CHRISTINA M. RIVERA v. HECTOR R. CORRALES

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1197-11T2

CHRISTINA M. RIVERA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HECTOR R. CORRALES,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________________________________________

January 31, 2013

Submitted July 18, 2012 - Decided

Before Judges Espinosa and Koblitz.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, Docket No. FM-03-1379-09.

Christina M. Rivera, appellant pro se.

Hector R. Corrales, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff appeals from two post-judgment orders, dated August 19 and October 14, 2011, in this matrimonial action. We affirm.

It is fair to state that this matrimonial litigation has been both contentious and bitter, including multiple post-judgment motions, the filing of criminal and professional complaints and the publication of sexually explicit videos on pornographic websites. We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal.

The parties were married in February 2009, and had one child. A final judgment of divorce (JOD) was entered on May 12, 2010. The JOD stated that the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA) was orally set forth on the record and incorporated into the JOD.1

Plaintiff filed a motion in September 2010, asking the court to vacate the settlement agreement, reopen the matter for equitable distribution purposes and for other relief. Defendant filed a cross-motion, asking the court to compel plaintiff to pay the mortgage for May and June 2010 and for legal fees.

Among the provisions of the order dated December 17, 2010 that disposed of these motions, the court denied plaintiff's request to vacate the PSA without prejudice, finding that plaintiff had not provided clear and convincing evidence that the agreement should be vacated. The court denied without prejudice plaintiff's motion to reopen the matter for equitable distribution purposes. However, the court also concluded that defendant had violated the terms of the PSA and ordered him to reimburse plaintiff for his failure to maintain the mortgage from May 2009 through June 2010. Plaintiff did not appeal from this order.

In December 2010, while the former motions were still pending, defendant filed a motion and plaintiff filed a cross-motion in which they collectively sought thirty-six forms of relief. The court entered an order dated March 23, 2011, which disposed of the motion and cross-motion. In that order, the court stated many of the requests for relief were "redundant and duplicative[,]" "frivolous and harassing in nature[,]" and, further, that some were "improper . . . and not within the purview of the Court." Plaintiff did not appeal from this order.

Following additional motion practice, the court entered orders dated April 15 and May 27, 2011. The May 27 order stated in part,

The Court has previously found that the mortgage is delinquent and the mortgage company is not accepting payments until Plaintiff's modification application is approved. The Court has ordered Plaintiff to complete the modification process so Defendant may comply with his obligation under the December 17, 2010 Order. The Court declines to enforce the terms of the parties' PSA until Plaintiff completes the loan modification process. Plaintiff shall complete the modification on or before July 15, 2011. If Plaintiff fails to be approved for a modification of the loan, the Court will reconsider an application for sale of the marital home and direct repayment of mortgage[] payments by Defendant to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff did not appeal from this order.

Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights on short notice in July 2011. She alleged that defendant was actively interfering with her ability to "remodify" the home mortgage by changing the contact information with the bank to his home address and that, because she had not received correspondence from the mortgage company, the former marital home was scheduled for a Sheriff's sale on August 15, 2011. Plaintiff asked the court to change the date for her to get a "home remodification" to August 15, 2011, and enjoin the Sheriff's sale. In addition, she asked the court to: hold defendant in contempt and sanction him; amend its order of May 27, 2011 so that she would not have to inform defendant of her home address; and reduce the amount of income imputed to her for the calculation of child support to zero. Defendant filed a cross-motion in August 2011.

By order dated August 19, 2011, the court addressed the concerns raised in plaintiff's motion comprehensively, stating reasons for each of its rulings. The paragraphs that are the subject of this appeal can be summarized as follows:

Paragraph 1 of the order denied plaintiff's request to hold defendant in contempt of court for willfully interfering with her loan modification, finding that she had failed to provide a sufficient factual basis for the relief requested. The court noted that it was unable to enjoin the Sheriff's sale and that plaintiff had not provided good cause to extend her deadline for modifying the mortgage. The court directed plaintiff to sell the home at short sale and sign a listing agreement within fourteen days. The court also appointed a realtor with full decision-making authority regarding the sale of the home and cautioned plaintiff that if she failed to cooperate, defendant would be placed in charge of the sale.

In Paragraph 3, the court denied plaintiff's request to order that defendant be responsible for any financial losses caused by the former marital home being sold by the Sheriff. The court found it inappropriate to hold defendant responsible for losses because plaintiff had bought out defendant's interest in the marital home.

Paragraph 6 of the order denied without prejudice plaintiff's request to reduce the income imputed to her to zero. The court noted that plaintiff failed to provide evidence of "consistent attempts to find full-time employment" or that her unemployment was permanent.

In Paragraph 8, the court denied without prejudice defendant's request to sanction plaintiff for violating court orders, finding defendant had not provided the court an adequate basis for such relief.

In Paragraph 13, the court granted in part defendant's request to compel plaintiff to make certain payments to him. After reviewing the transcript of the proceeding in which the parties' agreement was placed on the record, the court made the following ruling:

The Court's reading of the settlement entitles Defendant to $7,000 for the home, $2,700 for the Zales debt, and $5,000 for the Navy Credit Union debt. Plaintiff does not dispute that she has not paid Defendant $14,700 as part of the parties' global settlement. The Court finds it appropriate to offset Plaintiff's obligation from the $22,950 the Court found Defendant owed Plaintiff in the December 17, 2010 Order. Thus the Court finds Defendant still owes Plaintiff $8,250. The Court no longer finds it prudent to allow Plaintiff to continue to refinance. Therefore, Defendant must repay the $8,250 to Plaintiff directly. The Court finds it would be inequitable to compel Defendant to do so by way of lump sum payment. Defendant shall repay Plaintiff in 8 monthly lump sum payments. The first payment of $1,250 shall take place on or before September 1, 2011. Thereafter, Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $1,000 each month on or before the 1st of the month for the ensuing seven months. Failure to render timely payment may result in the imposition of economic sanctions or the issuance of a bench warrant for Defendant's arrest.

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on September 1, 2011, asking the court to:

1. Reconsider points/paragraphs [sic] 1 and grant me the additional time requested as I supplied the mortgage company with proof of employment which resulted in the home modification being sent to the underwriter for the first time and was approved and passed onto the second underwriter[.]

2. Reconsider point/paragraph 3 and hold Mr. Corrales accountable for at least half of the costs of the marital home if I am forced to sell the home via short sale[.]

3. Reconsider point/paragraph 6 and reduce the imputed income imposed upon me as my inability to get recommendations and a job as pediatrician is a direct result of Mr. Corrales['s] false and baseless accusations of child abuse [and HIPAA] violations.

4. Reconsider point/paragraph 13 and not include the $7,000 buyout amount that I agreed to pay Mr. Corrales as I only agreed to pay that based on fraudulent information supplied by Mr. Corrales and as the marital [residence] had no equity at the time the PSA was entered. I also ask that Your Honor reconsider reducing the amount of the Zales debt to $1,899.15. I also ask that Your Honor convert the $7,000 given to me as credit toward the nonexistent $14,000 buyout of the marital home as money that is owed to me in additional [sic] to the monies already awarded to me. I also ask that if the mortgage is remodified, the amount owed increase to the $22,950 amount originally ordered on November 29, 2011.

Plaintiff submitted a certification in support of her motion that expanded upon the factual assertions made in these prayers for relief. By order dated October 14, 2011, the court denied each of the requests for reconsideration without prejudice and set forth reasons for its rulings.

Plaintiff presents the following arguments for our consideration in this appeal:

POINT I

THE PSA ENTERED ON THE RECORD ON MAY 12, 2010, WAS BASED ON FRAUD AND MADE IN BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENT. AS SUCH IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO HOLD APPELLANT TO PARTS OF THE PSA THAT SHE AGREED TO BASED ON THE FRAUDULENT INFORMATION PROVIDED BY RESPONDENT CORRALES

POINT II

IF ONE WERE TO AGREE WITH [THE MOTION JUDGE] IN THAT THE PSA WASN'T BASED ON FRAUD AND SHOULD STAND, THEN RESPONDENT CORRALES WOULD STILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FINANCIAL STANDING OF THE MARITAL HOME AS RESPONDENT CORRALES AGREED TO LEAVE THE HOME IN GOOD FINANCIAL STANDING PRIOR TO VACATING THE MARITAL HOME ON JULY 1, 2010. RESPONDENT CORRALES FAILED TO DO SO, AND, THUS, IS IN VIOLATION OF THE PSA

POINT III

RESPONDENT CORRALES SHOULD NOT BE COMPENSATED FOR HIS NAVY FEDERAL DEBT AS HIS THEFT AND FRAUD LED TO APPELLANT'S INAB[I]LITY TO REFINANCE THE MARITAL HOME

POINT IV

THE TIMING OF WHEN APPELLANT RIVERA SUPPLIED THE COURT WITH PROOF OF THE ACTUAL AMOUNT SHE AGREED TO PAY FOR THE ZALES BILL IS IRRELEVANT, INCONSEQUENTIAL, AND IS NOT A LOGICAL, APPROPRIATE REASON TO FORCE APPELLANT RIVERA TO PAY [A] HIGHER AMOUNT

POINT V

THE INCOME IMPUTED ON APPELLANT RIVERA SHOULD BE REDUCED TO ZERO AS RESPONDENT CORRALES HAS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLANT TO BE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED AS A PEDI[A]TRICIAN

In reviewing a decision of a family court, we "defer to the factual findings of the trial court[,]" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008), in recognition of the "family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters . . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). It is only "when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'" that we will intervene and make our own findings "to ensure that there is not a denial of justice." E.P., supra, 196 N.J. at 104; see also Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). After reviewing plaintiff's arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles, we are satisfied that the trial court's findings are entitled to our deference and should not be disturbed and further, that plaintiff's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), beyond the following comments.

To a large degree, plaintiff's arguments rest upon her premise that the PSA should not be enforced because of defendant's alleged fraud. Because matrimonial settlement agreements are "essentially consensual and voluntary in character," they are "'entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability' in equity, provided they are fair and just." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 20 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981)); see also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 153 (1980). In the order dated December 17, 2010, the court denied plaintiff's request to vacate the PSA on this ground without prejudice, finding that plaintiff had not provided clear and convincing evidence that the agreement should be vacated. Although plaintiff has continued to allege that the PSA was based on fraud, she did not appeal from this order. The terms of the PSA therefore remain valid and enforceable.

Plaintiff also argues that the income imputed to her for the calculation of child support should be reduced to zero because changed circumstances exist for the modification of her support obligation. See Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 146. She contends that she has been unable to obtain employment as a pediatrician because of defendant's conduct in making false allegations of child abuse, false complaints against her medical license, slanderous statements on the internet, and filing false criminal charges against her.

In considering a motion court's decision to deny an application to modify or terminate support obligations, this court reviews for an abuse of discretion. Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006). A party who moves for modification must make "a prima facie showing of changed circumstances." Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999) (citing Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 157-59.) Requests for modification based on circumstances which are only temporary are routinely rejected as insufficient to warrant a modification. Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 151. We are satisfied that the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances.

Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was governed by Rule 4:49-2 and is "a matter to be exercised in the trial court's sound discretion." Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div.) (citing Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 (1988)), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 521 (2008). Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the court "expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis," or that the court "either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990); see also Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002). The motion was, therefore, properly denied.

A

1 The JOD ordered the parties to submit an amended judgment of divorce with the terms of the PSA attached or incorporated therein within ten days. However, the record does not include an amended judgment of divorce.