RUPERT BAPTISTE v. CARMELA SILVESTRI
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3885-08T2
RUPERT BAPTISTE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CARMELA SILVESTRI,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________________________________________________
Submitted May 10, 2010 Decided May 26, 2010
Before Judges Lisa and Alvarez.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part,
Essex County, Docket No. SC-3200-08.
Rupert Baptiste, appellant pro se.
Christiano and Christiano, attorneys for
respondent (Stephen J. Christiano, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Rupert Baptiste, appeals from a Special Civil
Part judgment in his favor of $700 plus $21 costs. The judgment
was entered after a bench trial. Baptiste argues that the
judgment was not supported by the evidence. We disagree and
affirm.
Baptiste was a residential month-to-month tenant of
defendant Carmela Silvestri. The monthly rent was $1200.
Baptiste had posted with Silvestri a security deposit of $1800.
After he moved out, Baptiste filed this action for the return of
the security deposit. Although we have not been furnished with
the pleadings, he apparently alleged that Silvestri failed to
return the security deposit and sought double damages. A
default judgment was entered for $3600 plus $22 costs. However,
that judgment was vacated because of deficient service of
process.
The case then went to trial. Both parties testified.
Silvestri testified that when Baptiste moved out, he removed the
stove, the dining room chandelier, and curtains from various
rooms. She produced photographs to verify that these items were
missing. She produced receipts verifying the cost of
replacement items, as well as the amount she paid an electrician
to install the replacement stove and chandelier.
Silvestri also testified that, after deducting these costs,
she attempted to mail to Baptiste a check for $800, representing
the balance of his security deposit. Because Baptiste did not
provide her with a forwarding address, she mailed the check,
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the address of the
leased premises, apparently hoping it would be forwarded to
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Baptiste if he established a forwarding address with the postal
authorities. The mailing was returned to Silvestri. She
produced the returned, unclaimed envelope and check at trial.
Baptiste denied removing the stove or curtains, and he said
there was never a chandelier in the dining room while he lived
there. With respect to the chandelier, he produced documentary
evidence of a home inspection, indicating the absence of a
chandelier.
The judge credited Silvestri's testimony, as corroborated
by the photographs, with respect to the stove and curtains. He
found, however, that she did not carry her burden of proof with
respect to the chandelier. Based upon the replacement costs of
the stove ($700), the prorated cost of the electrician's
services attributable to the installation of the stove ($200),
and the replacement cost of the curtains ($200), the judge
deducted $1100 from the $1800 security deposit, and entered
judgment in favor of Baptiste for the $700 due to him. To that,
the judge added $21 costs. Because Silvestri attempted to
return the balance due to Baptiste in a timely manner after he
vacated the premises, the judge did not award double damages.
In the face of an argument that the findings of a trial
court sitting without a jury are not supported by the evidence,
A-3885-08T2
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our standard of appellate review is very limited. Our Supreme
Court has described that standard as follows:
Considering first the scope of our
appellate review of judgment entered in a
non-jury case, as here, we note that our
courts have held that the findings on which
it is based should not be disturbed unless
"* * * they are so wholly insupportable as
to result in a denial of justice," and that
the appellate court should exercise its
original fact finding jurisdiction sparingly
and in none but a clear case where there is
no doubt about the matter. That the finding
reviewed is based on factual determinations
in which matters of credibility are involved
is not without significance. Findings by
the trial judge are considered binding on
appeal when supported by adequate,
substantial and credible evidence. It has
otherwise been stated that "our appellate
function is a limited one: we do not
disturb the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the trial judge unless we are
convinced that they are so manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible
evidence as to offend the interests of
justice," and the appellate court therefore
ponders whether, on the contrary, there is
substantial evidence in support of the trial
judge's findings and conclusions.
[Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins.
Co. of Am.,
65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)
(citations omitted).]
Applying this standard, we have no hesitancy in concluding
that the judge's factual findings and conclusions are well
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.
A-3885-08T2
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Accordingly, we have no occasion to interfere with them on
appeal.
Affirmed.
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