NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. P.L.B IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.C.O.B., a minor

(NOTE: The status of this decision is .)
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4473-07T44473-07T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

P.L.B.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF N.C.O.B., a minor.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted April 21, 2009 - Decided

Before Judges Wefing, Parker and Yannotti.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-252-01.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Chanima K. Odoms, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Anne Milgram, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Suzanne J. Shaw, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor N.C.O.B. (Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant P.L.B. appeals from an order entered on March 6, 2008 terminating her parental rights to her son N.C.O.B. The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. P.L.B. is the biological mother of five children, the four oldest of whom were emancipated at the time N.C.O.B. was born on May 17, 1999. The child tested positive for barbiturates, opiates and cocaine at birth. His biological father, J.F., defaulted and his parental rights were also terminated in the March 6, 2008 order.

The Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) first became involved with defendant in 1989 when her four older children were still minors. After numerous referrals and several years of supervision, the four children were removed from defendant's custody in 1995 and placed with their maternal grandmother.

In January 2000, DYFS received a referral from Saint Barnabas Hospital because N.C.O.B. had been admitted with second and third degree burns over seven and one-half percent of his body. Defendant had told the admitting doctor that N.C.O.B. may have rolled onto a steam radiator pipe while she was answering the telephone. The burn surgeon, however, reported that he smelled alcohol on defendant's breath when the child was admitted and considered her explanation inconsistent with the child's injuries. The child remained in the hospital from January 29 to March 28, 2000. Thereafter, he was placed in foster care.

In a report dated March 27, 2000, Raksha Gajarawala, M.D., a pediatric consultant for DYFS, reported that the child suffered from second and third degree burns on his face from his lip to his right ear, including his right cheek; his forehead; the right side of his eye; his right thumb, palm and forearm; and his left index finger, palm, wrist and forearm. Dr. Gajarawala opined "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that the child's injuries were non-accidental. She was not satisfied that "an accurate explanation" as to how the injury occurred had been provided by defendant.

Defendant was referred for a substance abuse assessment, parenting skills training and a psychological evaluation. The substance abuse evaluation, completed on February 2, 2000, indicated that defendant started to use heroin around 1992 and was then using two bags a day. She reported, however, that she was enrolled in a treatment program and on methadone. It was recommended that defendant be placed in intensive inpatient treatment with random drug screenings.

In September 2000, Leslie J. Williams, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, performed a psychological evaluation of defendant for DYFS. During that evaluation, defendant stated that she had been using heroin since 1983, rather than 1992 as she had stated during the substance abuse evaluation. Even though she was enrolled in a treatment program, defendant acknowledged that she had used heroin two weeks prior to the evaluation. After completion of the evaluation, Dr. Williams concluded that defendant was not prepared to care for the child at that time.

The child was placed with T.P., his paternal aunt, in November 2000. Some time thereafter, however, T.P. moved to Georgia and left the child in defendant's care. Defendant retained custody of the child for nine months before DYFS learned that T.P. had left New Jersey. In June 2003, DYFS advised T.P. that the child would not be placed with her permanently because her home in Georgia could not accommodate the child.

In December 2003, the child was placed with T.B., his adult sister. In October 2004, defendant and the child's biological father agreed to make an identified surrender to T.B., and the parents' rights were terminated to facilitate adoption by T.B.

After three years in T.B.'s care, however, DYFS had received several referrals regarding the child and ultimately removed him from T.B.'s custody and placed him in a therapeutic foster home, where he remained until trial. The parents' identified surrender to T.B. was vacated on April 18, 2007, but the permanency plan of terminating parental rights followed by adoption was reaffirmed as appropriate.

N.C.O.B. is a special needs child who has been diagnosed with global developmental delays, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), multiple learning disabilities (MLD) and hypotonia. The child had been placed in an early intervention program and by the time of trial, he was in a school that provided him with a one-on-one aide. At trial, the DYFS adoption caseworker, Cleo Crosley, testified that adoption was in the child's best interest because it would provide him with stability. She testified that numerous relatives had been assessed to determine if the child could be placed with them, but no suitable candidates were found. The plan was to terminate parental rights and facilitate the child's adoption by his current foster parent who was addressing his special needs and had a strong interest in adopting him.

At trial, defendant admitted to abusing drugs for approximately fifteen years. She testified that she had participated unsuccessfully in various drug treatment programs over the years, and maintained that she was currently enrolled in a program and had successfully abstained from drug use for six months. She did not, however, have a job or independent housing and had not completed the parenting skills or anger management programs recommended to her by DYFS.

Andrew P. Brown, III, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, performed psychological and bonding evaluations for DYFS. In his evaluation, Brown diagnosed defendant as suffering from adult antisocial behavior, mood disorder NOS and personality disorder NOS. He also found features of obsessive-compulsive personality, dependent personality and borderline personality disorders.

Brown reported that defendant's use of narcotics "compromised her ability to adequately protect [the child] as well as provide an environment that is suitable, predictable and sustainable for him." Brown found that defendant was at risk to endanger the welfare of the child as a result of "poor judgment and decision-making." He concluded "within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty" that defendant was not prepared to fulfill her parenting obligations and that her prognosis was poor.

The bonding evaluation indicated that the child would not suffer any degree of psychological harm if defendant's parental rights were terminated. Brown noted further that the child was non-responsive to defendant and indicated that he was afraid of defendant and did not want to live with her or any member of his family. Brown opined that it was in the child's best interest to find a permanent placement for him.

Gerard A. Figurelli, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, conducted a psychological bonding evaluation for defendant. Figurelli testified that defendant did not suffer from any clinically significant symptoms of depression or feelings of hopelessness or helplessness. He further found that defendant exhibited "borderline traits in the overall organization and functioning of her personality" requiring further psychiatric evaluation, particularly to assess the need for treatment for her reported mood disorder. In his view, defendant's substance abuse was in "early full remission." He further indicated that the child was pleased to see defendant and engaged in "verbal interaction" with her. In his view, the child appeared to feel "safe" and "comfortable" with defendant. He did not, however, find that they had a bonded relationship but believed that such a relationship could be cultivated. In his opinion, terminating defendant's parental rights would do the child more harm than good.

In its written opinion, the trial court found that DYFS proved "by clear and convincing evidence" each of the four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).

In this appeal, defendant argues:

POINT ONE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT.

A. The evidence adduced at trial did not support the court's finding that the State met prong two of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) as [P.L.B.] is willing and able to provide a safe and stable home for her child and the delay in permanent placement will not add to the harm as N.C.O.B. is not in a prospective adoptive home.

B. The evidence adduced at trial did not support the court's finding that the State met prong four of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) as termination of [P.L.B.]'s parental rights will do more harm than good to N.C.O.B.

We have carefully considered the extensive record in light of defendant's arguments and the applicable law. We are satisfied that defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the thorough, well-reasoned written opinion rendered by Judge Margaret M. Hayden on March 6, 2008.

Affirmed.

 

(continued)

(continued)

8

A-4473-07T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

June 18, 2009