NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. B.M.

(NOTE: The status of this decision is .)
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5904-07T45904-07T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

B.M.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF J.P., JR., A MINOR.

________________________________

 

Submitted: April 29, 2009 - Decided:

Before Judges C.L. Miniman and Baxter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FN-15-239-07.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attor ney for appellant (Mary Potter, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Anne Milgram, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa Raksa, Assistant Attor ney General, of counsel; Stephanie Anatale, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor J.P., Jr. (Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant B.M. appeals a June 3, 2008, final order termi nat ing this Title 9 abuse-or-neglect litigation due to the fil ing of a Title 30 guardianship complaint seeking to terminate defendant's parental rights. We affirm because plaintiff Divi sion of Youth and Family Services (the Division) proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant abused or neglected her one-year-old son, J.P., Jr. (the baby).

On May 27, 2007, the Division received a referral from the Berkeley Township Police Department alleging physical abuse by defendant of her sixteen-year-old son N.J.M. and stating that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time. The referral was investigated by Danielle Forshee, a Special Response Unit (SPRU) worker at the Division. At the May 30, 2007, hearing on the order to show cause instituting this action, defendant was represented by counsel. Forshee testified that she responded to the Berkeley Township Police Department and the police advised her that they had a report that there was some punching and slapping, defendant had been holding her baby dur ing the altercation, and the baby ended up on the couch or the floor.

Forshee testified that Patrolman Santucci told her that the police were going to file simple assault charges and he was con cerned about defendant because he saw her foaming at the mouth and appearing to be under the influence of some substance. San tucci explained that the police allowed defendant and her baby to leave with the maternal grandmother, who seemed to be "appro priate." Santucci understood that defendant was going to the Brick Police Department to file assault charges against her teenage son.

Forshee then went to the home of defendant's sister and brother-in-law where the altercation took place. The sister and brother-in-law had been supervising visitation between defendant and her teenage son. Defendant was no longer there, but her teenage son showed Forshee a superficial scratch on his middle finger, which he stated was a defensive wound as a result of his mother's attack on him. He stated that, about ten minutes after he had arrived, he confronted his mother about being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He related she was foaming at the mouth and he had seen her drinking. He explained that she had the same appearance as when she was abusing heroin and cocaine. This confrontation began the altercation.

Defendant's teenage son stated to Forshee that his mother stood up and "got in his face" and, while they were arguing, she swung at him, striking him on his lower right jaw. The baby then rolled out of her arm, landing on the couch, and the argu ment continued. When defendant threatened to kill her teenage son, the brother-in-law intervened. Defendant went into the kitchen and reached into a drawer; her son ran out of the house, fearing she was trying to get a knife. Defendant and her brother-in-law continued to struggle. The aunt grabbed the baby, ran outside, and the police arrived.

Forshee then went to the Brick Police Department. The police told her that defendant had been there attempting to file charges against her teenage son and her brother-in-law. The officer stated that defendant smelled like alcohol and "appeared wacky." Because the incident occurred in Berkeley, Brick would not accept the complaint.

Forshee next went to the family home in Brick, but defen dant and the baby were not there. However, she did speak to defendant's mother, who appeared to be under the influence of an unknown substance. She was having a very difficult time walking, was shuffling her feet, and was unable to focus on the conversation. She was very inconsistent with renditions of the story she was giving, but denied being under the influence of drugs and denied that anything occurred that day. Her vehicle was missing and she could not explain where it was, although she admitted that defendant did not have a driver's license. Forshee then left and went upstairs to interview the neighbor, who stated the last time he saw defendant was at 2:30 p.m., but that he did not personally know defendant or the grandmother.

About one hour later, the Brick police called Forshee to report that they found the grandmother under the influence walk ing in the rain and had discovered her car in a Pathmark parking lot. They reported that when they took her home, defen dant and the baby were in her apartment. Forshee then returned to interview defendant.

By now it was almost midnight. Defendant did not appear to be under the influence and refused to provide a drug screen. She admitted having one beer, but denied consuming any other alcohol that day. She stated that she had taken one Xanax at 9:30 a.m. and another at 12:30 p.m. Forshee asked for the pre scription bottle, which had been filled just two days before, and found that thirty-four pills were missing. Defendant said her mother had the missing medication, but the mother denied it. Defendant previously had been hospitalized for prescription drug abuse. She admitted that there was a physical altercation with her son, but denied threatening to kill him or trying to get a knife.

Forshee intended to institute a safety protection plan, hav ing concluded that defendant presented a substantial risk of injury to her two children. She and the police tried to iden tify someone to supervise defendant in the home with the baby, defendant's mother having been ruled out because she appeared to be under the influence of some substance. They asked a neighbor, who refused, and they asked the aunt, who also refused. They called the father, but he said he had been drink ing and could not drive. With no reliable person available to supervise, Forshee effected an emergency Dodd removal, took the baby for a preplacement physical, and effected a foster home placement.

Defendant's attorney carefully cross-examined Forshee. She testified that there had been prior Division involvement with this family. On December 18, 2006, there was an allegation of neglect respecting the baby when the mother and grandmother were involved in a domestic dispute and defendant threw a stroller at her mother, who was holding the baby, cutting the grandmother's lip. Forshee was not familiar with any services being provided in connection with the December incident. Forshee had also received a referral on May 10, 2006, while defendant was still pregnant as a result of a random urine screen that was positive for cocaine. Pursuant to a safety protection plan entered as a result of her drug use, defendant's mother was to supervise her with the baby.

Defendant and her mother also testified at the hearing on the order to show cause. Defendant testified that she had been in a methadone clinic and was "detoxed." She claimed that she had been clean for seventeen years, but relapsed in 2004. On the night in question, she was at her sister's home to visit her teenage son, who had been having some behavioral problems for which he had been treated at Summit Hospital.

Defendant further testified that on May 27, 2006, she had half a beer at 2:30 p.m., went for a walk and, when she entered the house, her teenage son had arrived. They conversed briefly with the baby still in a stroller next to her, but soon the exchange escalated into an argument. Her teenage son grabbed her by the neck, hit her in the temple, started beating her, and tried to choke her to death. Her sister took the baby in the stroller and ran out of the house. At that point, defendant's brother-in-law inter vened. She denied hitting her son or drop ping the baby. Defen dant then ran out of the house, took the baby, and started running and walking away until the police pulled up next to her. She testified that she went to the emer gency room on May 30 the first day of the hearing for treatment of the injuries she received three days earlier.

Defendant testified that her teenage son had been in alter cations with his father, who finally put him in a military school. She denied that she had been foaming at the mouth or that she was intoxicated. She explained that sometimes she gives her medication to her mother to hold because she "gets nervous." She had not consumed the missing medication; her mother had it. She explained that she had refused a urine screen because she thought Forshee was being hostile and "unpro fessional." Defen dant further denied that there was any physi cal altercation between herself and her mother in December 2006; the stroller was never thrown. Rather, her mother stood up as she picked up the stroller. She also testified that her mother had not been drinking on May 27, 2007, that she does not drink, and she does not do drugs. Finally, she testified that the alleged positive urine screen was a false positive because she had not used any cocaine in May 2006.

On cross-examination, defendant admitted that she was arrested as a result of the incident with her mother in December 2006, but explained that it was on an outstanding warrant in connection with a 2004 drug charge because she failed to pay the fine. She spent two weeks in jail while her mother cared for the baby.

Defendant's mother, who had been sequestered, testified that she was not present at the time of the incident on May 27. She dropped off her daugh ter and grandson at her other daugh ter's home and then she returned to her own home. An hour later she had to return to get her daughter and grandson. She had not been drinking; she does not drink or take any other substances. She takes no medi cation that would affect her gait, although she has arthritis in her knees.

Defendant's mother explained that she and defendant had an arrangement where she would hold defendant's Xanax for her, which she did on the evening of May 27. She explained that the missing pills had been lost down the sink in the bathroom. She, too, denied that defendant threw the stroller at her in December 2006, explaining that defendant walked past the stroller and it hit the grandmother in the mouth because she was sitting on the couch. She admitted that the police responded to this incident and that her daughter was arrested because she put in a complaint with the police. Her daughter had not been arrested because of any outstanding war rant. She admitted that she was very upset because she "never seen her push anything like that." She also admitted that there was a prior incident between her and her daughter on October 24, 2006, when the police became involved. She denied that defendant drank alcohol or used any illicit substances.

At the conclusion of this testimony, the Family Part judge agreed to ask the Division to consider defendant's mother as a placement for the child if defendant moved out of the her apart ment, but expressed concern about the prior difficulties she had acting as a supervisor for visitation, which led to the December 2006 assault. The judge permitted visitation super vised by the Division and set the return date of the order to show cause for June 26, 2007.

A fact-finding hearing was conducted on September 11, 2007. The Division reported that defendant did not submit to the urine screen on August 16, but she did complete a substance-abuse evaluation, which recommended a Level 2.1 intensive outpatient program (IOP). She had also participated in parenting classes and anger management. The Division requested that defendant follow through with the IOP, continue parenting and anger-management classes, attend individual therapy, and submit to random urine screens. The hearing then proceeded with testimony.

Corinne Jakalow, the Division caseworker, testified that the baby was fifteen months old at that time. Forshee, the SPRU worker, was no longer employed by the Division. Jakalow testi fied that the case file had been opened in May 2006. She described the two referrals the Division received thereafter. Defendant objected on the ground that Jakalow's testimony was hearsay, but the judge overruled that objection.

Jakalow testified that the fourth referral was on May 27, 2007. Jakalow briefly reviewed that occurrence, providing some more detail from the records about what the sister and her hus band said to Forshee. Specifically, Jakalow related that the Division's records indicated that the sister and her husband both told Forshee that, when defendant arrived at their home, she had a pint bottle of wine. Defendant took out the bottle, told them it contained pineapple juice and vodka, and she asked if they had cranberry juice to add to her drink. About thirty to forty-five minutes later, defendant took a little blue pill from a pre scription bottle in her purse and swallowed it. Later, defen dant's voice became "slurry" and she began foaming at the mouth. At that point, defendant's teenage son confronted her and the altercation ensued. They also reported that defendant threat ened to kill her teenage son and that the baby somehow landed on the couch.

Jakalow then testified that the Division found that a sub stantial risk of physical injury to the baby had been substanti ated against defendant because she was holding the baby while she was fighting with her teenage son, having consumed alcohol at the time of the incident. On cross-examination by defense counsel, Jakalow testified that the police report indicated that defendant had red marks around her neck, which she told the police were caused by her brother-in-law choking her. Ten docu ments, including the Division's summary reports from October 24, 2006, December 18, 2006, and May 27, 2007; the May 27, 2007, referral response report; and the Bayville police report from May 27, 2007, were moved into evidence without objection.

As her first witness, defendant called her sister, who had been sequestered. She testified that on May 27, 2007, at about 3:30 p.m. she went to the bus stop to pick up her teenage nephew for a visit with defendant, who had arrived about an hour and a half earlier. She returned to her house around 4:00 p.m. and everything seemed fine at first. However, within fifteen min utes her teenage nephew, "out of nowhere," suddenly pushed defendant and she and the baby ended up on the couch. She had never seen this happen before. The sister picked up the baby and left her house while her husband tried to get his nephew off defendant. Her neighbor called the police. She denied knowing that defendant consumed any alcohol and stated that the only pill she took was some Tylenol.

On cross-examination, the sister testified that a Division caseworker came to her home that evening and the police spoke with her, her husband, and her nephew. She was confronted with the police report, which indicated that she and her husband related that:

[defendant] became verbally abusive towards [N.J.M.], which caused an argument between them. They further stated that [defendant] then became physically abusive by throwing punches and scratching the above victim. Then they said that the victim pinned [defendant] against their couch and pleaded for her to calm down.

The sister denied making these statements to the police and denied that they were true. She also denied telling Forshee that defendant brought a wine bottle to her house with pineapple juice and vodka in it and that defendant helped herself to sev eral shots of brandy. She only admitted telling Forshee that defendant brought some pineapple juice to her house.

Defendant's brother-in-law, who had also been sequestered, testified that defendant and his nephew were arguing and his nephew pushed defendant, causing her and the baby to fall back wards onto the couch. Defendant then "went at" her teenage son, but the brother-in-law intervened. He did not see defendant consume any alcohol or take any drugs. On cross-examination, he admitted that the police and a Division caseworker came to his house. He denied telling the police that defendant was the aggressor, stating that she did not go after her teenage son until after he pushed her down. He did not remember telling Forshee that defendant helped herself to shots of brandy, although he did say there was brandy in the house. He also denied telling the police that he saw defendant take shots of brandy before the incident. He admitted that, when he inter vened, defendant was trying to get away from him and tore a chain off his neck.

The last sequestered witness to testify at the fact-finding hearing was defendant's mother. She repeated her earlier testi mony about the December 2006 incident, which she now claimed occurred while the baby was sleeping in his crib in his bedroom. With respect to the October 2006 incident, she testified that defendant did not throw a phone at her; rather, defendant dropped it at her feet. They had not been arguing. On cross-examination, she admitted that she called the police in December because she was upset.

The judge found that defendant's sister and brother-in-law both lied in order to help defendant. She rejected their testi mony as not credible and concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that the Division had "proven its case and that this child was placed at risk, and there was abuse and neglect involved here." The judge did "not believe that the grandmother is an appropriate caregiver here. She can't control her daugh ter, her older daughter, never mind take care of the child. She, herself, is afraid, obviously, or she wouldn't have called the police." A compliance review was scheduled for October 30, 2006. Appropriate services were ordered for defendant on September 11, 2006.

Compliance reviews occurred on October 30, 2007, and Janu ary 10, 2008, although defendant did not attend. On October 30, 2007, the Division reported that defendant had not yet followed up with treatment, had been late for visitation on October 5, and became very angry when she arrived at the Division office and realized that "she would not get her visit extended that day." The Division also reported that defendant was arrested on October 5 for stealing her mother's checks and assaulting both her mother and two police officers, causing defendant to spend five days in jail. Defendant also left a lengthy phone message on October 19 regarding visitation, which consisted of largely incoherent ramblings until the end when she began screaming and cursing at her mother and calling her names. These incidents caused the Division to be concerned about the efficacy of the anger manage ment treatment. The Division also reported that the father had not yet provided any names of possible relative caregivers.

A compliance review and permanency hearing was conducted on March 18, 2008. The Division reported that defendant attended her substance-abuse evaluation and was recommended for a Level 2 IOP through Counseling and Referral. The Division acceded to defendant's request to have both anger-management and substance-abuse treatment through Agape. It requested that defendant begin her individual counseling with St. Francis. The Division asked the court to permit it to simultaneously pursue on a dual track the inconsistent goals of care and custody as well as guardianship.

Defendant's attorney represented that defendant was com pletely compliant, having started anger management. Her IOP had been scheduled to start on March 17 and she was engaging in individual counseling. Defendant requested that her baby be placed with her mother because defendant was no longer in her mother's home. The Division was opposed to such placement because the baby had special needs and defendant's mother could not provide adequate care. The judge accepted the dual track and established a ninety-day time frame for moving forward. The judge agreed to review the denial letter and the appeal from it and consider the possibility of defendant's mother caring for the baby, although the judge expressed concern that she had lied on the witness stand during the fact-finding hearing.

The permanency order entered on March 18, 2008, established a dual track with the Division continuing to work with the mother and also termination of parental rights followed by adop tion. The judge found that reasonable efforts had been made by the Division respecting substance-abuse and psychological evaluations; referrals for parenting; anger-management and sub stance-abuse treatment; and had provided visitation. The judge also found that the baby was in need of permanency and required a permanency plan by June 18, 2008, with an interim compliance review.

The next compliance review was on May 1, 2008. The Divi sion reported that defendant's urine screen on March 18, 2008, was positive for barbiturates and that defendant had been incarcerated because she did not comply with Drug Court. The father had no family members able to care for the baby. Agape had reported that defendant was not compliant with its program and defendant had been scheduled to start Drug Court on April 22, 2008, and would be involved in Drug Court for two to three years. The Division requested that if defendant were released, she comply with the recommendations from Agape, comply with Drug Court, and comply with an updated psychological evaluation. The Division also reported that the father was opposed to defendant as a placement option because he feared for the baby's safety.

Defendant's attorney reported that defendant had been arrested for driving while her license was suspended and that she was currently in Drug Court. She asserted that her client took prescription medication for migraines, explaining the pres ence of barbiturates. She asserted that defendant was totally in compliance and that she was hoping to be released the follow ing week. The judge concluded that "we have to start looking around then for a different placement for this child," and that they needed to move forward with the termination of parental rights. At that point, defendant arrived from the county jail and engaged in a colloquy with the judge, acknowledging that she should not have driven while her license was suspended. The judge scheduled June 3, 2008, as the date for filing the guardianship complaint.

On June 3, 2008, the defendant was still in the county jail. When she arrived in court, she was served with the termi nation complaint. Defendant sought visitation for her mother and stated that she expected to be transferred from the county jail to a twenty-eight-day program. Defendant told the judge that she was in jail on a driving-while-intoxicated charge, not a drug charge. The Law Guardian sought kinship legal guardian ship, but the judge expressed that was not an option. The judge authorized placement of the baby with a preadoptive home, and an order terminating this litigation was entered that day. This appeal followed.

First, defendant contends that the judge improperly relied on inadmissible evidence offered by Jakalow at the fact-finding hearing, citing In re Cope, 106 N.J. Super. 336, 343-44 (App. Div. 1969), and on the teenage son's uncorroborated statements in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4), requiring reversal of the judge's determination that the baby was an abused or neglected child. Additionally, she contends that the casework ers' state ments about domestic violence between defendant and her mother were rebutted by the mother.

Second, defendant urges that the permanency order failed to include a provision requiring consideration of the baby's place ment with defendant's mother and failed to consider kinship legal guardianship simply because her mother had been a victim of domestic violence. In this context, she contends it was error for the judge to consider materials that were not marked into evidence relating to the father's accusations respecting the mother and also to consider the police report from her most recent arrest, which had not been moved into evidence, contrary to the requirements of New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245, 264 (App. Div. 2002).

As to defendant's second point on appeal, the Law Guardian has represented that the baby is in the process of being reuni fied with his father, rendering the issue of placement with defen dant's mother or kinship legal guardianship moot. Although we agree that it is moot, we also note that defendant has not accu rately characterized the basis for the judge's reluctance to consider her mother as a placement option. The judge clearly stated that she did not consider defendant's mother a viable placement option because in the past she had not been able to control defendant and protect herself or the baby from defen dant's abuse. The judge also expressed concern about defen dant's mother because she came to court and lied to the judge on the witness stand. These are perfectly valid reasons for being reluctant to consider such a placement.

Evidential rulings are generally committed to the sound dis cretion of the trial judge and we review them for a mistaken exercise of discretion so long as they are consistent with applicable law. State v. Fortin, 189 N.J. 579, 597 (2007); State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 568-69 (2004); Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli's Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 390 N.J. Super. 557, 563 (App. Div. 2007), aff'd, 194 N.J. 212 (2008). Rule 5:12-4(d) pro vides, "The Division of Youth and Fam ily Services shall be per mitted to submit into evidence, pursu ant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) and 801(d), reports by staff personnel or professional consult ants. Conclusions drawn from the facts therein shall be treated as prima facie evidence, subject to rebuttal."

There was no objection to the Division's three summary reports under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) and 801(d) and the conclusions of substantiated abuse or neglect therein were prima facie evi dence of same under this rule. That evidence was not rebutted by defendant and her witnesses. The judge specifically found that defendant's mother, her sister, and her brother-in-law all lied to the judge on the witnesses stand and the judge rejected their testimony as not credible. Inferentially, she rejected the testimony of defendant as not credible to the extent that it mirrored the testimony given by the rest of her family. As a consequence, it is clear that the summary reports and the conclusions therein were not rebutted by credible evidence.

With respect to the testimony of Jakalow, we considered the sufficiency of hearsay evidence in a termination of parental rights case. Cope, supra, 106 N.J. Super. at 343-44. In Cope, Bureau of Child Services staff members without personal knowl edge of the facts were permitted to testify to Bureau reports of the physical condition of the children while in the care of the Bureau and to reports that the defendant mistreated them while they were in her home. Id. at 341-42. We found very little competent evidence of even the potentiality for abuse and neglect. Id. at 342. Other than hearsay "reports" of mistreat ment in defendant's home, the only competent evidence was the testimony of an Englewood police officer who appeared at the defendant's apartment and found her holding an ironing cord and one of the children "in hysterics." Ibid. He found no evi dence of physical abuse and was unable to ascertain the cause of the child's crying. Ibid.

We observed that we were "presented with the difficult ques tion of what type of evidence is to be considered competent in a proceeding of this type." Id. at 343. On one hand, the parents' rights were substantial, but on the other, we were dealing with a statutory scheme to permit the Bureau to obtain guardianship. Ibid. We acknowledged that "a rule requiring all Bureau personnel having contact with a particular case to give live testimony on all the matters within their personal knowl edge would cause an intolerable disruption in the operation of the Bureau." Ibid.

As a result, it becomes necessary to allow certain evidence to be produced in a hearsay form while seeking to give full pro tection to the rights of the parent. In reaching this balance, we conclude that in cases of this type the Bureau should be per mitted to submit into evidence, pursuant to Evidence Rules 63(13) and 62(5), reports by Bureau staff personnel (or affiliated medi cal, psychiatric, or psychological consult ants), prepared from their own first-hand knowledge of the case, at a time reasonably contemporaneous with the facts they relate, and in the usual course of their duties with the Bureau.

[Ibid.]

We found that such reports "supply a reasonably high degree of reliability as to the accuracy of the facts contained therein." Id. at 344. We allowed the parent to rebut the information in the reports and committed the decision whether to call live witnesses to the discretion of the trier of facts. Ibid. We also cautioned that the admissibility of oral or writ ten reports from neighbors, the police, or other persons, was governed by the usual hearsay rules. Ibid. Because the Bureau's witnesses testified from written reports prepared by others, and because those written reports were provided to defendant or her counsel but were not placed in evidence, we concluded that we had "no way of knowing from the record whether the testimony fully and accurately reflected their contents." Ibid. As a consequence, we reversed and remanded for rehearing. Id. at 345.

This case is substantially different. First, the reports were moved into evidence and the content of the reports demon strates that Jakalow's testimony fully and accurately reflected their contents. Second, the pivotal referral response report from May 27, 2007, was prepared by Forshee, who testified on May 30, 2007, and submitted to cross-examination. Thus, the pivotal Division SPRU worker who investigated the abuse or neglect tes tified live and the judge had an opportunity to evaluate her credibility and contrast it with that of defendant and her wit nesses. Thus, Jakalow's testimony was not inadmissi ble and the judge did not err in relying on it and the documents moved into evidence.

After carefully reviewing the record in the light of the written arguments advanced by the parties, we conclude that the remaining issues presented by defendant are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A), (E), and we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial judge in her oral opinions delivered on September 11, 2007, March 18, 2008, and June 3, 2008. The findings and con clusions of the judge are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974).

Affirmed.

She also had been charged on seven occasions between 2001 and October 2006 with narcotics offenses.

The Dodd Act, as amended, is found at N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73.

According to the Division's December 18, 2006, screening summary, the Brick police advised the Division that the baby slid down the grandmother's leg and she picked him up. Defendant became upset and started to argue with the grandmother. Defendant then threw a stroller at the grandmother, which burst her lip open. Defendant told the police that she was on methadone, but was still "using"; she was arrested. The grandmother told the police that she was filing for a temporary restraining order. The Division substantiated abuse.

According to the Division's screening summary for October 24, 2006, after the argument, defendant took the grandmother's car, left home, and became involved in an accident. The Brick Police Department advised the Division that they discovered a crack pipe in the car and that defendant was driving while intoxicated. The summary also indicates that the grandmother had obtained a temporary restraining order and that she had the baby in her care.

The one-milligram Xanax is a small blue bill. Physicians' Desk Reference 332 (56th ed. 2002).

No transcript of this compliance review was supplied to us.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-5904-07T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

June 2, 2009