AUDREY J. CASPERINO v. BOARD OF REVIEW

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                  APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                     DOCKET NO. A-6394-08T3


AUDREY J. CASPERINO,

     Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW and ARAMARK
SCHOOLS, L.L.C.,

     Respondents.
___________________________________

         Submitted May 11, 2010 - Decided June 4, 2010

         Before Judges Parrillo and Lihotz.

         On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
         Labor, Docket No. 216,510.

         Audrey J. Casperino, appellant pro se.

         Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney for
         respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin,
         Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brady
         Montalbano Connaughton, Deputy Attorney General, on
         the brief).

         Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, L.L.P., attorneys for
         respondent Aramark Schools, L.L.C. (William J. Delany,
         Anne E. Martinez, and W. John Lee, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

     Claimant, Audrey J. Casperino, appeals from a final

determination of the Board of Review (Board) affirming the

Appeal Tribunal's decision denying her claim for unemployment

benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) for having left work

voluntarily, without good cause attributable to the work.        We

affirm.

    Claimant was employed as a cashier and cafeteria worker for

respondent Aramark Schools, Inc., (Aramark) at School 11 in

Clifton from February 1, 1996, to November 3, 2008.     As part of

her job duties, claimant served breakfast to twenty to forty

children in the school's breakfast program.    On Monday,

September 29, 2008, she gave notice of her resignation due to a

change in her work load.

    Three days earlier, on September 26, Ann Stein, Aramark's

Food Service Director at School 11, had attended a meeting

during which she was advised that children from the Boys and

Girls Club of Clifton would be added to the breakfast program at

School 2, and possibly at School 11 also.     Before Stein was

advised of any final official decision as to School 11, on the

following Monday, September 29, a nine-year old boy from the

Boys and Girls Club came into the cafeteria at School 11 for

breakfast.   Unaware of the addition, claimant seated the boy and

served him breakfast, but immediately thereafter complained to

Stein, who apologized to claimant for not giving her notice and

explained that she herself had not been aware that an official

decision had been made to add more children to the breakfast




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program.   Later that day when Stein arrived at the school,

claimant tendered her resignation, complaining: "[T]his is my

two weeks notice because I've had it.   There's no communication,

the jobs were more and more and no one helped to fix them."

Claimant's resignation surprised Stein, who considered claimant

a great employee.   Claimant remained in her position for five

weeks, until November 4, 2008, to help train her replacement.

    In denying the claim for unemployment benefits, the Deputy

to the Director of the Division of Unemployment Insurance found

claimant disqualified for benefits because she "voluntarily left

[her] job because [she was] dissatisfied with the working

conditions" and "[t]here is no evidence that the conditions of

[her] employment were so severe as to cause [her] to leave

available work to become unemployed."   The Appeal Tribunal

affirmed this determination, finding "[t]he employer's testimony

is competent, credible" and that claimant's "reason for leaving,

stress from an increase in work duties that day[,] was not

compelling."   While the Appeal Tribunal said that respondent may

have "used poor judgment in failing to notify . . . claimant of

the increase in her work duties for just one day, this is not so

compelling for the claimant to leave available work to become

unemployed."   Moreover, the Appeal Tribunal found that claimant

"did nothing to resolve her job dissatisfaction, and got




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distraught over a simple matter that could have been easily

resolved" and that "[h]er job was not in jeopardy."       The Board

affirmed this decision, which, on appeal, claimant argues is

erroneous.

    Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited.

Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 
39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).         In

challenging the agency's conclusion, claimant carries a

substantial burden of persuasion, and the determination by the

administrative agency carries a presumption of correctness.

Gloucester County Welfare Bd. v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
93 N.J. 384, 390-91 (1983).    We also accord substantial deference

to the agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged with

enforcing.   Bd. of Educ. of Neptune v. Neptune Twp. Educ.

Ass'n., 
144 N.J. 16, 31 (1996).       We will overturn an agency

determination only if it is found to be arbitrary, capricious,

unreasonable, unsupported by substantial credible evidence in

the record as a whole, or inconsistent with the enabling statute

                           Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J.
or legislative policy.

57, 71 (1985) (quoting Gloucester County Welfare Bd., supra, 
93 N.J. at 391); Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 
81 N.J. 571, 579-80

(1980); N.J. Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 
75 N.J.
 544, 562-63 (1978).




                                                              A-6394-08T3
                                  4

    Applying these principles, we are in accord with the

Board's decision denying claimant benefits.   The governing

statute, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), provides that an individual is

disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits where that

"individual has left work voluntarily without good cause

attributable to such work[.]"   In order to avoid

disqualification, the claimant has the burden to establish that

she left work for good cause attributable to the work.     Brady v.

Bd. of Review, 
152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997).   "Good cause means

'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving

the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the

unemployed,' and the reasons for terminating employment 'must

meet the test of ordinary common sense and prudence.'"    Heulitt

v. Bd. of Review, 
300 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997)

(internal citations omitted).   "Good cause" is defined in the

regulation as "a reason related directly to the individual's

employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no

                                       N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b).
choice but to leave the employment."

"'Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not

shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not

constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily.'"    Domenico

v. Bd. of Review, 
192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983)




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                                5

(quoting Medwick v. Review Bd., 
69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App.

Div. 1961)).

    Here, as found by the Appeal Tribunal, claimant left work

due to stress from the perceived increase in job duties on this

one occasion.   Yet, there is no proof that such an increase

rendered the work unsuitable, abnormal, or unhealthy.   On the

contrary, claimant's reason for leaving employment amounts to no

more than mere dissatisfaction with her working conditions, see,

e.g., Self v. Bd. of Review, 
91 N.J. 453, 460 (1982); Roche v.

Bd. of Review, 
156 N.J. Super. 63, 65 (App. Div. 1978), and

thus, did not constitute "good cause" for having resigned.

    The Board's decision finding claimant disqualified from

unemployment benefits was "supported by substantial credible

                                      Barry, supra, 100 N.J. at
evidence in the record as a whole."

71 (citation omitted).   We discern no basis to disturb the

Board's determination.

    Affirmed.




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