DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. Z.L.Z. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF D.S.Z., a minor

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3518-10T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF

YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Z.L.Z.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF D.S.Z., a minor.

_______________________________

December 20, 2011

 

Submitted November 16, 2011 - Decided

 

Before Judges Lihotz, Waugh and St. John.

 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-103-10.

 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Susan Curtin Gouldin, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

 

Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ayelet Hirschkorn, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor D.S.Z. (Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

 

PER CURIAM

We review challenges to a Family Part judgment of guardianship terminating the parental rights of defendant Z.L.Z., the mother of D.S.Z., and permitting the Division of Youth and Family Services (the Division) to secure the child's adoption.1 On appeal, Z.L.Z. argues the trial court's decision is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree and affirm.

D.S.Z. was born at Newark Beth Israel Medical Center on November 3, 2008. Z.L.Z., age twenty-four, tested positive for cocaine, and admitted she used tobacco, cocaine, ecstasy, and marijuana during her pregnancy, and neglected prenatal care. Hospital staff subsequently notified the Division. D.S.Z. did not test positive for narcotics, but showed symptoms of drug withdrawal and was transferred to the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit for "neonatal abstinence syndrome" treatment.

The Division had worked with Z.L.Z. two years earlier, following the birth of her older child, Z.Z. At that time, she enrolled in Renaissance House, a substance abuse treatment facility, but failed to complete the program and remained addicted. Following a trial, her parental rights to Z.Z. were terminated and the Division was awarded guardianship.

Responding to the new referral following D.S.Z.'s birth, the Division confirmed Z.L.Z.'s continued illicit drug use while pregnant. Z.L.Z. agreed to enroll in an in-patient substance abuse treatment program in an effort to be reunified with D.S.Z. The Division placed D.S.Z. with the resource parents who were caring for Z.Z. However, on December 8, 2008, the resource parents requested a change in placement because they could not effectively care for both young children. D.S.Z. was then placed with a different resource parent, in whose care she has remained.

Reciting Z.L.Z.'s six-year substance abuse history, which culminated in entry of a judgment of guardianship of Z.Z., the Division filed a Title Nine complaint alleging abuse and neglect of D.S.Z., and requested an order granting it custody, care and supervision. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.31 (requiring Superior Court review of the Division's emergency removal of a child); N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 (permitting the Division custody of children removed from their home when parents are unfit or unable to provide care).

The Division commenced services in an effort to end Z.L.Z.'s drug dependence and achieve reunification with D.S.Z. Specifically, the Division coordinated with the Child Protection Substance Abuse Initiative of Catholic Charities (Catholic Charities) for substance abuse treatment and education; scheduled weekly-visitation with D.S.Z., provided bus passes, parenting instruction, and counseling; as well as investigated the feasibility of placing the child with a relative.

Z.L.Z.'s substance abuse treatment was to start in December 2008, but she missed assessments scheduled in December 2008 and February 2009. Z.L.Z. was finally evaluated by Catholic Charities on February 25, 2009, when she admitted using marijuana during sixteen of the past thirty days, which was confirmed by a toxicology report. Catholic Charities recommended she be placed in an in-patient treatment program. Z.L.Z. declined, suggesting her responsibilities to care for her elderly parents and attend school took precedence. However, Z.L.Z. conveyed a willingness to attend intensive outpatient treatment.

Z.L.Z. began outpatient treatment with Family Connections Reunity House (Reunity). Z.L.Z.'s initial attendance was satisfactory as most missed appointments were verified by appropriate excuses. Thereafter, she suffered a medical emergency requiring several surgeries over the ensuing months. A June 11, 2009 Reunity report stated Z.L.Z. missed eleven counseling sessions from April through June, however, only three were documented as "excused." When tested on July 23, 2009, Z.L.Z. proved positive for cocaine and marijuana. On September 28, 2009, Reunity closed Z.L.Z.'s file and terminated her program participation.

On January 13, 2010, the Division filed a complaint for guardianship. During a case management conference, held on April 19, 2010, Z.L.Z. was ordered to submit to a drug screening, which proved positive for marijuana. Z.L.Z. was scheduled for a different intensive outpatient treatment program on July 1, 2010, but despite "efforts to re-engage" her, Reunity noted she did not attend. Z.L.Z. tested positive for THC on July 1 and July 13, 2010. Consequently, she was ejected from Reunity on August 6, 2010. Subsequent drug screenings were either positive or declined by Z.L.Z., which were deemed positive. Z.L.Z. sought the opportunity to attend in-patient treatment and requested postponement of the scheduled trial. A drug screening revealed she tested positive for marijuana.

Z.L.Z. was admitted to Integrity House's intensive, in-patient substance rehabilitation treatment program on November 15, 2010. She continued her participation in the eighteen-month in-patient treatment program when trial commenced on December 13, 2010.

From the time D.S.Z. left the hospital, weekly visitation with Z.L.Z. was arranged, supervised by Tri-City People's Corporation (Tri-City). Although Z.L.Z. offered explanations for some missed visits, all told, she attended thirty-four of the sixty-two scheduled visits.

In January 2009, Z.L.Z. failed to attend visits after being injured in an assault. She attended five visits in February and March 2009, but her medical needs disrupted her April visits. Z.L.Z. resumed visitation on May 7, 2009, when she attended two visits in each of May and June, but only one in July 2009. Z.L.Z. attended six consecutive weekly visits from August 6 to September 3, 2009, thereafter, she did not attend, later suggesting she had been caring for her injured brother. She missed other visits because she failed to confirm her attendance. Some visits were missed through no fault of Z.L.Z., including one that conflicted with an evaluation scheduled by the Division and another when D.S.Z. was sick.

On February 18, 2010, Tri-City ended the supervised visitation because Z.L.Z.'s attendance was "too sporadic." The records reflect she was unable to attend some scheduled visits as a result of her medical condition, but many others were missed without justification. During the visits, Z.L.Z. "interacted positively" with D.S.Z., "displayed appropriate behavior," and showed affection for the child.

The court ordered visitation to resume. Z.L.Z. missed only two scheduled visits from May 28 to August 20, 2010. Unfortunately, Z.L.Z.'s pattern of sporadic attendance resurfaced.

The Division attempted to locate relatives to care for D.S.Z. Each of Z.L.Z.'s parents and her sister were considered but rejected as placement resources for D.S.Z. The record reveals Z.L.Z.'s father was ill and unable to care for the child, her mother was "ruled-out" based on her history with the Division, and her sister's criminal convictions made her inappropriate as the child's caregiver. The assigned caseworker, Kerlyn Murat, recommended the Division reconsider Z.L.Z.'s mother as a potential care provider because the substantiated abusive or neglectful conduct had occurred more than ten years earlier. Z.L.Z.'s mother did not pursue this issue.

At trial, the Division presented the testimony of Murat, who discussed the case file recording the Division's involvement with Z.L.Z. Murat expressed guardianship was appropriate because Z.L.Z. had "not resolved her [drug-dependence] issues, . . . and D.S.Z. [wa]s currently in a loving home," with "an awesome foster mother," who "show[s] a lot of love and attention to [her.]"

The Division additionally offered expert evidence from Eric Kirschner, Ph.D., who related the results of his August 4, 2010 psychological evaluation of Z.L.Z. and bonding evaluations between D.S.Z. and her biological and foster mothers. Dr. Kirschner stated Z.L.Z. unexpectedly left the evaluation precluding complete testing, but his clinical interview confirmed her "long standing pattern of behavior which suggested poor judgment, impaired impulse control, [and] a lack of insight into her actions and the consequences or implications of her conduct." He also identified Z.L.Z.'s history of substance abuse "as a means of self-medicating" to mitigate negative feelings, which would interfere with her ability to adequately parent D.S.Z.

Dr. Kirschner opined D.S.Z. would not suffer harm from severing the relationship with her mother because "[a] bond did not appear to have developed between [Z.L.Z.] and [D.S.Z.]." Kirschner observed an indifferent interaction between Z.L.Z. and D.S.Z., which he acknowledged contradicted the positive visitations recorded by the Division. He explained the discrepancy as "an ambivalent attachment" between D.S.Z. and Z.L.Z., resulting from the child's lack of ability "to feel safe in [the parent's] care." Dr. Kirschner tested this possibility by instructing Z.L.Z. to leave the evaluation playroom briefly, but remain nearby so as to reenter the room. D.S.Z. "beg[a]n to whimper" when Z.L.Z. left. Dr. Kirschner's assessment was unexpectedly aborted because Z.L.Z. left and never returned. The child's reaction stemmed from the fact Z.L.Z. "essentially abandoned D.S.Z.," by leaving and "communicated a message to [D.S.Z.] that she cannot rely upon or trust [Z.L.Z.]"

In contrast, Dr. Kirschner noted a significant bond between D.S.Z. and her foster mother, who were "extremely comfortable" with each other. He opined D.S.Z. would "experience psychological trauma if her relationship with her foster mother was to be severed[,]" which would cause harm "likely [to be] serious and enduring." He also explained if D.S.Z. lost her relationship with her foster mother after reaching age two-and-one-half, she "would be vulnerable to psychological trauma, including serious and enduring impairments [of] her self-esteem, sense of security, basic trust of others and capacity to attach to them."

The trial judge issued an oral opinion on February 9, 2011. Reviewing the evidence, the court found the Division satisfied the four-pronged best-interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a, by clear and convincing evidence, warranting the termination of Z.L.Z.'s parental rights. A judgment awarding the Division guardianship of D.S.Z. was entered. Z.L.Z. appeals from that judgment.

As a threshold matter, the scope of appellate review of an award of guardianship is limited. In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002). "The factual findings which undergird a judgment in such a case should not be disturbed unless 'they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice,' and should be upheld whenever they are 'supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974); Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464, 475 (1988)). "[I]n reviewing the factual findings and conclusions of a trial judge, we are obliged to accord deference to the [] court's credibility determination[s] and the judge's 'feel of the case' based upon his . . . opportunity to see and hear the witnesses[,]" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998)), certif. denied, 190 N.J. 257 (2007), which "can never be realized by a review of the cold record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (stating deference is afforded to a trial court's findings of fact as the trial court "has the opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses" who testify).

We also recognize the special expertise of those judges assigned to the Family Part. Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412-13. "However, where the focus of the dispute is . . . alleged error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom, the traditional scope of review is expanded." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In those circumstances, we "accord deference unless the trial court's findings went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." Ibid.

When reviewing a Family Part order terminating parental rights, we consider these legal principles. "A parent's right to enjoy a relationship with his or her child is constitutionally protected." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982). Both the federal and state constitutions protect the inviolability of the family unit. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212-13, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558-59 (1972); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986). However, "the right of parents to be free from governmental intrusion is not absolute." A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 599. See also J.N.H., supra, 172 N.J. at 471 (holding parental rights are not absolute). "The constitutional protection surrounding family rights is tempered by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347.

"The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118 (1979). Nevertheless, some parents "may at times be acting against the interests of their children[.]" Id. at 602, 99 S. Ct. at 2504, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 119 (internal quotations and citations omitted). When "experience and reality [] rebut[s] what the law accepts as a starting point," the State's parens patriae obligations are triggered. Ibid. "More recently, 'concern has arisen for the best interests of children whose parents have forsaken their parental duties. The child's right to a permanent home has gained increasing prominence.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 505 (2004) (quoting In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., Jr., 161 N.J. 396, 404 (1999)). Undoubtedly, a child's need for permanency and stability is a critical factor in guardianship cases.

When a child's biological parents resist the termination of their parental rights, the court's function is to decide whether the parents can raise the child without causing further harm. In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). "[T]he cornerstone of the inquiry is not whether the biological parents are fit but whether they can cease causing their child harm." Ibid. "The analysis of harm entails strict standards to protect the statutory and constitutional rights of the natural parents[,]" and the "burden falls on the State to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent has not cured the initial cause of harm and will continue to cause serious and lasting harm to the child." Ibid.

While recognizing the fundamental nature of parental rights and the need to preserve and strengthen family life, the Legislature has also recognized "the health and safety of the child shall be the State's paramount concern when making a decision on whether or not it is in the child's best interest to preserve the family unit[.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a). This responsibility, in some cases, requires that the parent-child relationship be severed. A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 599.

"The balance between parental rights and the State's interest in the welfare of children is achieved through the best interests of the child standard." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347. The best interests standard, initially formulated by the Court in A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 602-11, was codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a, and requires the State to establish each of the following standards by clear and convincing evidence before parental rights may be severed:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

 

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

 

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a.]

 

These four requirements "are not discrete and separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348. The considerations involved are "'extremely fact sensitive' and require particularized evidence that addresses the specific circumstances of each case." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 258-59 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348). With each of these principles in mind, we turn to our review of the arguments advanced by Z.L.Z.

Challenging the evidence found by the trial judge to support satisfaction of the first two prongs of the best interests test, Z.L.Z. maintains she never put D.S.Z. at risk and proved she was willing to eliminate any perceived harm relating to her substance abuse. We reject these arguments as meritless. See In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999) ("Courts need not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect.").

Although D.S.Z. was never entrusted to Z.L.Z.'s care, the trial court found the infant was harmed in utero because of Z.L.Z.'s prolonged drug addiction. The child suffered harm at birth caused by neonatal exposure related to Z.L.Z.'s drug use while pregnant. D.S.Z.'s hospital stay was prolonged because she suffered neonatal abstinence syndrome, exhibiting symptoms of drug withdrawal, requiring treatment with Phenobarbital. Thereafter, constructive harm to the child occurred as Z.L.Z.'s unabated substance abuse mandated D.S.Z. remain in foster placement, a circumstance existing for the entirety of her short two-year life. N.J.S.A.30:4C-15.1a(2). At the time of trial, Z.L.Z. had only recently commenced in-patient treatment following several failed rehabilitation attempts spanning almost a half-dozen years.

This record reflects the Division solidly proved by clear and convincing evidence the first prong of the four-part test. The facts showed "[t]he child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(1). Z.L.Z.'s pre-natal neglect resulted in a child born "suffering from the symptoms of drug withdrawal as a result of her mother's substance abuse during pregnancy." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 349 (holding a child born suffering from symptoms of drug withdrawal due to mother's drug use during pregnancy satisfies the first prong of the best interests test). Moreover, Z.L.Z. had not resolved her drug addition at the time of trial. Consequently, actual harm, as well as the risk of future harm, was evinced. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 435-36 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 44 (2002); see also A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 607.

In reaching its conclusion regarding compliance with the second prong of the statutory test, the trial judge examined whether Z.L.Z. could become fit in time to meet the needs of her child, determining the evidence revealed the answer was no. SeeJ.C., supra, 129 N.J.at 10 (holding the court must determine whether a parent can cease causing the child harm). The uncontroverted facts relate Z.L.Z.'s repeated relapses, her inability to complete a rehabilitation program, and resistance to remaining drug-free, proved by a positive drug screen days before the trial. Collectively, these facts support the trial judge's findings that Z.L.Z. participated in "relentless drug use," and "failed to demonstrate . . . she has a demonstrable commitment to sobriety[,]" supporting the trial judge's finding the Division proved the harm to D.S.Z. was "likely to continue" as a direct result of Z.L.Z.'s inability or unwillingness to embrace the need for drug treatment. SeeK.H.O., supra, 161 N.J.at 348. See also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 105 (2008) (finding a mother's "drug relapses shortly before and during the guardianship hearings" sufficiently established the first and second prongs of the best interests standard).

We reject the notion suggesting Z.L.Z.'s 2009 medical treatments precluded her compliance with drug treatment or that she established she would abate her drug use. Understanding both the serious nature of Z.L.Z.'s medical issues and the grueling treatments, including surgeries necessary to abate her illness, we note she demonstrated continued drug dependency. Neither the services, extended from 2006, nor the termination of her parental rights in respect of her older child motivated her to secure treatment. Following D.S.Z.'s birth, in-patient treatment was offered and repeatedly declined. Z.L.Z. did not make rehabilitation a priority.

Even if the trial court had accepted as a fact Z.L.Z. would successfully complete her in-patient treatment program, her drug rehabilitation and reunification with D.S.Z. remained a distant possibility as it could not be timely achieved. Z.L.Z.'s in-patient treatment would not be completed until one year following trial. Thereafter, successful completion of after-care must precede any consideration of resumption of D.S.Z.'s care. Sadly, these facts show past recurrent drug abuse, noted to establish "parental dereliction and irresponsibility," revealing an "inability to provide a stable and protective home, the withholding of parental attention and care, and the diversion of family resources in order to support a drug habit[.]" K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 353. Z.L.Z.'s early departure from the evaluation precluded her complete psychological assessment, but past behaviors revealed a pattern of impulsivity, poor judgment, and neglect of the child's needs. All of which supported a conclusion it was unrealistic to accept that Z.L.Z.'s enrollment in an in-patient treatment would alter her behavior. We conclude, D.S.Z.'s needs for permanency and stability supersede the hope that Z.L.Z. might finally achieve abstinence.

We remain hopeful Z.L.Z. will continue her treatment and remain substance-free. Such an accomplishment will not only benefit her but also others who care for her. Nevertheless, the record offers no evidence that rehabilitation, which has eluded her for years, will become a reality upon which the court could ground D.S.Z.'s future custody.

Under the third prong of the best interests standard, the Division must demonstrate it undertook "diligent efforts to reunite the family" and assist "the parent to correct and overcome those circumstances that necessitated the placement of the child[.]" Id. at 354. See also N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(3).

The diligence of [the Division's] efforts . . . is not measured by their success. . . . These efforts must be assessed against the standard of adequacy in light of all the circumstances of a given case. Consistent efforts to maintain and support the parent-child bond are central to the court's determination.

 

[D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 393.]

 

The trial judge delineated the Division arranged for Z.L.Z.'s participation in "several drug programs, monitored her progress in those programs, offered her visitation, provided transportation assistance, assessed viable relatives, and referred for counseling." Treatment attempts continued, notwithstanding Z.L.Z.'s termination because of poor attendance and her failure to abstain from illegal substances. The Division arranged for continued supervised visitation, accompanied by bus passes. Z.L.Z.'s commitment was spotty, demonstrated by many unexplained absences and failures to abide minimal requests to confirm her attendance.

Also, we are not persuaded the Division ignored the necessity to accommodate Z.L.Z.'s medical needs. Nor do we agree Z.L.Z.'s situation was so "unique" it warranted additional delay in resolving the child's permanent placement. Whenever the Division was informed of Z.L.Z.'s medical needs, adjustments to visitation and communication with the treatment program were made, resulting in excused absences. As we noted, Z.L.Z. has many unexplained absences and others for which she offered excuses without supporting documentation. Overall, we determine there is no factual support the Division improperly accommodated her medical needs.

The assertion the Division predetermined the goal of termination of parental rights is not supported by the facts of record. The Division may rely on the fact that an older child was the subject of a prior guardianship proceeding
and it was not improper for the Division to note the same harm causing the older child's removal -- drug dependence -- remained unabated.

We are not persuaded by the argument the Division should have secured a waiver of a ten-year old abuse and neglect finding against Z.L.Z.'s mother, to allow D.S.Z.'s placement with her. Z.L.Z. notes her mother had been ruled out as a placement resource for her older child two years earlier. The Division examined the propriety of a waiver and noted Z.L.Z.'s mother had chosen not to challenge her elimination as a potential caregiver. In fact, when advised of the situation, her mother told the caseworker she "was not aware of any of [Z.L.Z.'s] business." Such diffidence cannot be ignored by the Division charged with assuring D.S.Z.'s safety, particularly in light of the fact Z.L.Z. resided in her mother's home.

The final prong, requiring the Division to prove "[t]ermination of parental rights will not do more harm than good[,]" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(4), often poses the most difficult and delicate balance of presented facts. K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 355. Under this prong, the question is "whether, after considering and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with her natural parents than from the permanent disruption of her relationship with her foster parents." Ibid. "[W]here it is shown that the bond with the foster parents is strong and, in comparison, the bond with the natural parent is not as strong, that evidence will satisfy the requirement of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(4)[.]" Id. at 363.

Here, crediting the expert's testimony, the trial judge concluded termination would not do more harm than good. We agree.

Children experience harm when parental contact is severed. F.M., supra, 375 N.J. Super.at 264. However, there is overwhelming evidence D.S.Z. is securely bonded to her foster mother, and severing the bond would cause significant and long-standing psychological trauma. The foster mother demonstrated her nurturing parental ability as well as the capability to satisfactorily mitigate any possible harm following termination of parental rights.

A delay in D.S.Z.'s permanent placement with a loving, capable caregiver who adores her, in favor of an untenable hope Z.L.Z. could one day assume the care of her child is unwarranted. Dr. Kirschner's opinion D.S.Z. would not suffer trauma once her relationship with Z.L.Z. ended was based on her foster mother's ability to mitigate any harm. On the other hand, separation from the foster mother would cause enduring harm. More specifically, Dr. Kirschner advised once D.S.Z. reached age two-and-one-half, she would be "vulnerable to psychological trauma, including serious and enduring impairments [of] her self-esteem, sense of security, basic trust of others and capacity to attach to them." Z.L.Z. demonstrated no understanding of the child's potential future needs.

Following our review, we find no basis to interfere with t

he judgment terminating Z.L.Z.'s parental rights and awarding the Division guardianship for the purposes of assisting the foster parent's adoption of D.S.Z.

Affirmed.

1 D.S.Z.'s biological father has never been identified by Z.L.Z.