A-0JENIFFER RANGHEL v. BOARD OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT and COMMUNITY BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE NETWORK OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC January 13, 2014

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

JENIFFER RANGHEL,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND

WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

and COMMUNITY BEHAVIORAL

HEALTHCARE NETWORK OF

PENNSYLVANIA, INC.,

Respondents.

____________________________________________________

January 13, 2014

Submitted December 17, 2013 Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Hayden.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 351,440.

Jeniffer Ranghel, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alan C. Stephens, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Sand & Saidel, P.C., attorneys for respondent Community Behavioral Healthcare Network of Pennsylvania, Inc. (Diane Lee Newman, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Jeniffer Ranghel appeals from a February 24, 2012 final agency decision of the Board of Review, which affirmed the November 14, 2011 decision of the Appeal Tribunal finding that Ranghel was disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employment. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm.

Community Behavioral Healthcare Network of Pennsylvania, Inc. (CBHNP) employed Ranghel as a DYFS1 Care Coordinator. She began as a temporary employee in November 2009, and became a permanent employee in March 2010. Ranghel began maternity leave in February 2011 and was due back to work on June 1, 2011. Unfortunately, Ranghel's daughter was born with several medical conditions necessitating one-on-one parental care and frequent breast feeding.

When Ranghel's maternity leave was ending, she requested to temporarily work from home. CBHNP could not accommodate her request because Ranghel's job involved working at the call center. Ranghel was then able to extend her leave to care for her daughter by utilizing six weeks of unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.A. 2601 to 2654. Thus, she was due back to work on July 7, 2011.

Ranghel returned to work, but, due to her daughter's illness, she left early on July 7 and 11, 2011, and missed work on July 8, 2011. On July 11, 2011, Ranghel spoke with a manager and requested to be temporarily switched to a part-time work schedule until she was able to wean her daughter off of breast feeding, which she had been trying to do to no avail. The manager declined her request as it was against company policy and because it was not possible to altered schedules for positions involving the call center.

Ranghel inquired whether, based on her three attendance-related issues, she would be let go. The manager advised her that she was a good worker and the company wanted her to stay, but the choice of whether to remain was up to Ranghel. The manager stated that she would be expected to work her full schedule, and that continued absences or leaving early could result in future discipline. The manager told Ranghel that if she resigned, it would not adversely affect Ranghel's references or ability to obtain reemployment with CBHNP in the future. Based on this conversation, Ranghel chose to resign because she was unable to comply with the requirements of her full-time schedule.

Ranghel filed a claim for unemployment benefits effective July 10, 2011. On August 5, 2011, a Deputy Director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance found that Ranghel was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), she had left her employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. Ranghel's appeal was heard before the Appeal Tribunal on November 9, 2011.

On November 14, 2011, the Tribunal affirmed Ranghel's disqualification stating that Ranghel

left work voluntarily on 07/11/11 because the employer could not accommodate her request for a change in hours from full-time to part-time. The claimant was requesting the change until her baby was weaned off the breast. This is a personal reason and unrelated to the work. The claimant contends that she was informed by the employer if she had continued to leave work early and was unable to work her schedule, she would be written up and would be terminated. The claimant's contention is rejected because there was no evidence that she was about to be terminated at the time she left her job[.]

Ranghel appealed to the Board. The Board affirmed the Tribunal's decision on February 24, 2012. This appeal followed.

Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citing Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980)). In challenging an agency conclusion, the claimant carries a substantial burden of persuasion, and the determination of the administrative agency carries a presumption of correctness. Gloucester Cnty. Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 93 N.J. 384, 390-91 (1983). We also accord substantial deference to the agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing. Bd. of Educ. of Neptune v. Neptune Twp. Educ. Ass'n, 144 N.J. 16, 31 (1996).

Further, "[w]e are obliged to defer to the Board when its factual findings are based on sufficient credible evidence in the record." Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty. v. Bd. of Review, 197 N.J. 339, 367 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We overturn an agency determination only if it is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unsupported by substantial credible evidence as a whole, or inconsistent with the enabling statute or legislative policy. Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 71-72 (1985) (citing Gloucester Cnty. Welfare Bd., supra, 93 N.J. at 391).

A person is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits

[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment, which may include employment for the federal government, and has earned in employment at least ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate, as determined in each case.

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).]

In order to avoid disqualification, the claimant has the burden of establishing that she left work for good cause related to work. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997). "'Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Medwick v. Review Bd., 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)). An employee's "decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones." Ibid. Moreover, "it is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Ibid. (citing Condo v. Review Bd., 158 N.J. Super. 172, 175 (App. Div. 1978)).

Thus, an employee who quits a job without a sufficient work-related reason is disqualified from benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). An employee who leaves work for a good, but personal reason is also subject to the disqualification. See Pagan v. Bd. of Review, 296 N.J. Super. 539, 542-43 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 150 N.J. 24 (1997). Childcare issues are among the personal reasons that do not constitute good cause. Espina v. Bd. of Review, 402 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2008) (citing N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)).

Applying our highly deferential standard of review, we find no occasion to interfere with the Board's decision. The record amply supports the Board's conclusion that Ranghel voluntarily left CBHNP without good cause related to her work when she resigned. Ranghel's assertion, citing Lord v. Bd. of Review, 425 N.J. Super. 187 (App. Div. 2012), that she was forced to leave her job when told to resign or be fired lacks merit. The Tribunal determined, and the record supports, that Ranghel was given the choice to resign, and at no point was she was in imminent danger of being fired. Moreover, even had Ranghel stayed and been subsequently fired for attendance-related issues, she would be unable to show that her unemployment was caused through no fault of her own. See Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 212 ("The purpose of the [A]ct is to provide some income for the worker earning nothing, because he is out of work through no fault or act of his own." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Based upon the Tribunal's well-grounded factual findings, Ranghel's reasons for resigning, while understandable and necessary for the well-being of her daughter, were personal in nature and thus disqualify her from unemployment benefits. See Pagan, supra, 296 N.J. Super. at 542-43; Espina, supra, 402 N.J. Super. at 93. We are sympathetic to Ranghel's plight, but the law is clear and leads to the inescapable conclusion that she left CBHNP without good cause related to her work.

1 DYFS is the acronym for the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, which has since been renamed the Division of Child Protection and Permanency.