionary appraisals." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973)). The standard of review applicable to other administrative agency decisions applies to our review of the Parole Board's determinations. Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19, 24-25 (1998). We must determine:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, i.e., did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Id. at 24.]

"Parole Board decisions should not be reversed by a court unless found to be arbitrary . . . or an abuse of discretion[.]" Id. at 25 (internal citation omitted); Pazden v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 374 N.J. Super. 356, 366 (App. Div. 2005).

After considering Olson's arguments in light of the record and applicable law, we conclude the Parole Board's decision to deny him parole and establish an eighteen-month FET was amply supported by the credible evidence in the record. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Nothing in the record suggests the Parole Board either abused its discretion or acted unreasonably. Olson's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.