KATHRYN GOODE ROBINSON v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and BOROUGH OF TUCKERTON

(NOTE: The status of this decision is .)
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-6253-07T26253-07T2

KATHRYN GOODE ROBINSON,

Appellant,

vs.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR, and BOROUGH OF

TUCKERTON,

Respondents.

__________________________________

 

Submitted: June 3, 2009 - Decided:

Before Judges Cuff and C.L. Miniman.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 105,812.

Kathryn Goode Robinson, appellant pro se.

Anne Milgram, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ellen A. Reichart, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Mulvaney, Coronato & Brady, attorneys for respondent Borough of Tuckerton (Terry F. Brady, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Claimant Kathryn Goode Robinson appeals from a final order of the Board of Review that found her disqualified for unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) as of December 26, 2004, and liable for refund of $9230 for the weeks ending January 22, 2005 through July 16, 2005. We affirm.

Claimant was employed full-time by the Borough of Tuckerton (Borough) as a finance clerk from November 2003 through December 29, 2004. She testified that she resigned at the request of the administration. She was responsible for processing retroactive paychecks for police officers. Problems arose, issued checks had to be reissued and tempers flared. In the course of an angry telephonic exchange with claimant, a Borough councilman stated she should resign if she was so unhappy with her job. Claimant responded she would do so, and she did. She conceded that no one ever threatened to terminate her employment.

She returned for one day in January 2005 to assist the new finance manager. After she was advised that the mayor wished her to submit a written resignation, claimant responded that she had been promised the treasurer's position when hired and that she wanted that position. When the mayor responded that no further employees would be hired in the finance department, she left work and filed a claim for unemployment benefits.

The Borough opposed the application. At the hearing, the mayor testified that claimant sent a resignation by e-mail. In her message, claimant stated she was leaving her job because she was disappointed that she did not obtain the treasurer's post, and she was dissatisfied with working conditions, including the volume of work.

The Board of Review accepted the findings of the Appeal Tribunal, which found that claimant left her job because she did not receive the desired promotion, work was available and there was no threat of loss of her job. Therefore, the Appeal Tribunal found that claimant left her job without good cause attributable to her work. On appeal, claimant argues that she left her job due to factors related to her work and she was eligible for unemployment benefits.

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) provides that a claimant is disqualified for benefits:

For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works four weeks in employment, . . . and has earned in employment at least six times the individual's weekly benefit rate . . . .

An employee who leaves work voluntarily has the burden of proving that she did so for good cause attributable to the work. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 218 ( 1997); Morgan v. Bd. of Review, 77 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 1962). Since 1961, the "good cause" must be "attributable to such work." Stauhs v. Bd. of Review, 93 N.J. Super. 451, 457-58 (App. Div. 1967); see also Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 457 (1982) (a departure not attributable to work is a voluntary departure without good cause). The court in Domenico v. Board of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983), stated that "[w]hile the statute does not define 'good cause,' our courts have construed the statute to mean cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed." The court further stated:

In scrutinizing an employee's reason for leaving, the test is one of ordinary common sense and prudence. "Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily." The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial, and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones. . . . [I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.

[Id. at 288 (citations omitted).]

"The basic purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act is to relieve employees, and the general public as well, from the adverse impact of involuntary unemployment." Stonco Elec. Prods. Co. v. Bd. of Review, 106 N.J. Super. 6, 9 (App. Div. 1969). Thus, the unemployment compensation statute is designed to serve the general public interest and not just the interests of the unemployed. Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J. Super. 46, 52 (App. Div. 1964). Accordingly, the statutory scheme outlined by the Legislature envisions that unemployment compensation benefits be paid only to those individuals who have become unemployed through no fault of their own. Medwick v. Bd. of Review, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 340 (App. Div. 1961). Moreover, the Board of Review is obligated to preserve the fund against the claims of those not intended to share in its benefits. Schock v. Bd. of Review, 89 N.J. Super. 118, 125 (App. Div. 1965), aff'd, 48 N.J. 121 (1966).

Here, claimant's testimony does not support her contention that she had no choice other than to leave her job due to excessive work demands and unfair criticism by her employer. She failed to support her allegations with credible testimony demonstrating that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, or that the work conditions confronting her were abnormal or otherwise adversely affected her health. Rather, claimant was unhappy with the amount of work she was required to perform on a daily basis.

Claimant's dissatisfaction with her job was further compounded by the fact that she had not received a desired promotion. In DeSantis v. Board of Review, 149 N.J. Super. 35, 38 (App. Div. 1977), the court held that "an employee's frustration caused by not receiving an expected pay raise does not constitute good cause within the statutory intendment." Likewise, in Nicholas v. Board of Review, 171 N.J. Super. 36, 37 (App. Div. 1979), where the claimant quit work voluntarily because she was dissatisfied with her income, the court held that there was no question "that such is a voluntary leaving without good cause attributable to the work and disqualifies the employee for benefits." Similarly, failure to receive a promotion does not give an employee good cause for leaving gainful employment for certain unemployment.

Claimant's reliance on Rider College v. Board of Review, 167 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 1979) is misplaced. In Rider College, the court held that leaving one's job to accept a "better" position does not equate to statutory "good cause." Id. at 47. Claimant did not leave her job with the Borough to take a "better" position with another employer, rather, she left because she was dissatisfied with the work conditions and because she had not received a desired promotion.

Claimant received benefits that she was not entitled to receive; therefore, she is liable for a refund of $9230 in benefits paid for the weeks ending January 22, 2005 through July 16, 2005, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). In Bannan v. Board of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App. Div. 1997), this court affirmed the proposition that full repayment of benefits is required from anyone "who, for any reason, regardless of good faith, was not actually entitled to those benefits." The court noted that the recovery of such benefits "furthers the purpose of the unemployment compensation laws" and emphasized that the Unemployment Trust Fund must be preserved "for the payment of benefits to those individuals entitled to receive them." Ibid. The court stressed that "[t]he public interest clearly is not served when the Unemployment Trust Fund is depleted by the failure to recoup benefits erroneously paid to an unentitled recipient, however blameless he or she may have been." Ibid. The court also stated in Bannan that, in situations involving refunds of unemployment benefits, the reluctance of courts to apply estoppel "is most warranted." Id. at 675. Admittedly, some claimants who are required to repay benefits may suffer hardship, but recoupment is crucial to the preservation of "the ongoing integrity of the unemployment compensation system." Ibid.

Moreover, the court in Bannan observed that "federal law requires that a state recover improperly paid unemployment compensation benefits." Ibid. Pursuant to federal law, the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) must ensure that all federal moneys it receives are used for the proper and efficient administration of the unemployment compensation laws. 42 U.S.C.A. 502(a). Federal law also requires that benefits be paid "when due." 42 U.S.C.A. 503(a)(1). This latter provision often results in payments being made upon an initial determination of eligibility that is subsequently overturned. See Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320, 1323-24 (W.D. Va. 1985) (holding that "benefits will be paid regardless of an appeal," thus resulting "in overpayments if, at the appellate hearing, it is determined that the recipient was not qualified to receive any benefits"), aff'd, 796 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1986). Because such payments are not "unemployment compensation," the moneys are not being used solely for the administration of the unemployment compensation laws and must be recouped. Bannan, supra, 299 N.J. Super. at 675.

Federal law notwithstanding, the Division is required by regulation to issue a demand for a refund of improperly paid benefits whenever a determination of overpayment is made. N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.1. The only time restriction the Legislature has placed on recoupment is that the Division must seek a refund "before four years have elapsed from the time the benefits in question were paid." N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). Here, the Division issued a timely request for a refund. Claimant has not requested a waiver of repayment pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2. Accordingly, claimant is properly liable for a refund of $9230 in benefits received.

The record in this case contains substantial credible evidence supporting the determination of the Board of Review that claimant is properly disqualified for receipt of unemployment compensation benefits from December 26, 2004, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), and liable for a refund of $9230 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). We, therefore, may not alter the agency decision. Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 71 (1985); Gloucester County Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 93 N.J. 384, 391 (1983); Doering v. Bd. of Review, 203 N.J. Super. 241, 245 (App. Div. 1985).

 
Affirmed.

The court noted the unpleasant fact that, in unemployment benefit cases, "virtually every recipient . . . relies upon the initial representation that benefits will be paid, uses the payments to meet expenses and faces difficulty repaying sums that are subsequently determined to have been erroneously disbursed." Bannan, supra, 299 N.J. Super. at 676.

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A-6253-07T2

June 19, 2009