KURT PRATT v. DEXTER MILLER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3286-09T4

KURT PRATT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEXTER MILLER; LADD

WORLD LLC,

Defendants-Respondents.

__________________________________________________

April 25, 2011

Submitted February 15, 2011 - Decided

Before Judges Carchman and Messano.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden County, Docket No. C-13-09.

Kurt Pratt, appellant pro se.

Respondents Dexter Miller; Ladd World, LLC, have not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Following a bench trial, the judge dismissed plaintiff Kurt Pratt's complaint against defendants Dexter Miller and Ladd World, LLC (Ladd World). Plaintiff's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, and this appeal followed.

The matter was tried before Judge Mary Eva Colalillo on January 11, 2010. Plaintiff appeared pro se and testified on his own behalf. Miller was married to plaintiff's sister, Angela. Miller also appeared pro se, testified on his own behalf, and called his mother-in-law, plaintiff's mother, Consuela Pratt, as a defense witness.1

The evidence revealed that Consuela was married to Walter Pratt, who died intestate in 1993. At the time of his death, Walter owned certain property located at 463 North 40th Street in Camden (the property) solely in his own name. In addition to Consuela, Walter was survived by five children including plaintiff and his sister. Consuela was appointed administratrix of Walter's estate and conveyed the property to herself individually in 1994. In 1997, Consuela again conveyed the property to Miller, who in turn conveyed it in 2003 to Ladd World, a corporation that he controlled.

Plaintiff filed this complaint in the Chancery Part on March 6, 2009. In essence, he alleged that the property had been conveyed to defendants in violation of the laws governing intestacy and defendants reaped the benefits of rental income from the property thereafter. Plaintiff sought to "[b]ar[] and foreclose[e] the defendants of all equity" in the property, as well as compensatory damages for lost revenues. At trial, plaintiff testified regarding the above events and introduced into evidence the deed from Consuela to herself.

Miller testified that the property was going through foreclosure when he bought it from Consuela for "[$]23,000 and change." Plaintiff had been living at the property and had not paid any of the utility bills, which Miller paid before taking title to the property. Miller testified that plaintiff had filed an earlier suit in 2004 seeking the same relief. After attending two arbitration sessions, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed by a judge.

Consuela confirmed in her testimony that she was in dire financial straits before she conveyed the property to Miller. She asked plaintiff if he wanted to purchase the property, but he refused. Consuela further testified that plaintiff attended a meeting that she had with an attorney in 1993 or 1994 during which her financial situation, and possible bankruptcy, were discussed. Consuela stated that she executed the deed to the property in her favor as a result of that meeting, and believed she was entitled to the property as Walter's surviving spouse.

Plaintiff denied being offered the opportunity to buy the property and denied knowing about the transfer of the property from Walter's estate to Consuela when it occurred. Plaintiff admitted, however, that he had known since 2000 that the property had been conveyed to Miller. Indeed, he had commenced suit in 2004 but voluntarily dismissed the action because he could not determine the value of Walter's estate.

Judge Colallilo determined:

The statutes that apply to intestate estates of decedents dying before February 27th of 2005 . . . are as follows: if a decedent has a surviving spouse and a surviving issue . . . all of whom are also the issue of the surviving spouse . . . then the surviving spouse will inherit the first $50,000 of the estate plus one-half of the balance of the estate. . . . [T]hat is found in N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1 and 3B:5-3(a) [and] (d).

So since Walter passed before 2005[,] the law is . . . that [Consuela] was entitled as a surviving spouse to the first 50 percent [sic] of the estate plus one-half of the balance of the estate. It is therefore imperative that this Court know what the value of the estate was before I can decide whether [Consuela] is entitled to these properties.

Examining some of the documentary evidence plaintiff produced regarding another piece of property Walter owned at his death, Judge Colalillo was unable to determine "what the valuation [wa]s based on" the exhibit. She also determined that plaintiff's documentary evidence regarding the value of the property was unreliable, noting she "ha[d] no idea where [the exhibit] came from."2

Judge Colalillo continued:

I need that information because I need to know if [Consuela] received the first 50,000 plus one-half the balance of the estate. I need to know what was in the estate. . . .

. . . .

[Plaintiff] hasn't established the value of the estate for me to determine whether or not his mom is entitled to th[is] property or not.

Secondly, I have another problem with what is called laches . . . . It's an equitable defense that may be interposed in the absence of a statute of limitations. It's obviously a policy that's designed to discourage stale claims. Laches is a defense when there is a delay unexplained and inexcusable in enforcing a known right and prejudice has resulted to the other party because of the delay.

Prejudice is very important in laches. [Plaintiff] . . . waited from 2000 to 2004 to file his first claim because he wasn't aware if there was anything left in the estate . . . . [Plaintiff], by his own admissions, . . . indicated he was not able to establish the value of the estate.

[Plaintiff] had another four to five years to establish that which he needed to do to prove his case, what was the value of this estate. . . .

. . . .

[Plaintiff] cannot assert ignorance of fact if such ignorance is a result of his own culpable neglect. Well, here it is . . . . He comes yet again before this court unable to present in any fashion that's conclusive to this Court the value of the estate.

Prejudice has accrued to the defendant in that he has expended his monies, paid back mortgages on this property . . . and has put in money into this home presuming that it was his to do so. . . .

The length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and . . . the prejudice that has accrued here is why this Court is ruling that there . . . is a defense of laches in this matter.

Judge Colallilo dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

Plaintiff apparently moved for reconsideration, which was denied on February 19, 2010.3

On appeal, plaintiff contends that Consuela "could not sell the property to . . . Miller" because of plaintiff's inchoate interest in the property under the statutes governing intestate succession.4 We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Colalillo in her thorough oral opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A).

Affirmed.

1 Because many of the individuals are related and share the same last name, we will use their given names when necessary to avoid confusion. We mean no disrespect by this informality. The record includes two different spellings for Mrs. Pratt's name. We have adopted plaintiff's version, "Consuela."

2 The exhibits are not part of the appellate record.

3 No order was entered after the trial and, regarding the motion for reconsideration, only the February 19 order denying the motion has been furnished to us. Plaintiff filed this appeal, and then moved before us to proceed without a final order or judgment. That motion was denied. When plaintiff sought reconsideration of our order, we denied the application and deemed the appeal to be from the February 19, 2010 order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. On May 18, 2010, Judge Colalillo apparently entered an order indicating that plaintiff's complaint had been dismissed with prejudice following the January 11 trial.

4 Plaintiff's appendix includes a discharge of mortgage that he executed with Consuela on November 15, 1994, that apparently discharged a mortgage on the property in favor of "Miriam McIntosh." The document does not support plaintiff's claim that he "own[ed]" the property when Consuela transferred it to herself.