STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. CHRISTOPHER JONES
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1698-07T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Submitted December 1, 2009 - Decided May 19, 2010
Before Judges Skillman and Simonelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Morris County,
Indictment No. 92-10-1187.
Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,
attorney for appellant (David A. Gies,
Designated Counsel, of counsel and on the
brief).
Robert A. Bianchi, Morris County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Paula Jordao,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Christopher Jones appeals from the denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) grounded on
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.
Defendant was indicted for murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and
(2), and possession of a weapon (knife) for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d. There was no dispute that defendant stabbed
a complete stranger, Paul Tucker, causing his death. At issue
was defendant's state of mind and whether the killing was
murder, as the State argued, or aggravated manslaughter, as
defendant argued. Defendant raised an intoxication defense to
prove that he lacked the capacity to act purposely or knowingly.
State witnesses disputed that defendant was intoxicated at the
time of the stabbing. Defense witnesses, including defendant,
testified about defendant's extreme intoxication.
Defendant's psychiatric expert, Steven Simring, M.D.,
rendered a report concluding that defendant is a chronic
alcoholic, and that at the time of the stabbing he was extremely
intoxicated, and thus lacked the capacity to act purposely or
knowingly. The doctor also stated that defendant suffered from
depression.
At trial, the doctor stated for the first time that in
addition to his extreme intoxication, defendant was also
paranoid at the time of the stabbing, which led him to arm
himself with a knife to protect himself from unknown dangers but
not to intentionally stab anyone. The doctor could not say "for
sure" that defendant's paranoia was "the most likely
explanation" for his attack on Tucker. He concluded that
defendant's paranoia was one of several "possibilities" for his
A-1698-07T4
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behavior. The doctor also did not believe that defendant was a
paranoid individual. He made clear that he only testified to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that defendant's extreme
intoxication impaired his mental faculties. Dr. Simring
concluded that defendant's mental faculties were "prostrated" by
his extreme use of alcohol, making him "incapable of forming
purpose, of acting with purpose and knowledge."
The trial judge charged intoxication as a defense and the
lesser included offense of aggravated manslaughter. Despite a
joint motion by all counsel, the judge did not charge the lesser
included offense of reckless manslaughter. Defense counsel did
not raise diminished capacity or request a diminished capacity
charge.
The jury convicted defendant of both charges. On November
30, 1995, the trial judge sentenced defendant to life
imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility
on the murder conviction, and to a concurrent five-year term of
imprisonment on the weapon conviction. The judge also imposed
the appropriate assessments.
Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. On appeal,
he contended, in part, that the trial judge should have charged
reckless manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder.
In his appellate brief, he referred to his defense as
A-1698-07T4
3
"intoxication/diminished capacity," and argued that "applicable
precedent establish[es] that the reckless manslaughter
instruction is clearly warranted when a colorable diminished
capacity defense is raised."
In an unpublished opinion, another panel of this court
affirmed, concluding the judge's refusal to charge reckless
State v. Jones, No. A-
manslaughter constituted harmless error.
2930-95 (App. Div. July 10, 1997) (slip op. at 4). The panel
reasoned that by convicting defendant of murder, the jury
rejected his intoxication defense and his claim that his conduct
was not purposeful or knowing but only reckless, which is an
element of both aggravated manslaughter and reckless
manslaughter. Ibid. The panel stated in a footnote, "[t]o the
extent defendant suggests that he suffered from a diminished
capacity, we also note that where the defendant's facilities
were or could have been affected by voluntary intoxication,
mental disease and defect is not a defense to a crime of
Defendant filed a petition for
reckless culpability." Ibid.
certification, which our Supreme Court denied. State v. Jones,
152 N.J. 191 (1997).
On April 24, 2000, defendant filed his first pro se PCR
petition contending, in part, that trial counsel was ineffective
for raising an intoxication defense instead of diminished
A-1698-07T4
4
capacity, which would have provided a basis for a reckless
manslaughter charge, and in failing to request a diminished
capacity charge. The trial judge concluded that defendant was
entitled to a hearing and appointed counsel to represent him.
On October 17, 2002, PCR counsel withdrew the petition "without
prejudice."
On January 31, 2003, defendant filed a second pro se PCR
petition, again raising claims of trial counsel's deficiency
based on the diminished capacity issue.1 In opposition, the
State argued, in part, that defendant's petition was time-
barred. Defendant responded that excusable neglect existed for
his untimely filing because he was unaware that PCR counsel had
withdrawn the first petition and counsel failed to respond to
his letters.
After an evidentiary hearing, at which defendant testified,
the judge permitted the petition to proceed based on "certain
constitutional issues," which the judge did not identify. The
judge denied the petition, finding that defendant failed to
present specific facts supporting his ineffective assistance of
Specifically as to diminished capacity, the
counsel claims.
judge found as follows:
1
Defendant also raised other claims of trial counsel's and
appellate counsel's deficiencies, which he does not address in
this appeal.
A-1698-07T4
5
Now, the defense as I've indicated was
an intoxication theory and in my view, that
was vigorously pursued. Dr. [Simring]
testified. He was experienced. His
qualifications were set forth. He's a
psychiatrist and he concluded that the
defendant was an alcoholic and was severely
intoxicated at the time of the killing.
[Dr. Simring] further concluded that
the defendant's drinking prevented him from
forming a purposeful or knowing state of
mind. And in analyzing this intoxication
defense as opposed to diminished capacity,
the proofs were more available as far as the
intoxication defense is concerned because
there was the . . . 151 rum, there was the
consumption, there were witnesses that the
defense attorney called that really provided
factual support for the intoxication
defense.
In my view, this was a tactical
decision. [Defense counsel] had witnesses
that could corroborate what the defendant
was saying and the defendant himself, was
willing to corroborate that.
On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:
POINT ONE
A TRIAL ATTORNEY'S STRATEGIC MISCALCULATIONS
WHICH ARE OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AS TO THWART THE
FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE OF A FAIR TRIAL MAY
SUSTAIN A CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
POINT TWO
THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL
ATTORNEY TO REQUEST A CHARGE WITH RESPECT TO
AN ISSUE SO ESSENTIAL AND FUNDAMENTAL TO THE
DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.
A-1698-07T4
6
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY ON THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE
IRRESPECTIVE OF A REQUEST BY COUNSEL
DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT FOUR
SOLE RELIANCE BY THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL
ATTORNEY ON THE INTOXICATION DEFENSE
RESULTED IN CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE IT BLINDED HIS
PERCEPTION OF THE CASE.
In opposition, the State contends that the petition is
time-barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a), and that the diminished
capacity issue is barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-5 because it was
adjudicated in defendant's direct appeal.
"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the
federal writ of habeas corpus" and thus "a safeguard to ensure
that a defendant was not unjustly convicted." State v. Afandor,
151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997). A PCR petition may not be used as a
substitute for a direct appeal of the conviction, or as a
substitute for a motion that could be brought "incident to the
3:22-3. The Rules
proceedings in the trial court." R.
accordingly bar the assertion of any "ground for relief" not
previously raised at trial or in an appeal, R. 3:22-4, or that
could have been raised at trial or on appeal but was not.
Afandor, supra,
151 N.J. at 50. The bar also applies if there
was a prior post-conviction review proceeding in which the
A-1698-07T4
7
ground for relief was not raised. R. 3:22-4. That procedural
bar does not apply if the ground for relief "could not
reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding," or if
enforcing the bar "would result in fundamental injustice" or
otherwise "would be contrary to the Constitution of the United
States or the State of New Jersey." R. 3:22-4.
In addition to the procedural bar, "[a] prior adjudication
upon the merits of any ground for relief is conclusive,"
regardless of whether it was made at trial or in a prior PCR
proceeding, or in "any appeal taken from such proceedings." R.
3:22-5. This res judicata bar applies to any claim that is
either "identical or substantially equivalent to" the
adjudicated claim. State v. Marshall,
173 N.J. 343, 351 (2002).
Except for a petition to correct an illegal sentence, the
general time limit on a PCR petition is five years after
"rendition of the judgment or sentence sought to be attacked[,]"
unless the additional delay reflects the defendant's "excusable
3:22-12(a); State v.
neglect" or to avoid an injustice R.
DiFrisco,
187 N.J. 156, 167 (2006).
We reject the State's contention that the diminished
capacity issue was adjudicated in the direct appeal. The
footnote in the opinion did not state that raising diminished
capacity would have been futile, which might have satisfied the
A-1698-07T4
8
substantially equivalent standard. Rather, the footnote merely
emphasized that, like the intoxication defense, diminished
capacity in combination with voluntary intoxication cannot, by
law, negate reckless culpability. Thus, we conclude that Rule
3:22-5 does not bar defendant's PCR petition. In addition,
although defendant made no persuasive showing of excusable
neglect, and the trial judge did not articulate what, if any,
constitutional violations occurred, we will nonetheless address
the merits of this appeal.
A defendant seeking to vacate a conviction on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel has the heavy burden of
proving that trial counsel committed serious professional
errors, and that those errors prejudiced him or her by causing
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687,
an unfair trial.
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1084). Prejudice
is shown by proof creating "a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct.
proceeding would have been different."
at 2068,
80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. A strong presumption exists that counsel "rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
Id. at 690, 104
exercise of reasonably professional judgment."
A-1698-07T4
9 S. Ct. at 2066,
80 L. Ed. 2d at 695. Adequate assistance of
counsel should be measured by a "reasonable competence"
State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 60-61 (1987). That
standard.
standard does not require "the best of attorneys," but rather
that the attorney not be "so ineffective as to make the idea of
a fair trial meaningless." State v. Davis,
116 N.J. 341, 351
(1989). The strong presumption that counsel has exercised sound
trial strategy is grounded in "the inherent difficulties in
evaluating a defense counsel's tactical decisions from his or
State v. Arthur,
184 N.J. 307,
her perspective during trial[.]"
319 (2005).
Simple mistakes, bad strategy, or bad tactics "do not
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel unless, taken as a
State v. Bonet, 132
whole, the trial was a mockery of justice."
N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 1975). The simple fact that a
trial strategy fails does not necessarily mean that counsel was
State v. Bey,
161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999) (citing
ineffective.
Davis, supra,
116 N.J. at 357), cert. denied,
530 U.S. 1245,
120 S. Ct. 2693,
147 L. Ed. 2d 964 (2000). Applying all of these
standards, we agree with the trial judge that there was nothing
deficient about trial counsel's performance.
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 states as follows:
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a
mental disease or defect is admissible
A-1698-07T4
10
whenever it is relevant to prove that the
defendant did not have a state of mind which
is an element of the offense. In the
absence of such evidence, it may be presumed
that the defendant had no mental disease or
defect which would negate a state of mind
which is an element of the offense.
Expert testimony is necessary to establish that a defendant
suffered from a mental disease or defect and that the
defendant's mental deficiency could have affected his or her
cognitive capacity to form the mental state necessary for the
commission of the crime. State v. Bauman,
298 N.J. Super. 176,
197 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting State v. Galloway,
133 N.J. 631,
647 (1993)).
Defendant presented no expert evidence that he was
diagnosed as suffering from paranoia, that paranoia and
depression are mental diseases or defects, or that these
conditions impaired his cognitive functioning so as to render
him incapable of acting purposefully and knowingly. Rather,
although Dr. Simring diagnosed defendant as suffering from
depression, he never diagnosed defendant as suffering from
paranoia, and he never concluded that these conditions were
mental diseases or defects that affected defendant's cognitive
capacity to form the mental state necessary for the commission
of the crime of murder. Rather, the doctor predicated his
A-1698-07T4
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opinion that defendant was incapable of acting purposefully and
knowingly solely on defendant's extreme intoxication.
Even if Dr. Simring had included defendant's depression and
paranoia in his opinion, diminished capacity would not have been
available to defendant. Depression and anti-social disorders do
not purport to establish an inability to have formed the mental
state required for the offense of purposeful and knowing murder.
State v. Russo,
243 N.J. Super. 383, 396 (App. Div. 1990),
certif. denied,
126 N.J. 322 (1991). Also, the combination of
an underlying mental disease and alcohol intoxication, which may
cause a defendant to lose control of his impulses, does not
entitle a defendant to an instruction on diminished capacity in
prosecution for murder. State v. Carroll,
242 N.J. Super. 549,
560-61 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied,
127 N.J. 326 (1991).
Affirmed.
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