JOHN REIMERS v. CHESTERFIELD TOWNSHIP

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5627-07T35627-07T3

JOHN REIMERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHESTERFIELD TOWNSHIP,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted May 18, 2009 - Decided

Before Judges Carchman and R. B. Coleman.

On appeal from the New Jersey Tax Court,

Docket No. 008831-2007.

John Reimers, appellant pro se.

Parker McCay, attorneys for respondent

(John C. Gillespie, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff John Reimers appeals from a judgment of the Tax Court involuntarily dismissing his complaint against defendant Chesterfield Township challenging the 2007 assessment on the property. We affirm.

The property in question is located at 125 Sykesville Road, Chesterfield Township and consists of three acres. The improvements include a single-family home constructed in 1925 with a livable area of 2,480 square feet. The out-buildings on the property include a barn (3,168 square feet), a detached garage (480 square feet), a one-story shed (1,380 square feet), another one-story shed (406 square feet) and a third small shed. The total assessment for the property was $520,300, allocated at $230,000 for land and $290,300 for the improvements.

Plaintiff appealed his 2007 assessment to the County Tax Board, which affirmed the assessment. Thereafter, plaintiff appealed to the Tax Court. At trial, plaintiff presented various documentation that included an amalgam of information gleaned from construction code permit documents and other sources. No comparable sales were presented but "values" that plaintiff then cobbled together to generate a value for his property. At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 4:37-2(b). The judge granted the motion, dismissed the complaint, and this appeal followed.

We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that plaintiff's arguments are without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the following comments.

In granting the motion, Judge Menyuk said:

The plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which the Court could determine the value of the subject property. There was a single comparable sale introduced by the plaintiff in this case which there are certain comparisons made, but I have no idea how to value the differences in the two properties. One is attached to a farm as part of a homestead for a farm and the other is apparently just a 2.54 acre piece of property with no farm. Whether that makes it more or less desirable, I don't know, but I don't think they're particularly comparable.

The fact that there is a fairly significant difference in the size of the well, there's some difference in the size of the properties. One is new, one is old, or newer I guess. There had been replacements made on the comparable sale. But again, I just, you haven't provided me with any way that I can compare these two properties. I don't even have, I guess, pictures. I don't know where they're they're located three miles apart. You've described them both as being rural. And all these properties are apparently derived from an appraisal report and we don't have the benefit of the appraisal here to even examine that appraiser as to whether or not this is an accurate description.

The judge noted that plaintiff had failed to provide either meaningful comparables or a sound basis for the challenged valuation of his property.

In reviewing appeals from the Tax Court, certain basic principles apply. First, generally, we will defer to the expertise of the Tax Court as this is a highly specialized, complex area. Pan Chem. Corp. v. Hawthorne Boro., 404 N.J. Super. 401, 406 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 2 009 N.J. LEXIS 387 (N.J. Mar. 20, 2009). In Pan, we identified the second principle that informs our decision.

There is a presumption that tax assessments made by the proper authority are correct and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove otherwise. Pantasote Co. v. Passaic, 100 N.J. 408, 413 (1985) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Newark, 10 N.J. 99, 104-105 (1952)). The taxpayer cannot meet this burden unless it has presented the reviewing tribunal with "sufficient competent evidence to overcome the presumption, that is, to establish a true valuation of the property at variance with the assessment." Ibid. "In other words, it is not sufficient for the taxpayer merely to introduce evidence: the presumption stands until sufficient competent evidence is adduced to prove a true valuation different from the assessment." Ibid. "Such evidence must be definite, positive and certain in quality and quantity to overcome the presumption." Ibid. Even where the assessment methodology is incorrect, the deficiency does not necessarily "manifest an arbitrary or capricious discharge of the assessor's responsibilities, . . . so long as the quantum of the assessment appears to be a reasonable approximation of fair value." Pantasote Co., [supra,] 100 N.J. at 415.

[Pan Chemical, supra, 404 N.J. Super. at 412.]

In dismissing the complaint, Judge Menyuk concluded that plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption with "competent evidence."

We are satisfied that the judge's conclusions were supported by the record. We affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint for the reasons set forth in Judge Menyuk's thoughtful and thorough oral opinion of May 14, 2008.

Affirmed.

 

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-5627-07T3

June 24, 2009


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